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j ■ ABSTRACT 
i ■ ' " ' ' 
i ^ ■ ,
• I ■ ■ ■ . , • 
This report describes the development of commercial banks
 
" j ■ ■ 
.[■ . ■ . 
in Russiaj and role of government and Central. B.ank in 
advance oif Russian financial system. First banks appeared 
j, ■ . ■ ■ . . ' ^ , 
in late sjos - early ROs as soon as they were legally
i ■ ■ , ■ ■ 
permitted using the capital created by distribution of 
state funds and assets and with trade operations involving 
■I ■ 
natural Resources. Further, banks were adapting to 
extremely unstable economic situations. Instability of 
' I ■ ■ 
■ 1 ■ " " ■ 
political and economical environment determined the 
j , ■ . 
orientation of banks' activities on short-term profits 
rather tden on building long-term foundation for normal 
■ ■ i 
functioning. In order to provide such profits, banks got 
. i . ■ , ■ ■ 
involved!in foreign exchange operations, short-term (up to 
, , . i • . ■ • ■ 
a year.) jLending, governmental securities trade, and in 
j ■ , ■ . 
creation!of FIGs - affiliate enterprises supported by
 
■■ j ■ ■
 
banks, cjrisis of August 1998 became a sound culmLination of 
consequehces of every wrong step that had been taken by 
' ■ ■ ■ . ! ' ■ 
banks' management and Russian government. Today, high 
i 
operating, default, and liquidity risks and governmental 
i , , : 
practices make Russian banks unsafe for long-term 
i 
I . ■ . ■ ■ 
1 ■ ■ . 
relationships, but likely profitable for short-term gains. 
I ■ ■ ■ ■ 
! ■ ■ ■ . ii.  
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I CHAPTER ONE 
. ■ I 
! ' 
. . 
■ ■ 
■ 
■ 
■ 
■' 
■ ■ , 
j INTRODUCTION 
1 
! ' ' ' ■ " ■ 
In decent years, foreign investors considered Russia 
' I ■ ' ■ 
as risky but potentially profitable market. Hedging funds 
[ 
and port.fjolio managers were actively involved in dealing 
with Russian governmental securities. But to successfully 
■ ■ i ^ ■ . ■ 
conduct business in any country presence of developed or at 
least normally functioning banks are necessary. 
Thi.^ research is thought to describe the current 
situation for commercial banks in Russia as a mirror of 
developing economic reforms in the country with detailed 
analysis of reasons and consequences of crisis of August 
1998. Itjtouches also question of money laundering that 
stronglyjaffect the activities of commercial banks. This 
paper car| be useful to not only financial majors or 
potential investors but also to any business entrepreneur 
' ■ ■ ! ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ' ■ . ■ . ■ 
who is thinking of doing business with Russian companies. 
. Thejdata, presented and analyzed in this report was 
collectec^ form numerous business magazines, newspapers, and 
web pages in USA and Russia. ,No specific researches that 
! ■ ■ ' ■ • ' ' ■ 
utilize Whole area presented in this report were found ­
i ■ , , ■ . 
i ■ ■ ' ' ' ■ ■ ' the information was collected piece by piece. However, some 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russian sjources are thought to be neutral and objective in
 
their evajluations; and some particularly detailed articles
 
■ about spejcific sides like legal environment of banking 
i ■ ■■ • 
industry |or historical development of commercial banks,
 
were very directing and beneficial. . .
 
Devellopment of commercial banks in Russia, was shown
 
■ ! ■ , ■ . - ■ ■ 
from histdrical perspective, in connections with the
 
' I ' ' '
 
general pdo^^^ss of ma.rket .reforms in the country.
 
Due Ito the large amount of the different data sources,
 
the biggeist problem faced during this research was , the
 
1 " ■ ■ ■ ■ .
 
contradictory statistical num.be.rs - especially for
 
historical trends. Presented data was chosen by majority
 
principle;, as less emotional and biased data, or as imply
 
t . ■ ■ . ■ ■ ■ . " ■ ■! ■ ■ - ■ 
averaged.! Nevertheless, although generally all presented
 
i ' . . .
 
inforraati'on is correct from.author's perspective, there is
 
a possibility of mistake in the preciseness of numbers.
 
i Functions of Commercial Banks
 
Banking crisis is long-standing inability of the
 
majority .of the banks to fulfill their obligations and.
 
responsifcjilities to their partners and customers. In
 
i . ■ ■ ■ ■ , .
 
particular, obligations of payments, responsibilities for
 
investor^ and depositors of banks, bankruptcies and
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
liquidati,bns of. banking branches and filials. More banks
 
are!" invol|ved into critical conditions of operations, harder
 
are the cjonsequences of such economic crisis which can
 
affect exjistence of the whole banking industry of the
 
country ejspecially if involved are the banks with higher
 
i ■ ■
 
volumes of operation in the industry.
 
{ ■ . ■ ' ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ i: ■ , , ■ ■ . . ■ . . 
Crisis of 1998 was a result of external financial 
troubles jof Rirssian banking system such as almost
 
■ ■ . i ■ • ■ ■ , ■ ' ' 
bankruptdy of the government, sharp devaluation of national 
currency,] and break up of financial markets, as well as 
internaljstructural weaknesses: management mistakes, low 
I . ■ ' ■ , ■ 
level oficapitalization, inadequate evaluation and 
.estimation of risks,, weak development of real banking 
businesses. Magnitude of losses in crisis of 1998 was
 
estimated .as 50-60% of country's whole banking system
 
i ■ ■ ■ ■ ' . 
capital.j
 
Financial interm.ediaries facilitate the capital
 
formation process by efficiently directing the flow of
 
funds frbm lenders to borrowers. When current income
 
exceeds purrent consumption, desires, people tend to save
 
I . '■ .. ■ ' ■ .
 
the excess. Or when people deliberately lay aside part of
 
^ S. I Aleksashenko. Banking Crisis: Does Fog Go Away? Questions of 
Economics,! 5/1999.
 
. i ■ , ■ . .. ■ ' ■
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
their income in order to get higher returns in future,
 
I ■ " ' . . ' ■ , _ . • • .
 
excess of funds created. These resources become available
 
1 ■ ■ ■ , ■ 
! • . ■ ' ■ ■ . . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ' . . ■ 
for investment purposes. However, coordinating savings and
 
i ■ ■ 
investing is difficult because .many different participants
 
are involved in this process. Coordinating such process is 
i ■ ■ ■ • ■ . ■ 
primary function of financial services industry. The major 
representatives of financial industry are banks..
 
Marjcet-driven banks compete to attract savings by
 
offering!the highest deposit rates that are consistent with
 
their cost structure and revenue stream. At the same time,
 
they compete to lend to creditworthy customers by offering
 
. 1 ■ . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ , 
the lowekt lending rates that will cover overhead costs and
 ■ I ■ . . . . 
interestj payments on deposits.
 
To write about Russian banks is challenging because
 
. . I , • ■ ■ , ■ ■ ■ . 
Russian banks are not financial intermediaries in the
 
Western iDanking glossary meaning - basic rules of banking
 
may not japply "to Russian banks. For example, changes in
 
supply and demand on funds, interest rates, and conditions
 
of borrowing in Russia are just barely following Western
 
style lojgic. Not, many economists . consider banking in Russia
 
even as jseparate industry or as basis for development of
 
nation's economy.
 
  
 
 
Due jto specific conditions, commercial banks in Russia
 
were evoljving as profit,oriented non-production
 
organizat|ions. For Russian banks actual lending, especially
 
for long-jterm, takes far smaller part of activities than
 
for West^'rn banks. They are oriented on getting profits
 
today, ncjt next year, and not even tomorrow. The most
 
■ ! ' ■ . 
popular dctivities are foreign currency exchange and
 
"i ■ . • ■ " ' 
manipulatiions with governmental bonds.
 
Anotiher specific tradition is the close relationships
 
i ■ ■ ■ ■ ' 
with clients and partners. Tell me who your friends are,
 
and I wi.il tell you who you are - Russian folklore idiom.
 
became ttjie strategy among businessmen and bankers in
 
today's Russia,^ Relying on personal connections in business
 
became traditional diplomacy in Russia.
 
Most of the functions performed by commercial banks
 
may be- dtvided. into few categories:
 
■ • ■ ■ i ■ ■ . . ■ ■ ■ ■ . r ■ ■ ■ . 
• .Paymehts - creating and efficiently transferring the
 
natior|'s miean of payment. Because an efficient payment
 
systenj is vital to a stable economy, banks are the
 
essence of payment system.
 
Thfe R-as.sian ■ F-conn^ctioiis. Problems of Post-Coirimunism, Section': 
E'crmal IriS'titutions 1/1999. 
  
 
 
 
• Interrriediation. Commercial banks intermediate between
 
those who have money (savers or depositors) and those who
 
need money (borrowers). To the savers or depositors,
 
commercial banks offer various types of deposits that
 
meet the needs of those customers better than alternative
 
uses c
f funds. To attract depositors banks provide
 
deposit instruments with low denomination, low risk, and
 
. high 1iquidity. Banks are able then to package large
 
amount, of small deposits and lend those fuhds to
 
borrov\ers V
 
• Provicing trust services to individuals and business
 
firms
 
• Financing international trade.
 
• Offering financial planning and securities related
 
services (brokerage, and investment banking, related
 
services).
 
• Off-balance sheet risk taking .(generating fee income by
 
assumj.ng certain Gontingent liabilities); and insurance
 
and real estate related activities,.
 
: During. Soviet Era, the main functions of Central Bank
 
and its subsidiaries were to provide stable and reliable
 
.payment transferring system and provide distribution, of
 
  
state budlget's subsidies. Although payment system was
 
inefficient and slow, it was operating. Another function of
 
the bank Was to help enterprises to meet the targets for
 
output an^ investment that had been laid down in the
 
■ ! . ■ ■ 
governmen^t's annual plan for the economy. The Bank
 
performed! this function by putting,at the disposal of the
 
enterprisjes the necessary amount of credit to realize the
 
i. ■ ' ' ' ■ . ■ 
"planned"! transactions. 
■ i ■ ■ , . . ■ . ■ 
Othejr functions did not exist at all or were provided
 
through cjentral Bank with governmental central control.
 
Both priCjds and credits served primarily as accounting
 
tools. Eniterprises paid each other by instructing the Bank
 
to affect! a transfer from one deposit (or overdraft)
 
account tjo another, and the Bank would - more or less
 
automatidally - permit overdrafts to accumulate. Plan
 
prices weire state-determined and were adjusted very
 
infrequerjtly. Interest rates, which were also changed
 
infrequently, bore little relation to the return on
 
Gapital. the system left no role for profits, as a
 
motivating factor. , \ .
 
Althjough banks in Russia) were always present, history
 
of cornmefcial independent banks has . started just recently.
 
In the cQuntry where planned .economy existed for a 70 years
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and Centrjal Bank's functions were mostly to control
 
payments jtransfers; development of commercial independent
 
■ 'J ■ , ■■ ■ •■ 
banks wasj interdependent with development of market economy 
reforms. 
Personal Connections 
! ' . . . ■ . , ,
Coordinating movements of the securities from lenders 
i ■ ■ . ■ 
to borrowers may have form of direct or indirect transfers. 
' ■ ! 
i . ' 
Direct transfers - face-to-face negotiations - considered 
inefficient from point view of Western style banking 
■ i ; ■ . ■ ' " • ■ ■ ■ 
because df the additional costs incurring duririg process of 
matching jneeds of borrowers and lenders. From. Russian point 
view, it |is primary duty of bank's top officials to search 
i ■ ■ . . . . , . ■ 
for trustable and reliable clients.^ 
■ I , ■ ; ■ ' . \ , ' ■ ­
In an economy where nonpayment of debts is contagious, 
i 
i ■ . /
there is'no tradition of loan repayment and there is no 
i . 
legal recourse for defaulting on a loan because of the 
Soviet practice of subsidies. Under these circumstances, 
the F-cormection serves as a. minimum protection against 
irresponsible borrowers and dishonest dealers. Reacting to 
the riskh of lending, many banks cohcentfate on a few v/ell-
The Russian F-conne.ctions. Probleras of Post-Cominunism^ Section: 
Formal Institutions 1/19,99. • 
 known customers, develop veryclose patron-client
 
relations, and. remain suspicious toward outsiders.
 
® Relying on personal connections,in business became
 
traditional tactic in Russia. If one would ask today's
 
Russian bankers and businessmen about the early days of
 
their careers, businessmen would refer to personal
 
connections: friends or relatives inyited them to work, a
 
family member telephoned a manager to refer them as
 
potential candidates for vacant positions, or former
 
colleagues recommended them to bosses.^ New Russian
 
businesses reconnect friends, classmates, former coworkers,
 
and extended families. Russians believe their tradition of
 
heart-td hard conversations is superior because it builds
 
trust, makes people be involved and interdependent with
 
each other, and creates usually long-lasting relationships.
 
The network of personal connections known as blat
 
provided access to information and resources. The pattern
 
of krugovaya poruka -circular support and responsibilities
 
".ensured an interconhected cover-up of activities,
 
including illegal ones. Patron - client relationships.are
 
nurtured by the risks of doing business in Russia. Groups,
 
The. Russian F-connections. Problems of Post-Communism/ Section:
 
Formal Institutions 1/1999. . , •
 
 or clans, or gruppirovkas, function as cooperatively
 
organized entity pursuing its own interests,^
 
Personal connections provide security and certainty of
 
business It is very important for such groups to have
 
support or be connected to powerful businessman or leader.
 
From another side, as good as it gets to have powerful.
 
friends, strong connections, and to belong to.respected 
group, as; much dangerous it became to interfere with other 
■clans' interests.. 
Tho profitable, banking in Russia is a.dangerous 
business Armies of security guards are no guarantee 
against hostile competitors and criminals. .The president of 
one bank: stated: "Nothing can save one from a contract 
killer, and anything less than the security service of the 
president of a country is ineffective." As an alternative, 
he suggested personal connections as :a reliable means of 
protecti-on. Another bank founder and president prided, 
himself on his access to a large social network, regarding 
it '.as a guarantee against the >Goilapse .of his bank He 
.said: "If you a.sk me nO"w to name all my, friends and 
■ '.The Rnssian F-connections. Problems of Post-Communism^ Section: 
Formal•In titutions 1/1999., 
, 10 
acquaintances, I can give you 10,000 names - who, where,,
 
and why. All this information is in my head."^
 
Bankers and leading Russian businessmen prefer to ,
 
speak in,plural of themselves: - "we", rather then "I." .
 
Bankers describe their commercial space as a "village," in
 
which everyone knows everyone else, and where business
 
deals depend on evaluations of people as well as projects.
 
In the words of one of the businessman: "Much business is
 
done on intuition and, on the knowledge of the personal
 
qualities of your, partners.. If an intelligent, wise as
 
Solomon, Muscovite takes my position; he would not
 
accomplish what I, can. He does not know the specifics of
 
St. Petersburg, of its banks, of the people behind these
 
banks...: St. Petersburg is a small town for us. Moscow is,
 
the same for Muscovites: everyone knows each other,
 
although the population there is twice,as large.^"
 
Moscow became a cent.ral point where all biggest deals
 
are made, capital of Russian capitalism. The city makes up
 
to six parcent,of Russian population, but attracts two­
^ Th Russian F-corinections. Problems,of Post-Coininunism^ Section:
 
Formal Institutions.. 1/1999.
 
The Russian F-connections,. Problems of. Post-Communism^ Section:
 
Formal.Institutions. 1/1999.
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thirds of foreign investment and provides 24 percent of the
 
country tax revenue. Majority of Russian banks are Moscow-

based.
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i
 CHAPTER TWO
 
i . DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING INDUSTRY
 
1985 - 1991: First Private
 
Capital
 
In 1985 perestroika movement was thought to modernize
 
the Soviet system of production and distribution by opening
 
' ■ ■ i . ■ ' ■ 
Russia tcj the world market with intentions of introducing
 
advancedjtechnology, to diversify the Soviet economy so
 
that it would be less dependent on sale of raw materials,
 
and raising the basic standard of living. Government
 
permitted opening of private companies and allowed direct
 
dealing: with foreign firms without central control and
 
intervention.
 
Thejbest and easiest way to earn money in end of the
 
80s and e:arly 9,0s was to buy materials such as metals or
 
oil at low, state-controlled prices'in, Russia and then
 
resell tHem abroad at world, prices; In early 1990, for
 
example, ithe Moscow free-market price of a package of
 
i ■ ■ ^ ■ . 
Marlboro(Cigarettes was 30 rubles - exactly the same price 
as a ton of crude oil.^ In 1988, state enterprise managers 
^ Russian Corruption And Money Laundering (L.H. Suimners). FDCH. 
Congressional Testimony, ■ 9/21/99. 
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were allbwed to set up private cooperatives for arbitrage
 
with "their" government-owned businesses. Managers of state
 
oil compjanies bought oil from :their enterprises privately,
 
obtained! export licenses and .quotas from corrupt officials,
 
and sold the oil abroad at the market price.^ This situation
 
created jopportunities for quick fortunes to be made by
 
those wh!o were able to purchase oil domestically and then
 
I .' " ' . ■ 
1 ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ . ' ' ■ ■ • ■ 
resell i|t overseas. From different sources, from 30 and up
 
60 percent of GDP was lost in this type of business in 1990
 
- 1992. |ln 1992, the Russian price of oil was still one
 
percent jof the world market price. Eventually, after 1992,
 
the refdrmers succeeded in deregulating commodity prices,
 
but only after few managers had extracted billions of
 
I ' ' "
 
dollars ifrom their state enterprises.

i . ,
 
Ancjther way of making big money in this period was
 
through food - import subsidies. Slowdown of internal
 
production of food and agriculture products in the winter
 
of 1991-1:92 caused the reformers inability to cancel the
 
existing subsidies for food. A food importer paid only one
 
percent of the going exchange rate when purchasing
 
essential foods from abroad, but could resell them
 
^ Winner Takes It All. Foreign Affairs, 9/1/99.
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relatively freely on the domestic.market and pocket the
 
subsidy.
 
These imports were paid for with .Western
 
"humanitarian" export credits that were added to Russia's
 
state debt. Total import subsidies were 17.5 percent of
 
Russia's.GDP in 1992. These profits were highly
 
concentrated, benefiting a limited number of traders in
 
Moscow who operated through the old state agricultural
 
monopolies,
 
Altogether, the gains from these two business
 
activities amounted to no less than 79 percent of GDP in
 
1992. Most of the profits, billions of dollars, were highly
 
concentrated among a small elite - tight inner circle of
 
governmental officials, their friends, and relatives who
 
had access to useful resources, and information. Inside
 
informat on, insider lending, and insider privatization
 
were the key tools of this, distribution.^
 
Before perestroika the banking system in Russia
 
consiSte.d of Central Bank and its regional branches and few
 
government controlled specialized banks. Functions of
 
Central 1
Bank were to provide payments system, accept
 
winner Takes It All. Foreign Affairs^ 9/1/99.
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savings f|rom people, and print additional money to cover
 
■ i ■ , ■ ■ ■ 
budget dejficit when government spent more than it was
 
supposed to. Central Bank had specialized branches, such as
 
Sberbank !- Savings bank that accepted deposits from people,
 
Vneshtorg'bank - state trade bank, .and-Vnesheconombank ­
■ ' . j , ' ' 
bank that} dealt with international operations of Russia. 
Less important branches included Selhosbank that served
 
farms - liolhoz- and agricultural organizations; Industrial
 
bank - served production companies especially in natural
 
. i . ■ 
f , ■ ' ■ ■ ' ' 
resourced, heavy machinery and equipment industries.
 
, i . ' ■ . ■ 
Securities markets were,virtually absent. 
The.jrecent monetary history of Russia begins in the
 
■ I ■ ■ ■ ■ ' ' 
late perestroika period, when the Central Bank printed vast
 
I .
 
quantities of money to finance an out-of-control budget,
 
while the government used strict price controls to limit
 
i ' ' ' ■ ■ ■ 
inflation. 
By l|:he end of 1991, when the Soviet Union became
 
Russia and Boris Yeltsin declared the disbandment of 
i ' ■ 
Co.mraunist Party, there were about five times as many rubles
 
in circulation as were needed to finance national income.^
 
i . ■ . ■ 
Presencejof money excess not supported by appropriate
 
^ When Property Is Theft. Reason, 12/98,
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1 
quantity of goods called fot hyperinflation,'long lihes.
 
and empty stores that symbolized that period. Before 

reforms, .during. Soviet era, people^ were .allowed to save • but:
 
not to invest. Investment as an option of money managing .
 
did not exist at all. People were trying to save for
 
retirement by laying aside part of their wages. During,the
 
hyperinflation of 1992-1993 most of these savings were
 
simply lost. For example, money that would have bought a
 
cottage in south would now buy a winter coat. Money saved
 
by a pensioner to pay ,for the.burial would buy only a
 
candle.
 
l:99l 1994:'Growth , " ■ ' . 
This period can be characterized by explosion of new 
banks: tle numbe.r of registered credit organizations rose 
from 1,1 DO to 2,600. It can be explained by low 
requirements of starting capital and by attraction of 
banking business due to high profitability potentials of 
high inflation and continuous fall of the ruble.•In early, 
1991 Russia transformed all 900 regional branches of 
specialized govefnraeht .,banks, on Its terfitory.into 
independent banks, .ths■banking business,became; the first 
evolved market with a competitive ,structure. 
17 
Absence of legal regulations and lack, of professional
 
experiencp of operating coramercial.banks caused opening of
 
commercial banks almost on, each cornet of the streets. Even
 
as late a|s in 1993 the capital requirement to set ,up a bank
 
was about $100,000 - giving new Russian entrepreneurs a
 
choice between buying a luxury apartment and opening a bank
 
(from 1999 ^ the minimum capital requirement, is set at ECU
 
3 million, for new banks and ECU 1 million for existing
 
banks),. ^
 
For the new banks to discover that taking deposits
 
from savers and,making, loans to businesses whs not the
 
quickest way to get rich did not take much time. A much
 
more profjitable strategy v;a,s to attract Central Bank's
 
credits at interest rates well belo'w the rate of inflation,
 
invest the proceeds in hard-currency assets, and pay off
 
the credits later in devalued rubles. Under Soviet system,
 
interest rates had no economic function and were fixed at
 
three percent per year by Russian Central Bank. Even in
 
1992, when inflation was at 1,500 percents, Central Bank
 
continued, to give away 10-^25% interest rate loans. In 1992
 
The Financial System In Russia Compared To Other Transi'tion
 
Economies: I The Anglo-American Versus The German-Japanese., Comparative
 
Economic Studies, Spring 1999.
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 alone, credit issue of the Central Bank was 32
 
percent of GDP.^
 
For'the first■years of Gommerciai banks existence, : 
Central Bank's low interest rates credits substituted the 
savings deposits. There were no particular interests in 
having s ich anchor - private accounts; banks were opening 
accounts just because they supposed to. 
In addition to the fall of ruble and government loans, 
other so irces of profits were "free" uses of resources on 
the accoints of the industrial enterpirises. Resources of 
banking system were: formed from money.of the enterprises 
that in 1994 accounted of 35% and in 1995 - 24^ of banking 
passives, which excided several times deposits of the 
population, 
The first major act of economic reform, on January 2, 
1992, wa to decontrol prices. President Boris Yeltsin and 
Prime Miilister Egor Gaidar introduced so-called "shock 
therapy They presented it as initial step toward ; 
macroecoi:lomic stabilization and privatization of the 
economy and claimed that, although the process would be 
very painful, the situation would begin to improve in six ­
Winner Takes It All. Foreign Affairs, ,9/1/99. 
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 nine month. Given the huge excess of money supply, the
 
price levels were jumping, rising by 245 percent in January
 
1992 alone. If no new money had been created, inflation
 
would sooin have run out of steam. But inefficient state
 
industries, which fail to rationalize their production,
 
processes and labor distribution, began complaining that
 
they didDjI't have enough cash to stay in operation.
 
It also was proved politically incorrect to hold the
 
levels of wages and pensions. Number of people living below
 
poverty llirie increased unexpectedly high; economic strikes
 
followed jone after another, disappointed people^ especially
 
elder, turned back to support Communist Party. The
 
I ■ ' . • ' ■ 
reformer^ gave up. Viktor Gerashchenko, head of Central
 
Bank, turned an unavoidable.one-time jump in the price .
 
level into continuous hyperinflation. Gerashchenko stayed
 
in charge of the Central Bank until October 1994, during
 
which peiriod the annual rate of money growth never fell
 
below 200 percent. Under Gerashchenko, the Central Bank had
 
been willing to print enough money to: cover the gap, but if
 
progress was to be made against inflation, something else
 
had to,be done. There were three options: to cut spending,
 
to increase taxes, or to borrow.
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: ■ The first Russian reform governments, headed by BgQ.t , 
■CS.aidar 	 and Viktor Chernomyrdin with Viktor Gerashchenko as. 
Head; of Central Bank, had bridged the budget deficit with. ■ 
funds borrowed from the Central Bank - by printing money as. 
needed. Although/ everyone involved understood that.this was 
;inflaf io,hary, there was simpiy no alternative. 
■ :'d, - By June ,1992, when the first phase of market reform 
was Officiaily over, it had .failed tb//accpmplish the 
regime's main goalr ,Ihf raged and.inefficient 
enterprises Continued to operate. Poiitidal pressures and 
successfu1 maneu'v'erring; by the main ecohomic participatbrs­
managed •o deform and distract real mUrket reforms. ■ 
But goyernmeht' rushed with impiementatidh of second 
step of reforms - privatization. The minister of 
privatization'Anatoliy Chubais hurried with distribution, of 
.ic property. Millions of privatization vouchers were,, 
distributed to the public at large, one for every man, 
woman, and child. These could be exchanged for stock at 
auctions of state enterprises. But the. vouchers turned out 
to be worth less' than $20 each. Most people either .sold; 
them immediately, investing the proceeds .according to their 
- Empire Envy And Other Obstacles/To; Economic Reform/ In Russia.
 
Problems of Post-Comm.unism;, 6/1998.
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 tests or needs/ or else placed them with fraudulent voucher
 
pyramidsj masking themselves as legitimate mutual funds. In
 
the end,! the shares purchased with vouchers mostly ended-up
 
■ ' - 1 • ■ ■ ■ ■ ' ■ 
in the hjands of the same former communists, government
 
official|s and other used-to-be-rulers and now businessmen
 
who benefited from other quick but profitable forms of
 
businesses.
 
Although idealistic ideas that- voucher privatization
 
would lead to a broad-based people's capitalism turned to
 
dust, but in it's own terms privatization was a success. In
 
just two years, from early 1992 to early 1994, 104,000
 
state enterprises were privatized. At the end of this
 
period the private sector accounted for more than 50
 
percent of GDP and some 60 percent of employment.^
 
In jthe largest and most attractive Russian companies
 
with hi^h market liquidity, outside investors by now owned
 
more shares than workers and managers, and this pattern was
 
likely to emerge in other companies, whose shares were not
 
yet traced in the market and which were still controlled by
 
work collectives. In the large, but not the largest.
 
' Wlken Property I-s Theft. Reason, 12/98,
 
w:T.en Property Is Theft. Reason, 12/98.
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privatizeB Russian companies outsiders owned in 1996 only
 
3,1% of shares, with 59% of shares belonging to insiders, and
 
9% to the state, while,in the 100 largest Russian companies
 
outsiders owned, on average 57% of all shares (insiders ­
22%, the state - 21%).^
 
,At that period there were also lots of speculations in
 
the press where institutional investors, namely banks,
 
gained stlrength after the "shares for , loans" auctions—sales
 
of the mqst profitable pieces of government property to the
 
highest bidder that started in late 1995, and,did not
 
involve ny concessions to the work collectives. Several
 
major banks received—as a collateral for credits issued to
 
the government—large blocks of shares of non-financial
 
companies (Menatep bank won 78% of shares of Yukos—the
 
second largest oil producer, Oneximbank got 38% of the
 
shares of Norilsk Nickel, etc.).
 
By the end of 1996 the newspapers were writing about
 
the group of five-seven banks that control a good half of
 
the Russian economy. The largest group, Oneximbank, in 1996
 
reportedly controlled,several banks with total assets of
 
^ The Ednancial System In Russia Compared To Other- Transition
 
Economies: I The Angl0-ALne,rican Ve,rsus The Germ.an-Japanese. Comparative
 
Economic Studies, Spring 1999.
 
  
 
some $5 billion and few. industrial enterprises with sales
 
of about $ 9 billion. The second largest, Menatep, had
 
banking assets of,about $2 billion and held control over
 
enterprises with sales of about $6 billion. This is
 
obviously a significant proportion,of national economy
 
(1995 GDP was $ 364 billion). ,
 
In Russia, similarly to other post-communist
 
economies, commercial banking became one of the few growing
 
sectors - it expanded,even in the middle of the recessions.
 
hiring new employees and opening new offices. The GDP
 
created in banking, finance and insurance grew by 57% in
 
1991-94,1 while the total GDP decreased by a good 35%.
 
• ! • - • ■ • 
I , ■ ■ • ■ 
I . • . ■ 
Howeverj this increase was largely due to the growth of
 
operations other than issuing credits to the enterprises.^
 
Russian banking activity until recently was
 
concentrated in processing payments, not in attracting
 
deposits and issuing credits. Back in Soviet times total
 
bank credit to enterprises exceeded half of GDP, with long
 
term credits alone amounting to 12% of GDP. After
 
deregulation of prices in 1992, the demonetisations of the
 
The Financial System In Russia Compared To Other Transition
 
Economies: The Anglo-ftmerican Versus The German-Japanese. Comparative
 
Economic Studies, Spring 1999.
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economy proceeded surprisingly quickly: total bank credits
 
outstanding fell to about. 10% of GDP by the .end of 1996,.
 
while the long term credits shrank to less than 1% of GDP.
 
By the end. of 1997, total net assets of Russia's banking
 
system amounted to only about $100 billion, less than that
 
in Luxerrbourg or Singapore. When the possibility of a bank
 
crisis was discussed, in the summer of 1996, a frequently
 
made argument was that the total Bank assets are so small
 
compared., to the size of the ecbnomy that even the collapse
 
of major banks would not become a disaster. ^ 
 
Banks', focuses on individuals fluctuated widely during
 
1990-1997: the share of personal deposits in banks stood at
 
50 to 60% in the 1980s, decreased to belowlO% in late 1992,.
 
and then increased td over 40% by the. end of 1996.
 
Enterprises' cash and bank deposits went down from the
 
highest point of 28% of GDP in late 1992 to only 4% of GDP
 
by the end of 1996.^ Initially, in 1992-94, ns^ly created
 
weak banks survived only because they were able to get huge
 
credits from the CBR-Central Bank of Russia.
 
the Financial System In Russia Compared To Other Transition 
Econom.ies :■ The . 'Anglo-American Versus The German-Japanese. Comparative 
Economic Studies, Spring, . 1999. 
The ■Financial System In Russia ■Compared To Other Transition 
■Economies :' The Anglo-American .. Versus' The GermLan-Japanese. Comparative 
Economic- Studies, Spring 1999. ' ' ' ■ 
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Table 1. Balance Sheet.of Commercial Banks in 1992, Billion
 
of Rubles
 
ASSETS 1-Jan 1-May LIABILITIES 1-Jan 1-May
 
I
 
Credits; short-

term 395. 850 Founding capital 43 76
 
Credits: long­
term 40 50 Deposits (rubles) 315 . 475
 
Inter-bank Deposits (foreign
 
credits 15 25 currency) 3, 390
 
Cash 5 7' Loans from banks 190 460
 
Correspondents
 
accounti 130 110 Government loans 45 110
 
Foreign!, currency 445 . 34
5 Others 154
 
Preciods metals ,0 10
 
Others 1 ' 40 168
 
Total 630 1665 Total 630 . , 1665
 
Table: The Financial System In Russia Compared To Other Transition
 
Economies: The Anglo-American Versus The German-Japanese. Comparative
 
Economic Studies^ Spring 1999.
 
Commercial banks formed out of regional branches of
 
specializled banks acted in fact as "channel banks": a good
 
part of their liabilities were credits,from CBR intended
 
for specific industrial enterprises. To be eligible for
 
such a centralized credit an enterprise was supposed to :
 
apply to jthe respective industrial department. If the
 
application approved, the CBR issued credit to the
 
commercial bank from which the enterprise was willing to
 
get this credit. Normally, these were ex-specialized banks
 
providini^ services to that particular enterprise before
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transition and continuing to .do so afterwards. In late
 
1992, CBR's credits to commercial banks amounted to 30-40%
 
of total credits outstanding to enterprises and .to over 50%
 
of total credits of "channel banks"v.: For."channel banks'
 
these CBR credits were more important sources of funds than
 
deposits of enterprises and..households..: and i'nterbanking
 
credits,.
 
On the asset side of the balance sheet, the most
 
impressive disproportion was the high share of total assets
 
invested in hard currency (at that.time the rapidly growing
 
exchange rate of the dollar in rubles provided greater real
 
returns than interest charged.on ruble credits)..Russian.
 
commercial banks were mostly borrowing long-term and
 
lending short term: long-term loans constituted only a very
 
small portion of their total assets.
 
Later the CBR stopped issuing credits to enterprises
 
through commercial banks, inflation slowed down and the
 
share of. assets invested in hard currency decreased.
 
However, these changes only revealed the real structural
 
weaknesses of the Russian banking sector. It turned out
 
^ Th Financial System In Russia Compared To Other Transition
 
Economies': The Anglo-American Versus The German-Japanese. Comparative
 
Economic Studies. Spring 1999.
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 that bankj services to enterprises were more centered not on
 
accepting! deposits and.issuing credits, but on processing
 
payments.
 
The lion's share of activity of Russian banks has to
 
do with processing payments, which is a sharp contrast to
 
the operations of the Western banks - the share of
 
liabilities in the form of processed payments in Russian
 
banks was! over two times higher. .Banking operations per se—
 
accumulating deposits and issuing' credits—was only a small
 
visible pjart of the iceberg, whereas about 70% of total
 
liabilities and about 50% of assets were engaged in
 
operationis of clearing payments.^
 
Development of Commercial
 
Banks in 1995-1996
 
Since 1995, the government has pursued a "forced
 
lending" policy of not paying workers and pensioners on
 
time. This was intended to satisfy the IMF's budget-cut
 
targets: it's easier to "borrow" from workers and
 
pensioners than to collect taxes from the wealthy and well
 
i ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
connected|. By the end of 1997, a quarter of workers had not
 
been paicl in at least six months--the government had .$10
 
A Pile Of Ruble. The New Republic, 9/7/1998,
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billion in- unme^^ obligations, it owed ; anOtn.gr $12
 
.billion in back pensions, and it had yet to dbllect some-:
 
$21 billion in back taxes. But this strategy worked —the
 
Federal government deficit.fell from;11 percent in 1994 to
 
.5 percent in 199.5..1
 
The ;grpwth of .the^ public debt derives fro.Hi a'
 
1994 decision by Boris ;Fedordv,\ Minister of Finance> to
 
stopffinancing the budget riefic.it with loans from the. CBR.
 
The traditional ;method of,printing money finally proved ;.to
 
be inflationary and not acceptable anymbre.. Although there,
 
were high, numbe,rs;b operating banks.,; banks' sizes and.
 
zation made them incapable .of making,large loans to
 
.gov.ernment.. In addition, foreign investors were not
 
optimist.ically inclined to lend but were ready to
 
issued b y. government... securities. 1 ,
 
The IMF and Western advisers .endorsed Fedorov's method
 
ofrfinancing . the budget .deficit by issuing goverhmental ■ 
seGurities• Buring 19:95 the market ^ fpf :. Russian Treasury 
bills (GKOs) arid.bonds grow. This enabled., 
the CBR to pursue; a tighter monetary policy. As a result,
 
the inflation rate deG.lined and the ruble exchange rate
 
A Pile Of Ruble;. The New Republic, 9/7/1998.
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stabilized. Moreover, ais a consequence of. reducing
 
inflation, the, nominal rate of interest on.government
 
securities also declined, which helped national finances.
 
The nominal interest rate fell from 95 percent in September
 
1996 to about 20 percent in the summer of 1997.^
 
Also by early 1995, under the.new leadership of Sergei
 
Dubinin,|the Central Bank began to apply conservative
 
monetarist methods.^ Inflation steadily slowed. When the
 
disinflation effort began, government expenditures at all
 
1
 
levels ajccounted for more than ,40 percent of GDP, a higher
 
figure than in the United States or Japan, and very high
 
indeed for a country of low income level.. Tax revenues were
 
over a tlird of GDP, but were not high enough to prevent a
 
budget deficit of more than 7 percent of GDP.^
 
When inflation slowed, machinations with cheap loans
 
stopped bringing as much profit as it used to,"but another
 
way of getting high earnings took place. By 1996, Russian
 
government bonds were paying interest rates of up to 100
 
percent, per year, double or triple the inflation rate.
 
^ Thk Russian Financial Panic and The.IMF. Problems of Post-

Communism, September-October 1998.
 
w:len Property Is Theft. Reason, December 1998.
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 Banks became the largest buyers of Russian government
 
debt, still financing some of their purchases with cheap
 
government credits but increasingly also borrowing dollars
 
and German marks on international financial markets.
 
Suchj schemes made the banks so rich and powerful that
 
those five - seven banks that raised on food subsidiaries
 
and natural resources schemes became to be described as
 
"oligarchs," widely perceived to have dominant influence
 
over the Russian government. Unfortunately, along the way.
 
the banks failed to.develop true financial customs. Instead
 
of being used for loans to businesses., all available funds
 
were invested into the government debt market.^
 
As ilt was already said, the loans-for-shares deals at
 
the end of 1995 were a scandal that damaged reputation of
 
Prime Minister Anatoli Chubais and paled the significance
 
of privatization. A few large banks were allowed to
 
privatize some large enterprises in auctions they
 
themselves controlled. Several huge cash cows of oil export
 
business changed hands, most notably three big oil
 
companies: Yukos,.Sibneft, and Sidanko.
 
^ When Property Is Theft. Reason, December 1998.,
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No qualitative change accompanied these- takeovers. The
 
! ' ■ ■ • 
new majority owners did not behave like self-interested
 
proprietors but just continued to manage with orientation
 
on instant profits,, primarily, by.selling the products below
 
market prices to their own trading companies, letting the
 
old state companies corrupt. After a short-lived boom,
 
these coi|ipanies,' values fell below their low purchase
 
prices. For instance, Norilsk Nickel, the large metal
 
company, was long worth less than what Oneximbank paid for
 
it in a,1995 noncompetitive deal. In 1998, the big new
 
"capitalists" showed yet again that they could not care
 
less for the market value of their enterprises. Many
 
minority]shareholders responded by selling off their
 
■ ■ ■ ■ ' ■ I ■ ' ■ ■ , ' ■ 
holdings 1 The Russian stock index consequently drove down
 
94 percent from its peak in 1997.^
 
Financial-Industrial Groups
 
Since 1995,, large industrial and commercial
 
enterprises have created close ties with the leading banks.
 
This was a common strategy in the Soviet era and was a
 
- r : . ,
 
reasonable response to current pressures. Mergers through
 
interlocking shareholdings,and directorates allowed having
 
winner Takes It All. Foreign Affairs, 9/1/99.
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greater control of assets through the development of
 
assets, pquity, and personal ties. The creation of
 
financial-industrial groups (FIGs) allowed key players to
 
go around, co-opt, suspend, or eliminate market ties and, to
 
control oompetition, conditions that could increase chances
 
of survival for the incorporated financial institutions and
 
firms. By owning industrial firms,, banks , were receiving
 
guaranteed customers and tax havens,; could , reduce
 
uncertainty in lending, and: expand, enterprise revenue for
 
short-term financial dealings. Fears of an anonymous market
 
produced this strategy.
 
These new conglomerates (Financial-Industrial Groups
 
or FIGs) have begun to form, seeking to vertically
 
integrate all stages of the production, process. The most
 
powerful FIGs controlled large parts of the most profitable
 
sectors of the Russian economy - those relating to natural
 
resources, especially to oil and gas - the result of a
 
deals, to secure support for Yeltsin in the 1996
 
presidential elections. The key figures in the FIGs, have
 
become, exceedingly wealthy, buying up the Russian media,
 
and becoming increasingly involved in political decision-

making processes. The importance of seven leading banking
 
figures has led them to be called the Voligarchs', a term
 
 which reveals their influence.^ As of now. President Putin
 
is closely investigating operations of "oligarchs" and
 
connected to them businessmen - top managers of that period
 
are now Jnder arrest or giving testimonies.
 
Lack of parliamentary control over government and the
 
presidential apparatus has allowed the relationships
 
between financial: figures and state officials to become a
 
revolving door. Boris Berezovsky,, head of the LogoVAZ
 
combine. was rewarded for bankrolling Yeltsin's 1996
 
election campaign with a key position in the Security
 
■ i ■ - ' ■ ■ ' ' 
Council - a body,frequently referred to as the functional 
equivalent of the old Politburo. 
Other politicians have found themselves comfortable . 
positions as directors of FIGs. In addition, criminal 
groups (irafia) also exercised a growing influence. 
pocketing substantial resources that were not productively
 
invested or channeled to the state in- the form of tax
 
revenue.' But even after the creation of bank-based FIGs, it
 
did not appear that banks were becoming long-term strategic
 
stockholcers of production-oriented companies:.
 
Russia's C,risis. Capital and Class, Summer'1999.
 
R.ussia's Crisis. Capital and Class, Summer'1'999.
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';Capitalization of Banking
 
Industr
 
In 1:995-97, when ^ inflation was finally brought down to
 
reasonable leyeis, part of.the banking activity associated
 
with processing payments decreased considerably. The other
 
major cha|nge was the sharp rise of the share of government
 
securities in total banks' assets (over 20% of total assets
 
in mid 1997) - partially at the expense of the reduction of
 
the share bf, bank .cr to businesses.
 
he ehd of1996-Russia had over. 2,'600 banks (about
 
500 of them were not,operating though)/by the end of l997
 
- 1675: operating banks and 22 bther credit institutions ­
.(including 730 with capital less than;EG:U:1 million).
 
The concentration in:the'Russian i bankihg sector. was.
 
very:low. .As d January 1, 1997, in Russia: the. share: pf the
 
largest 5.banks in total banking assets was only 33%>
 
whereas in western economies it i.s::withih the range Pf 57..­
79%. By the beginning of 1997 the ayerage bank had only:2; ,
 
branches (if Sberbank with its branches.across Russia is :
 
excluded) and the registered capital ■ (equity)-of lesspth 
$500,000. There are no "big three" or "big:four'' natipni .
 
wide banks. The largest Russian bank—Sberbank (former state
 
Savings bank still controlled by the CBR):.accounte
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of total, credit outstanding, while the ten largest banks
 
accounted for only 1/3 of total creditsi Only two Russian
 
banks had assets of over $5 billion and capital of over
 
$500 million by early 1997.^
 
Also, banks virtually stopped the financing of capital
 
investment. Total bank credits outstanding in relation to
 
GDP declined steadily. In 1992 they ensured the financing
 
of only 10% of total capital investment, in 1993 - less
 
than 6%, in 1995-96 - less than 1%, i.e. an amount
 
comparable with equity financing. No less important, long
 
term credits (over 1 year term) amounted to only 5% of
 
total bank credits and did not play any significant role in
 
the financing of capital investment. In late 1996, when
 
inflation was already under control, interest rates on bank
 
credits to industry still stood at a level of about 100%,
 
higher than the rates on inter-bank credits, the CBR rate
 
(about 50%), the returns on GKOs—government treasury bills
 
30%), and much higher than the rates of return in industry
 
itself.^ . ,
 
^ The Financial System In Russia Compared To Other Transition
 
Economies: The Anglo-7\merican Versus The.' German-Japanese. Comparative
 
Economic St 'ieSy Spring 1999.
ud 
 
^ The Financial System In Russia Compared. To Other Transition
 
Economies: The Anglo-American Versus The Ge.rman-Japanese.. Comparative
 
Economic Studiesy Spring 1999. ,
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Table 2. Assets, Registered Gapital, an:c]i:; Gred^ of 10
 
Largest Russian Banks as of, January 31, 1996 ,
 
Legend for Chart: 	 A - Bank
 
B - Asset.s,, trillion rubles.
 
C Registered capital, trillion rubles
 
D Credits outstanding, trillion rubles
 
E - Share in total credit outstanding, %'
 
B C '	 D E
 
Sberbank 256.5 15.3 31.9 13 
Vneshtorgbank 27.9 6.1 8.1 3 
Inkorrbank 22,2 2.0 7.7 ■ 3 
ONEXIMbank 20.6 219 , 10.6 .4 
.Mosbiznesbank 17.7 . 110 3.1 1
 
Rossiyskiy Credit . ,16.3 172 2.5 1
 
Tokokank , 14.5 . 1.1 3.3 1
 
Stolichniy Bank 13.9 •1:.3 2.5 1
 
Sberezheniy Menatep 12.2 1.0 7.8 3
 
Natsional*niy 11,2 ■ ,1.6 2.2 ■ 1 
Total 413.0 33.5 79.7 33 
Table: The Financial System In Russia Compared To Other Transition
 
Economies: The Anglo-American Versus The German-Japanese. Comparative
 
Economic Studies, Spring 1999..
 
Markets for corporate securities were only emerging, ,
 
and only large companies could classify for equity and bond
 
financing. Nevertheless, it seemed like these sources of
 
investment financing for large companies were already more
 
important than bank credits. Total volume of t.rade in
 
shares in 1995 (mostly OTG) was estimated at about $5
 
billion - 1-2% ;of 	GDP or 25% of market capitalization. And
 
market capitalization as well as the volume of trading
 
increased threefold in the second quarter of 1996 after
 
stock prices soared on the eve of presidential elections,
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 and twofiold - in late 1996 and early 1997 - after Yeltsin
 
recovered from heart surgery. Estimates for 1996 put the
 
total market capitalization at $50-55 billion (13% of GDP)
 
and the volume of trade in shares—at 40-70 millions a day,
 
or $13 billion annually (3-4% of GDP)
 
Banking Crisis..of Year 1995
 
Act!ivation of business life and increase of values in
 
market capital provoked banks to lower their already weak
 
security measures. The share of bad loans rose from 32% in
 
1994 to |37% in 1995 and to 45% in the first quarter of
 
' 2 ! '
1996. Tljie banking crisis of August 1995 was a logical
 
result,o^ the foolish credit policy of many banks that lent
 
money wi|thout collateral or good guarantees. Russian
 
government had to make state debt more attractive as an
 
investment for the private sector.
 
When the ruble was in danger of falling for the first
 
' ■ I ■ ■ ' ' ' ■ ^ ■ ■ " • ■ ■ 
time, the interest went up to as high as 200 percent.
 
Because of high interest rates, most of the private banks
 
had their assets in rubles, not in dollars'. So, by the
 
. 'The Financial System In Russia Compared To Other Transition
 
Economies: The Anglo-American Versus The German-Japanese. Comparative
 
Economic Studies, Spring 1999.­
The 1 Financial■System In-Russia Compared To Other Transition 
Economies: The Anglo-American Versus The German-Japanese. Comparative 
Economic Studies, Spring 1999;. 
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spring of 1995, majority of commercial banks were loaded
 
with bad debts and, to function, they had to be net
 
borrowers on the money markets. About 90% of Russian banks
 
had less than 100 billion rubles in equity and, thus, were
 
very sensible to market changes.
 
In April ,95, one of the big banks, MMKB, stopped to
 
pay its debts. This bank was one of the biggest borrowers
 
for about two months and after it went bankrupt, it was in
 
debt for several thousand of billions of rubles.
 
In the summer 1995, when debts of those banks that
 
became borrowers after the spring events increased
 
enormously, banks started to decrease or close credit lines
 
to each other. That led to bankruptcy of several small
 
banks, as well as two well-known banks - Lefortovsky and
 
National Credit. Two weeks after that the markets became so
 
nervous that one small rumor of something else going wrong
 
was enough to crash the whole 'system;
 
A.technical glitch in Mosbusinessbank becanie such a
 
thing. Their computers went down one day preventing the
 
bank fromi making payments to anybody. ; Next day they had to
 
pay with penalties but a wave of delay of payments was
 
already triggered. Almost nobody paid, as everybody
 
preferred to wait and,rather pay later with penalties, than
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 to pay to on time and not get the money from a counter
 
party in return.
 
Interest rates on ruble money markets reached 1000­
i ■ ■ . . ■ ' ■ ■ ■■ ■ ■■ , ■ ■ ■ ■ - ■ ' ■ ' ■ 
1500% for overnight deposits and 50% for USD denominated
 
deposits, but there were no lenders. In two or three days,
 
the Central Bank tried to increase the liquidity in the
 
markets by placing its: deposits with the biggest of the
 
commercial banks and by massively buying government bonds.
 
This measure helped the markets, but not the banks.
 
Customer^, hearing about problems in their bank, rushed to
 
transfer money out.
 
Whe1 the state debt pyramid did collapse, the banking
 
system also collapsed. Most of the banks lost most of their
 
assets, so they were not able,to pay their customers.^ A lot
 
of money accumulated in forms of so-called financial
 
capital ,- state debt, state bonds - that didn't go into
 
product!on but were recirculating in the banking system.^
 
That was the week that changed the psychology of,
 
bankers in,Russia. It took half a year to reestablish links,
 
between banks and set clean credit lines again. But
 
1 On The Russian Collapse. Multinational Monitor, 10/1998,
 
" On The Russian Collapse. Multinational Monitor, 10/1998,
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 attitude to risk became much more serious. Another result
 
of the crisis was the fact that bad banks either
 
disappeared or their names became well known. The crisis
 
led to reduction of 2,500 commercial banks to about 2,300
 
in January 1996. The state-owned Sberbank, by far the
 
largest with a capital base of $1.3 billion in 1996, ranked
 
below the worlds top 500 banks. Most Russian banks were
 
much smaller. About 80% had capital of just $1 million or
 
less, anc. only 4% had capital greater than $5 million.
 
Persistent high real interest rates meant that
 
borrowing costs remain high, and little lending took place
 
on terms of more than 30 days. Interbanking lending rates
 
rose sharply following an August 1995 liquidity crisis and
 
reached 120% in June 1996. Commercial lending was still a
 
small share of business, and long-term lending—in Russia
 
meaning anything over one year—accounts for less than 8 %
 
of all credits. Most businesses were concentrated in
 
projects and trade finances, trading in various types of
 
securities, and foreign exchange dealings. . ,
 
The new commercial banking law, effective in January
 
1996, permitted foreign banks to establish full-service
 
subsidiaries in Russia, though it allowed the Central Bank
 
to use nvhtuality as a criterion for granting approval.
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Republic National Bank of New York took advantage of the
 
new law to obtain a license and begin full-service
 
operations in September 1996.,
 
On May 16 1996 the Central Bank announced that the
 
ruble exchange band, which since January 1996 had been set
 
between.4,550 and 5,150 rubles per dollar, would be
 
replaced I with a erawling-peg mechanism, with parameters
 
that would shift gradually from 5,000 to 5,600 rubles per
 
dollar on July 1 and then to 5,500 to 6,100 rubles per
 
dollar by the end of 1996.
 
1997: Stability
 
This year was the most stable year during reforms.
 
Banks were counting wounds and accumulating new strength,
 
government was spending IMF loans., and businesses were
 
enjoying soft economic and financial constraints.
 
Main characteristic of this period was the fast growth
 
of banks' investments into governmental obligations: from
 
1996 .to 1997 the volume of such investments had tripled.
 
Volume and technology of investments into governmental
 
obligations allowed the participants of this market to
 
quickly and almost without expenses to turn their
 
obligations into highly liquid and profitable governmental
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 instruments. The election company of 1996 and constant need
 
of the government in "live" cash guarantied high interest
 
rates that were unmatched with current inflation rates and
 
economical indexes. Russian banks become active buyers
 
governmental obligations denominated not only in rubles but
 
also in dollars and other foreign currencies. Governmental
 
obligations become the major source of revenue for, banks:
 
in 1996 the revenues on such obligations were 40% of all
 
banking revenues, in 1997 - 30%.^
 
Mr. Fischer, former economics professor at
 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and No. 2 at the
 
I ' ' ' '
 
International Monetary Fund, and Mr. Summers, a former
 
economist at Harvard and No. 2 at the US Treasury termed
 
1997 as "a year of achievement." They noted "dramatic
 
progress ~ toward stabilizing economy.and integrating it
 
more closely with the global economLy." What they referred
 
to was a stable exchange rate for the ruble and lov/er
 
inflation - 11 percent in 1997, down from 35 percent in
 
1996 and from 2,500 percent in 1992. Further, according to
 
s. Aleksashenko, Banking Crisis: Does Fog Go Away? Questions of
 
Economics, 5/1999.
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them, the Russian financial markets survived the. East Asian
 
crisis, though not without some troubling days."''
 
Both economists also ranked getting its tax collection
 
system in order as Russia's No.l economic problem. Russia .
 
collects taxes equal to about 10.8 percent of gross
 
domestic product, its total output of goods and services.
 
That is far less than the 19 percent of GDP collected by
 
Washington. But Russia's government spending amounts to
 
18.5 percent of GDP.
 
After six years of decline, output was up a bare 0.3
 
percent last year, but it ;was positive. One estimate finds
 
70 percent of Russian economic activity accounted for by
 
private, enterprise. For all.its.imperfections, the private
 
sector has Tbecome the major agent of economic growth and
 
change." Money.that was flowing out.of Russia has
 
apparently been flowing back. Russian banks becQme active
 
particip'ants in activities of:external markets. Stability
 
of ruble, low interest rates of.external markets, and
 
almost absence of internal savings pushed banks to borrow
 
big time and borrow from foreign investors.
 
Russia: Progress at Last. Christian Science Monitor, 1/20/98,
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 Year 1997 was also characterized by excessive inflow
 
of foreign,portfolio investments. In 1997, they amounted
 
$46 billion or over ten percent of GDP - far more than
 
, i ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • 
Russia could absorb. The consequences became evident on
 
August 17, 1998, when Russia suffered a cataclysmic crash.
 
Total foreign stock ownership in Russia peaked in late 1997
 
at about 30 percent of market capitalization - about $30
 
billion, or 7 percent of GDP.^
 
By mid 1997 market capitalization was presumably at a
 
level of $100 billion, about 25% of GDP, whereas the volume
 
of trading - over 5% of GDP made Russia one of the leaders
 
of stock market development together with China and Central.
 
European countries.
 
In 1993-97, with short setback in summer 1995, Russian
 
stocks definitely outperformed the stock markets in East
 
European countries. In summer and fall 1994 the demand for
 
shares of. major Russian companies increased greatly (mostly
 
due to the inflow of foreign capital), and the stock prices
 
skyrocketed for the first time. Later, the stock market
 
remained slow due to the Chechen war and political
 
uncertainty in the country, but in April - June 1996 stock
 
Winner Takes It All. Foreign Affairs, 9/1/99.
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prices 1ncreased again about 3 times in real and dollar
 
terms anticipating and then welcoming Yeltsin's victory in
 
the presidentlal elections.^ Investing in Russia was a fad
 
for hedging funds, which enjoyed high returns in 1993-1994
 
on,Russian .seGurities.:
 
By the end of 1997 the quantity of channels and-

linking Russia,with the global financial system had
 
increased: significantly. The credit and investment sphere
 
was the principal source of these ties. According to
 
various estimates, the aggregate share of foreign capital
 
in the Russian banking system had reached 5.6-8% by the
 
beginning of 1998, given a legal limit of 12%,.
 
Russia has,been attractive for large amounts of
 
capital investment..Direct investment, even through Russia
 
banks, r ached nearly $3 billion in 1997, which is actually
 
less then 2% of the world market of capitalization ($300­
320 billion a year). At the end of January 1998, the
 
Economics Ministry reported that the list of foreign
 
investors ready to invest in Russia looked something like
 
the foilswing: Exxon, MacDurmet, Sodeko, and Shell - $28
 
^ The Financial System-In .Russia Compared, To Other Transition
 
Economies:, The Anglo-'Ttoierican Versus The German-Japanese. Comparative
 
Economic,Studies, Spring 1999.
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billion (in Sakhalin); Pepko -$23 billion (Yakutia); a
 
consbrtium of European banks and firms -$14 billion (a gas
 
pipeline from Yamal to Berlin); Domineko -$8 billion
 
(Volgograd region); Cyprus Mineral, OPEC, and Shroeder
 
Finance Holding -$4.7 billion (eastern,Siberia); Conoco ­
$2 billion (the Nenets Autonomous area); General Motors ­
$1.4 billion (Yelabuga); United Technology, Pratt and
 
Whitney, Rockwell Collins -$1 billion (Voronezh, Moscow,
 
Perm); British Gas 1 billion (Komi); British Petroleum ­
$700 million (Irkutsk region); and Coca Cola -$600 million
 
(Moscow, Orel, St. Petersburg, Novgorod, Krasnoyarsk,
 
Rostov-narDonu). There were reports of other, less
 
extensive projects.^
 
By 1996, there were some 200 taxes in Russia.
 
Nevertheless, Russia's chief tax collector, Boris Fedorov,
 
cited in August 1998 that almost 5,000 companies owed
 
nearly $50 billion in unpaid taxes and fees. To collect
 
that money, the government built a force of hundreds of
 
thousands of police, where upon many underpaid and unpaid
 
policemen began holding back tax receipts for themselves.
 
Web 
Page of Ministry of Internal Business Affairs of Russia.
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 X collection in Russia is a dangerous profession. In
 
193:5:^ialone, 26 tax collectors were killed, 74 wounded, 6
 
ed, and 41 burned out of their homes. Attempts to
 
extract even small sums of money from needy workers have
 
produced big waves of discontent. But, in general, :
 
Police ^Degan gain weight and respect. Business people
 
started to understand that they are better off paying than
 
hiding, The fights now are not about "to pay or not to
 
pay", b at. about how much to pay
 
19.9.8: Deyelbpmeht of Crisis
 
As of 1/1/98, 1697 credit organizations were operating
 
in the country. On average, on 18,500 men of.popuiation of;
 
the country there.was one. credit organization: bank or
 
branch. Although, majority of commercial banks issued their
 
own stocks and-d papers, none on themy.with,
 
exception of Sberbank was able to achieve appropriate;
 
liquidity of such papers and had appropriate market
 
capitalization.
 
Barter
 
Even though previous year was stable with positive
 
growth, in GDP and massive cash inflow from foreign and
 
• -T he Russian Far East's Endless Winter. Orbis, ■Winter 1999. 
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domesti investors there were few negative moments that .
 
could destroy fragile success. Russia's large industrial
 
compani s were still living by Soviet era rules, not by
 
market economy regulations. Yet few went out of business.
 
More U. . companies are going bankrupt during a four-week
 
period than did Russian businesses all of 1997 year. This
 
anomaly is made possible through the widespread use of .
 
barter. The enterprises could continue to produce goods
 
because they had a guaranteed set of ''buyers' and because
 
they avoid the use of money.
 
Avoiding money, through barter and other forms of non-

monetary exchange, allows the goods to be overpriced,
 
giving the appearance of more value being produced than is
 
the cas . These overpriced goods are then delivered to the
 
government instead, of taxes, or to value-adders, mainly
 
energy uppliers such as the natural gas monopoly Gazprom,
 
It continues to function by using barter and other non-

monetary devices to generate prdducts .less valuable than
 
the reguired inputs, while pretending.to add value.^ More
 
than 50 percent of payments made among industrial companies
 
and 40 ercent of corporate tax payments were made through
 
Seeing Russia Plain. The National Interest, Spring 1999,
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the exchange of actual goods and. services. For accounting
 
purposes; such exchanges can be given whatever value makes
 
the books balance.^
 
Russia and Foreign investors
 
From 1996, banks become active borrowers on the
 
external markets and lenders to industrial enterprises. By
 
the 1997 possibility of expanding banks' passives from
 
internal sources almost did not existed. - Leading and big
 
banks borrowed form foreign investors with majority of such
 
investments (80%) with repayments within one year and
 
opportunity to prolong payment period upon agreement of
 
both side;s. Guaranteed stability of ruble and high
 
profitability of governmental securities allovjed banks to
 
convert currency into rubles and invest into governmental
 
obligations.
 
The difference between passives and actives
 
denominated in foreign currency for commercial,banks
 
reached a.bOut. 40% of volume of banks' currency obligations,
 
which showed that there were structural, disproportions in
 
banking Operations and high dependency on Stable exchange
 
Why Did Reform In Russia Fail? Wilson Quarterly, Summer 1999.
 
50
 
rates and currency risks. Although the situation when
 
foreign bankS; were lending to Russian banks in 1995-1997
 
presented high level of trust and positive evaluation of
 
economical situation in the country,.in 1997 these the
 
duration of such funds was mostly up to a year due
 
partially to the Asian financial crisis. Short terms funds
 
pushed Russian banks tOi;borrow even m.ore in order to pay
 
matured debts...
 
In 1998-99, Asian crisis finally reached Russia. In
 
the first stage of crisis,.Thailand's currency depreciation
 
triggered a sudden collapse in other Asian exchange rates,
 
causing a. rash of bankruptcies among corporations and
 
financial institutions that had borrowed heavily in U.S.
 
dollars in the first half of the 1990s. In turn, the
 
devaluations contributed to a slide in.world commodity
 
prices, leading currencies of other commodity producers
 
such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand,, Chile,, and Mexico
 
to fall as well.
 
During these two stages, Russia escaped ruble
 
devaluation thanks to previously pledged IMF support and
 
investors demands for high-yield Russian Treasury bonds.
 
A. Astapovich, D. Sipmolotov. Russian Banks in 1998: Development
 
of Crisis Questions of Economics, 5/1999.
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But when the IMF failed to help sustain the ruble in the
 
spring and early summer 1998 as it came under pressure from
 
Russia's large budget deficit and first post-communist
 
trade deficit, investors panicked. .
 
In July 1998, foreigners held at least $25 billion of
 
the $70 billion of outstanding Russian treasury bills ­
some six percent of GDP. They provided revolving credit to
 
the Russian government easing Russian enterprises' need to
 
pay taxes but still permitting them the enjoying government
 
subsidies. Private and regional bond issues were even
 
worse, with poor guarantees of repayment. The 1997 foreign
 
investment inflow was so huge that in the early 1998 some
 
'tycoons concluded they had better take the money while
 
they could.
 
The West has decided to allow Russian domestic banks
 
to open operations abroad. In January 1998 70 banks had 10
 
branch offices and 100 representative offices in the far
 
abroad (outside the CIS). Such expansion has begun to
 
reveal its negative side. By the end of 1997 the total
 
obligations of credit institutions outside Russia exceeded,
 
their assets by almost $6 billion. For comparison, in the
 
fall of 1997 this amount was only $2.5 billion, and in 1996
 
their assets had actually exceeded their liabilities by
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$500 million. The share of non-residents' funds in Russian
 
inter-bank loans had increased to 60% by the beginning of
 
1998.
 
Nearly 400 foreign banks are holders.and traders in
 
the Soviet debts to the London Club totaling $32.6 billion.
 
In the fall of 1997, as per an agreement.with the Club, the
 
debt was restructured, that is, stretched over 25 years
 
with a 7-year grace period given the payment of the current
 
interesi ($3 billion in 1997). At the same time Russian
 
' i ■ ' ■ ■ " 
banks tried to diversify investment portfolio by buying 10% 
of all debts of former Soviet Union to London Club spending
 
2.5 mrlliard of dollars in hope that restructurization will
 
raise the its value. However, price fall started in October
 
1997 till December 1997 caused losses of $300 million.^ ,
 
Europe was becoming more and more active in crediting
 
the republics and regions, bypassing the government. Of the
 
various Russian institutions emitting "Eurobonds" ($7
 
billion), nearly $1 billion was emitted by the regions. Of
 
those eirIssions, 40% were acquired by investors from the
 
US, 45% by Western Europe and 15% by investors from Asia.
 
In 1998 16 regions expressed their willingness to come
 
A. Astapovich, D. Sipmolotpv. Russian Banks in 1998: Development
 
of Crisis! Questions of Economics,;5/1999.
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forward as borrowers on the world capital market. There has
 
also been a lot of.interest in Russian short-term bills,
 
the value of which has reached $12-15 billion.,Of these,$6­
7 billion were emitted by corporations and nearly . $8
 
billion were emitted under banks' guarantees.
 
Dollar-denominated former Soviet debts to the private . .
 
sector were publicly traded and in 1998 were worth around
 
8-10 cents on the dollar. It was renegotiated on very; ,
 
favorable terms in the early 1990s, in the hope that Russia
 
would be booming by the,end of the decade. Servicing this
 
debt will soon become very expensive.. For year 1999
 
repayments on the biggest category .will be $1 billion,
 
rising to neariy;. $5'billion by 2010. The last and most
 
immediately sensitive category is Russia.'s $16 billion in
 
Eurobonds, for which the legal penalties for default are
 
frightful. No sovereign Eurobond has ever defaulted. Banks
 
view Russian eurobonds as an attractive way to serve their
 
clients. They earn commissions, and investors who like junk
 
bonds accept the risks. Russia has to find the.$500 million
 
needed for the year 1998, and the $1.6 billion due in 1999.^
 
Default Settings'. The EGonomist, November '7, 1998.
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As a result of panic following Asian,crisis foreign
 
investors started to withdraw capital from Russia, domestic
 
businessmen were just transferring money offshore, to secure
 
accounts. Domestic banks had net foreign liabilities of
 
around $4 billion, where a year ago they had net foreign
 
assets, of ,$2.5 billion.^ In order to prevent further outflow
 
of capital from country. Central Bank had to increase
 
interest rates on domestic securities.
 
Central Bank Policies of Issue
 
of Governmental.Obligations
 
One of the main reasons of financial crisis.coming
 
into existence was unbalanced practice of governmental
 
finances. Since 1995, the,process of macroeconomics
 
stabilization - reducing inflation.growth, controlling
 
rates of exchange, and interest rates - was implemented
 
based on hard management monetary mass. However, the
 
problem with this practice is that at the same time budget
 
deficit fluctuations 11.8% in 1994 to 3.9% in 1998, which
 
causes huge instability and unpredictability of
 
consequences of such practice for future.
 
Rcssia: The Next Domino? Forbes, .June 1, 1998,
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Table 3. The Federal Budget (Outcomes, Percent GDP)
 
According to the Ministry of Finances
 
19.93 1994 1995 1996 1997
 
00
 
Expenditure 24.0 6.9 OL 5.3
 
Income 13..2 14.1 3.9 2.5 2.1
 
\—1
 
Deficit 6.9 9 3.0 3.3 3.2
 
According to the IMF
 
Income 13.0 11.9 12.0 12.8 10.9
 
Expenditure 28.6 22.5 17.4 , 20.5 17.4
 
Deficit 15.6 10.6 5.3 7.8 6.5
 
Table: The Russian Financial Panic and IMF. Problems of Post-Goirmiunism,
 
9-10/98.
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O
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From this table we can see that the income,
 
expenditures, and deficit of the federal government have
 
all been falling, but the deficit (using IMF methodology)
 
remained high, as a percentage of the GDP. In.. 1997 only 63
 
percent of federal expenditures were covered by income. As
 
a result, the Russian government must sell securities every
 
week to.finance its current deficit and redeem maturing
 
securities.
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Table;: 4. State Debt:;of: Federal Governmen
 
.1592: 
.i;993 1994 ,1995 ■ 1996 1997 1998, Sep-98 
in-itlllard riiibles 
Total;' ■ ■■ ■. , 43.,0 . 134.0,, ,; :490.6 ' , 749.9 i1,05.9.:F: ' 1,238.2 1,360.9; ; ; 2>'749.6 > 
Denominated in . Currency , 34.i lia.5 ■ 402.2- 55&,.7 ' ^ '^ '694.3 737.2 . .854.9 2,279.6 . 
: Denominated In ,Rubles ' 8.3; ■ 15.5. . 365.1: ' 5:01.0. , '506.0, ;■ :470.o; . 
Incuding, GKOs ;i ;il' , - ; 0.2' 10.3 ' [ 13.1 . 237..! i : , 384,,. 9 : 436.0 ■ 387.li' 
;gK0s as- Percent To Total ; 0.0% - , ..0.1%. , 2.1%: ;; 9.8%' ; 2214% 31.1% 32.0% ■ 14.1% 
In Milliard of Dollars 103.6 ■ 107.4, 134.4 161.;6 :, , 19d;;8,- , ; 2 217.0 ; 171.2 
.Denominated. In Currency , 8316; ; 95.0, ,11,0.2 , 120.4 ; ■125.0. ; Vl23.4: . . 136.3:^ 141.9' 
'benominated.Ip Rubles 2,0.0 . 12.4 ■;/ 2,4.2; ; 41.2 . : 65:.8 ;i', 83.9 80.7 29,3 
Incuding GKOs ■ ■ ;,0:2 . 2.8. 15.9 , ' ICvl . , , ,,;64.,4 ' 69..5' • ,:24,.l ; 
GKOs.as Percelt,To Total ,: ■o.,0% . ■ '0.1%:' , 2.1% . :9.8% : ,.22.4% ' 31.1% ■ 32.0% ., 14.1% 
Table: A. Illarionov,: ;Ho,w .Was Russian Financial Crisis, Organized, 
Questions of- Economics 11/ 9.8 ' 
, : These transac-ti,o^,n in . a finahcial and eGonomic 
environment marked by ;economic ,recession and. 
extraordiharily -high real rates of, interest'.. According to 
one esti:mate, in .19,97 ihterest payments comprised about ,28 ■ 
percent of federal .expenditures In 1998 this figure was at 
least 30 percent. Acco.rding to,; Prime Ministef Kirienko, . in, : 
■the firs; five months of;!998. interest: payments 
,34; pefcent ef :ail federal. :expenditures 
The reason it happens Goncerhs: the close 
.relationShip .among t.he gDVerhmeht., private banks .and the: 
new business elite. Arrangements .where banks managed the 
cash, flows of - government agendies created a, windfall,for 
the bank They poGketed the interest earned 
57 
redepositing this money in the money market or using it to
 
buy Treasury bills. Although such schemes have supposedly
 
ended, other comfortable arrangements favoring the banks
 
still exist. For example, state guarantees for bank loans
 
to businesses have replaced the old system of direct state ,
 
loans or subsidies for firms. The high interest rates paid
 
on the GKO and OFZ market were particularly advantageous,
 
for the banks, which are the main holders of these
 
securities.
 
Given Russia's changing and uncertain economic and
 
political conditions, market operators strongly preferred
 
very short horizons. Thus, the maturity profile of the
 
government securities issued varied between very short and
 
extremely short, usually between one and six months. It was
 
continually necessary to issue new securities to repay
 
maturing ones. For example, in 1998 if there was no crisis,
 
the government would have to find 379 billion rubles (about
 
$60 billion) to redeem maturing securities. At the
 
beginning of July, the average yield on GKOs exceeded 94
 
percent, even though inflation in the previous twelve
 
months was only 6.5 percent and part of the planned sale of
 
GKOs had to be canceled because of insufficient buyer
 
interest.
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By the beginning of 1998 the stock market lost half of
 
its value and capitalization and volume of trade indicators
 
returned to their 1996 levels. Short-term ruble-denominated
 
bonds (GKO) were issued at attractive rates of interest.
 
These did. indeed bring in much-needed resources - the value
 
of GKO in August 1998 was.estimated at $40 billion, $11
 
billion of which came from foreign sources. .
 
This situation, however, created two additional
 
problems: first, it .
 reinforced the shift to barter
 
arrangements by diverting banks' resources away from loans
 
to industry; second, these bonds had to be paid back with
 
money ths.t the state could only obtain by issuing further
 
bonds at ever-increasing rates of interest. Furthermore,
 
many Russian banks had themselves borrowed from abroad in
 
order to invest in GKO. The pyramid of borrowing became
 
increasingly insupportable and the government had to
 
manufacture revenue from any source it could in order to
 
cover its due debts.^
 
Unfortunately, potential sources of revenue were
 
rapidly disappearing. At the end.of May 1998 the
 
government'failed to find a buyer for 75 percent of shares
 
Russia's Crisis. Capital and Class-, .Summer 1999.
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 in Rosneft, the largest state oil company-blue chip.
 
missing,jout on an anticipated windfall of $1.6 billion. For
 
Shell and British Petroleum who,had earlier expressed
 
considerable interest decided that, with oil prices
 
falling, Rosneft no longer looked an attractive,
 
proposition. The few Russian companies with the resources
 
to participate also withdrew.
 
In mid-1997, with oil prices rising, the Russian
 
government could have harvested $2.5 billion from the sale.
 
Now the only option was to reschedule the sale for later in
 
the year. At the same time, the yield on GKO rose to an 84
 
percent. forcing the Russian Central Bank to raise interest
 
rates to a 150 percent in order to defend the ruble, but
 
the pressure on the government to devalue was enormous. The
 
first tranche of IMF money ($4.3 billion) arrived just in
 
time to meet some GKO commitments, but too late to prevent
 
the devaluation of the ruble, an option previously ruled
 
out by Yeltsin.
 
Russia's C.risis. Capital and Class, Summer 1999.
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Current Cost ofServicing GKO-GFZCompared to
 
Incomefrom Tax Collections
 
in 1997(Trillion Rnbles)
 
40
 
30
 =|q

20
 
10
 
■S^ 
IRevenue From Tax Collection 
iExpenses to Serve Maturing GKO and Other Obligations 
Figure 1. Current Cost of Servicing GKO-OFZ Compared to Income from Tax 
Collections in 1997 (Trillion Rubles) . Sibirov A., Banks and Industry, 
Bulletin of Financial Information, August 99. 
After raising interest rates to 150% from 94% to stop 
a run on the ruble, the Central Bank's head said that the 
■	 I ■ ■ . .
 
! ■ ;
 
tide had turned and that hard-currency reserves were being 
replenished. Yields on the shortest-term treasury bills, 
which had jumped to around 130% at the height of the panic. 
fell bac c to a still high 50%. But with the Central Bank's 
reserves still at only $15 billion, markets remained 
unstable 
Can Russia Fight Back? The Economist, 6/6/98. 
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 Table 5. Reserves of thei:Central Bank of Russia (in
 
Billions of Dollars)
 
12/31/96 6/30:/91 9/30/97 12/31/97 3/31/98 5/31/98 7/14/98
 
Foreign ex(:hange 11.3 20.4 18.7 12.9 11.9 10.:0 ,: : ■ 5' 
Gold . 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.9 4.9 4.,9 : : 5..'0 ; 
Total 15.3 24.5 23.1., 1.7>8 ; , -16.8: 14 ,. 9 . 13.5 
Table: Can Rtissia Fight: Back? The .Economist^ -' 676/,9'8:-.
 
By.:July:i;9SS:-leconomic success ; of 1997: hurried to dust
 
Sharp drop in,oii: and dther raw^m prices dufirig 1998
 
,deereaspa ^BusSia'S earnings .frpiii. export. This, caused d:he ­
.value o.f Russia'S : oil exports, its main spurde- pf foreign j
 
currency earnings,, to fall, by:almost half in the first:six
 
, rttonths of 1,998 compared to the, same , pe,ri:od, of 1997. The ,;
 
,gpvernment had to .redeem $5: billion,in treasury,- bills, every:­
month' - ver a .third of the, .budget, was going on servicing , , 
: deb:t. : AliO; capital flight out of Russia:increased to, 
.ehormous proportions,. : And an a.GcumulatiOri pf unpaid taxes 
arid unpa d wages has pushed half of Russia's economic 
transact: ons into; barter, thus redu,cing the .collectipn of 
:tax:.:reveri,ue., , h' : , ' ' ' . - ''l' ' ■,- ■7 ■ 'ViV;: ,- 1, 
'■y the: pppulatiPn has withdrawn its money: frpm thd credit, 
institut. ons. Erimarilylin Sbefbank, which held:about :75% 
Cap.iialls't Collapse, : ' ,How '• R-ussia' Can , Reeover. Dollars and Sense, : 
Nov/Dec. ,1:998,. 
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of the savings accounts and 65% (without including the CBR)
 
of all state securities. But the account holders,
 
frightened by announcements regarding the ruble's
 
revaluation, began to withdraw their money from their
 
accounts and convert it to freely convertible currencies.
 
In August-September the flight from the ruble reached 2
 
trillion rubles. 
j ' ■ ■ , . 
The first, mini, crisis was.in November-December 1997. 
On November 11, 1997, the Central Bank raised its 
refinancing rate to 28 percent. CBR handled it mostly due 
to issuing new high-yielding debts. At .the beginning of the 
May-July 1998 crisis, this rate was raised to 150 percent. 
(It V7as reduced to "only" 60 percent as of June 5, but 
increased again to 80 percent as of June 29.) 
Summer 1998: Pre-Crisis
 
, Situation
 
As of summer 1998, from point of view of groups of
 
ownership of Russian commercial banks, banking system did
 
not present homogeny. Every major or leading bank was fully
 
controlled by the group of interconnected people
 
/organizations or government. The type of the ownership,
 
could diA/'ide commercial banks on,following groups:
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• Banks under: Gontrol of th Sberbank,.
 
:Vne£;K.torgbank, Vnesbeconombank/ Rosex
 
; International Hoscow Bank,.: Eufofinance,.. ,
 
Ail these ba.nks atta.c,ked:mo:re than 80%' of deposits,
 
denominat.ed in .rubles: end about 40% of deposits denoinihated
 
in ;foreign . currehcy. of population,and Were deeply :iny"olved
 
in dperatdohs with ■governmental obligations. For example, . 
as df 1.997 65%, of the, revenues of Sberbank came from 
irianipulat.ions with GKO. ''' In addition to , operati.on.s with 
.governmental securities-, issued insid:e the country,, these , ■ 
banks due to close relationship with government were , : : 
serving governmental need on foreign markets , 
Secc nd group ©f ,;;,b,anks we,re prganized by priyati'zation . , 
.l:, :of:: brmer goverhmental, specialized banks: . 
prombank, Vozrozhdenie, Mos:Cow: IndustrialiBank,:: 
I- ' unicombank, Mosbusinessbank, Promstroibank. 
The e banks had about 8-10% of "actives: of banking 
industry ^ The major problem these banks:: ,faced was the tight: 
relationships with depressed, industries,of Russian; , 
,; ; -y Astapoyich, .D;. Sipmolotov, Russian Banks in.1998: Development,:: 
.of G'tisis', Questions of Economics,: 5/1,999. . , ■,■: 
. . -2 A. Astapovieh;, D'.;, SipmolPtov, Russian Banks in ,1998;: Development 
of Crisis,/ Questions of r'.concmics, 5/1999. ■ ■ ; 
64. 
  
 
economics::agriculture, heavy machinery construction,
 
military industry, metal industry and continuous grpwth-Of
 
■ the defaulted■ credits and limited acceptance df 'these^^, 
to the market of interbanking credits plus of . 
banks in this group' .was their existence bf. mahy filials and 
high, coverage : Of^ Country' s territory. 
;i - '"01igarch^i,.:banks -- banka that wefeicreated baseti: on, . . 
tight : relatiohships 'between'several profitable 
. industries: bahkihg-industriai groups (BIG): 
Oheximbank, Incomebank, - Menatep, Rossiisky , Credit ' 
: ' iAlpha-Bank, : M CBS-Agro.^ ' , ; ■ 
These banks presented: the:, private .financial sO.ctor and, 
specialized on serving monetary .flows tf; controlled by 
.banks 	enterprises.. The prima.rk Sdurce.s pf. revenues of this 
group were interbahking cr.edi.ts>: external borrowing, 
deposits of popuiatioh, and sefyice of the.ehterprises ■ 
financial' needs on externai: marke.ts . v 
•	 Next group is very oiose to the previous: banks that . 
: were, created:by the ieading non-governmehtai 
enterprises: (Gaspfombank, NRB, .imperiei Bank,. Gutar 
■ ■ ,Bank, .■Map'o-Bank.' ' ' 
^. A..' Asta.povich, .■ ;D:;: :SipUol'6tov.,;:RuBsian .Banks ■ in 1.998 : ■. .Development: 
of 	Cri'sis, Questions of . Economics,- b/1999. 
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■ • Banks controlled by local (city or regional) 
governments: Bank of Moscow, Promstroibank St.
 
Petersburg, .Bashcreditbank.
 
These banks based their operations on financial
 
resources:of local administrations including resources of
 
regional' budgets.
 
• Gredit orgahizationa with high proportions of foreign
 
capiital: Avtobank, Tokobank, Dialogbank.
 
These banks represented Russian banking system abroad
 
and were more suitable to the "classict description of
 
banks. Their operations were more specialized with .emphasis
 
on operations with low-risk governmental securities.
 
• Bar.ks - branches of foreign credit organizations (16).
 
These banks served foreign companies operating in
 
Russia and were not involved into dealing with Russian
 
companies and population. However, during rise of market of
 
governmental securities, significant part of GKOs belonged
 
?to these banks. In addition, these banks made big number of
 
short-term deals and were active participants of
 
interbanking ruble and currency credits markets. Proportion
 
of foreign starting capital in banking actives did not
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eXcided %, which represented low level:bf
 
internat;idhalization of Russian banking system./'­
:: • \Fingl group - small banks that were not branGhes and
 
did; hot have, rela-tionships with big and.industrial
 
; : /ban'<s, central or local governments.
 
?./belong usually to: private group of people, did:
 
..not have t-ight conriections with industries,. and played
 
insignificant role in banking system.^
 
In may 1998, profitability.of. G.KOs;-rbse up to 80.%/and
 
stock indeXes had .fa11eh 40% which cahbe explain.ed
 
outflow of capital of foreign investors and refusal of
 
governme:it to issue further GKOs and . obligations-with
 
higher profitability... Falling prides on goverhmental
 
obligatipns.led.to.fall of bverali/ capifafi of.
 
banking system fof ' 20%. As of .second/quar . of 1.998, Only
 
six banks out of first 30 showed positive prgfi.tv Maib
 
of banks refused to serve their futures contracts.
 
Criticism- of situation was made greater by lack of legal
 
support of defaults on such deals - courts did not
 
^ A. Astapovich, D. Sipmolotov, Russian.Banks in 199.8: Development
 
of Crisis, Questions of EGonomics, 5./1999. .;
 
^ A. Astapovich, D. Sipmolotov, Russian Banks in 1998: Development:,
 
of Crisis, Questions of Economics, 5/1999,.
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recognize this, kind of deals as official but as bet-deals
 
and refused to force payments.
 
Operations on currency markets grew significantly and
 
reached maximal numbers of operation volumes. Banks were
 
buying qurrency for three major goals:
 
• Serving customers requests including non-residents for
 
transferring money out of the country.
 
.•. Payments of bank's own obligations.
 
• Investments in currency with expectation of ruble
 
devaluation.
 
Although the investments flew into financial markets
 
and period of increasing deposits of population was fairly
 
long, Russian banking system was not able to become
 
affective tool of accumulation and transition of
 
investments. Functions of transformation of savings into
 
investments and credits between diffe.rent sectors of
 
economics did not developed appropriately and credits to
 
industries especially long-term took low proportion of
 
banking actives.
 
• The market of industrial credits did not provide as
 
high profitability as market of governmental
 
obligations. ,
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 Risks of default of credits to enterprises, liquidity
 
and ability to pay of borrowers were poor. Lack of legal
 
support in case of default made banks frustrating and legal
 
actions against debtors long and unpredictable. However, in
 
1997, with stable ruble rate and:increase of deposits,
 
credits to industries and private slightly increased.
 
Banking Credits to Enterprises and Organizations in 1998
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Figure 2. Banking Credits to Enterprises and Organizations in 1998.
 
Astapovich A., Sipmolotoy D. Russian Banks in 1998: Development of
 
Crisis, Questions of Ecdnomics., 5/1999.
 
• In the period from 1995 through . 1997, majority of the
 
banks were involved into manipulations with GKOs and
 
other governmental obligation with revenues from these
 
operations as significant portion of overall profits
 
of banking industry.
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The Droportion of investments into GKO constantly grew
 
throughout the banking industry and reached 12,2% in 1/97
 
from 7.1% inl/96. In early 1998, 40% of 300 biggest Russian
 
commercial banks had about 10% of their actives as
 
governmental obligations, 12% of banks it exceeded 25%.^ But
 
if in; 1995-95, banks' sources, of borrowing were deposits of
 
population, in 1997 - external credits which made banks
 
more sensitive to currency rates.
 
• Stability of ruble made deposits into banks more
 
attractive for population. However, increased activity
 
of population forced banks to improve their
 
reliability and efficiency.
 
Operations with people's deposits are more expensive
 
than with funds of enterprises and require higher expenses
 
for. banks' infrastructure creation and maintenance. In
 
addition, in case.of trouble, the withdrawals of
 
population' savings from banks is more active.
 
• Another factor of banking crisis was the.behavior of
 
top manag.ement of comn\erciar, banks,, ;
 
■ Lack of professionalism and experience, situation when 
banks were created around group of tightly related people. 
Aleksashenko Banking Crisis: Does Fog Go Away? Questions of 
Economics^ 5/1999. ■ 
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or around just one person and, as a consequence, internal
 
hierarchy, and domination of relationships over
 
professionalism, and political influence were common for
 
majority of the banks' top management teams. As of the
 
style of management, funds were spent on wide
 
advertisements and luxury offices; investments decisions
 
were mad.s based on profitability and friendship between the
 
managers rather than risk and liquidity analysis. .
 
• Inadequate legal support and enforcement of banking:
 
laws.
 
Although for several years'of existence of' commercial
 
banking in Russia, Central Bank was,constantly developing
 
laws and regulations; to enforce operations of banks,
 
functions and structure of control, reporting, and dispute
 
solving procedures, ten years were not enough to create
 
optimum,database of regulations that would govern operation
 
Of banking industry effectively and fairly. In. addition.
 
enforcem- mt practices were,inadequate and personnel did not
 
have expi;rience and skills to competently perform the jobs,
 
*	 Asi:-an crisis led to withdrawal of currency investments
 
of foreign residents.
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 Although,Central Bank was able to handle the
 
situation reduced reserves of gold (from 18.4 milliards to
 
12.2 milliards of dollars) provoked rumors and doubted
 
about further stability of ruble. In addition, falling
 
prices of raw and oil materials - major source of currency
 
earnings for Russia - reduces inflow of dollars into
 
country, Trust to the government as guarantee of its
 
obligations was declining, banks began to have troubles
 
with prolongation of contracts with foreign investors and
 
shorter terms to pay back their loans. Decision of
 
government in June of 1998 to stop placement of new.issues
 
of GKOs and other obligations caused rapid loss of value of
 
existing obligations.^ , ,
 
• Reduction of investments of foreign residents.
 
Investments of foreign residents reduced for 0.9
 
milliards of dollars, event that showed changed behavior of
 
external investors. They began to, refuse to,prolong terms
 
of credits and, in the worst cases, to call back'their
 
loans. According to Institute of International Finance,
 
obligations of Russian banks to foreign investors reached
 
's. Aleksashenko. Banking Crisis: Does Fog Go Away? Questions of
 
Economics, 5/1999. ^
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16 milliards of dollars with 13.8 milliards - in short-term
 
credits.
 
The reasons of worsen conditions of commercial banks
 
in 1998 were:
 
• Loss of value of governmental obligations denominated
 
in rubles and foreign currency.
 
• Stopped external financing and refuse of majority of
 
foreign investors to prolong the terms of credits.
 
• Growth of losses and bad debts of enterprises and
 
finance-industrial groups controlled by banks.
 
• Reduced liquidity of banks. Expectations of ruble
 
rumble put banks in front of choice: increase reserves
 
of foreign currency by refusing serving of customers
 
and using funds to buy currency in hope of receiving
 
profit after reevaluation with new rates or serving he
 
customers by selling currency now and having losses.^
 
S. Aleksashenko. Banking Crisis: Does Fog Go Away? Questions of
 
Economics, 5/1999.
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Table 6 Structure of Revenues of Banking System
 
o
Structure of Revenues of Banking System
 
CO
(in % to total revenues) G  \—1
 
1998
 
1996 1997
 
I-II Q 111 Q IV Q
 
Revenues 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 
Interest received from credits 39.0 33.0 32.0 4.5
 
GKOs
 
and other governmental , 29.0 . 14.0 2.5 .
 
Revenues from operations with c 6.,0 12.0 7.0. 50.0 84.0
 
Other revenues , 26.0 33.0 , 9.0
 
1
o
 
o
Table: A. Chernyavsky, Perspectives of Solving Banking Crisis in
 
\—1
 
OL
 
Russia, Q-jestions of Economics, 5/1999.
 
• Recucing, of deposits of population in both currency
 
and	 rubles and "bank runs": expectations of coming
 
Oh.
 
00
 
fin o
ancial troubles and non existent deposit insurance
 
for banks.(no guaranty from the government in case, of
 
bank bankruptcy) made the situation.of loosing
 
everything on accounts real for depositors,
 
One of the specifics of dealing with foreign investors
 
was "cross-default" contracts where if one Of the Russian
 
banks default on payment, other lending banks can request
 
payments from other Russian bank ahead of the schedule. The
 
first defaulted Russian bank was TOKObank, 14^^ of August ­
Imperial, and 17 of August - Menatep. The decision of the
 
government to impose 90-days moratorium is thought to be
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right. The piriiTtary goal of this moratorium was riii
 
organizatiori of talks betvfeen Russian banks and their
 
lender about'reviewing terms of contracts. The
 
first roundof talks started on September 2 in Moscowj
 
hov/ever, after change of management of Ce-htral Bank, talks
 
stopped and every bank was on its own in dealing with
 
lenders.
 
In third quarter, liquidity and profitability of banks
 
sharply dropped, the only profits that were showed came
 
from reevaluation of assets with new currency rates. In
 
fourth quarter, profits and expenses of currency
 
manipulations accounted for 83.7% of profits and 76.8% of
 
expenses of whole banking system which suggest that big
 
propdrti'on of the operations was still tighten to currency
 
actives reevaluation. Growth of bad credits and default on
 
loans of ehterprises and private groups could also
 
characterize this period. Majority"of enterprises
 
especially enterprises- with.'import operation, suffered from
 
growth of ruble.
 
As a result of fall in prices , of Russi.an debts and
 
obligations banks operating on external markets faced
 
Aleksashenko, Banking'Crisis: Does Fog Go Away? Questions of 
Economics, 5/1999. ■ . 
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increased number of margin calls. These banks began to
 
sell huge packages of governmental obligations and delay
 
payments of budget disbursements in order to pay off. needed
 
margin calls. Losses from these paymehts were up to 10
 
milliards of rubles. Banking system began to shake under .
 
the sharp demand of rubles; rubles on accounts in Central
 
Bank went down to 11 milliards.
 
From the beginning of August, SBS-Agro and Incomebank
 
the biggeSt banks with payment servings- of more than half
 
of all feideral tax flows - began to delay payments From
 
11"' of A.ugust due to mass defauits on payments, of
 
IEC ceased to exist. Reducing of resources denomLinated in
 
rubles financial markets caused jumps in interest rates in
 
interbanking credit market.
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 Remainders ofBanks'Fundsin CentralBank
 
Millards ofrubles
 
28 
26 
24 
22 
20 -
18 
16 -
14 
12 
10 
00 00 00. 00 00 00 00 00 00 • 00 00 
i 
o^ 
■ '• I . 
o 
(D 
Q' 
c^■ o^ , o^ o^ ■ 
1 
■c^ a^ o^ 
< , 
o^ 
dr c« 
o^ 
^ O §^ 
o^ 
I 
o 
CL> 
Q 
IRemainders of banks' funds in Central Bank 
Figure 3. Remainders of Banks' .Funds in Central Bank. Astapovich A. ^ 
Sipmoiot.ov D., Russian Banks in 1998: Development of Crisis, Questions 
of Econoiqics, 5/1999. ; ; . 
Fifst jump of profitability on 1-day interbanking 
credits (IBC) .happened in the end of May. Although contra,ct 
of Central, Ba:nk forced rates into its limits, preference of 
dealing in dollars remained strong. Devaluation of market 
of GKO and other governmental obligations destroyed the 
only one, sOhem.e of IBC marketV- credits with GKOs and other 
governmental obligations,as, collateral. Lack of ruble mass 
in Central Bank freed market, mechanisms and interest rates 
rode up and down from middle of June till end of July when 
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non-existence of ruble on market led to absence of deals at
 
all,
 
%annual
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—■—MIACR 1 day 
■ --CeiitralBaik 1Day onMterbanldng 
o CentralBank 1day Rates for D^ositsDenominatedinRuble 
MIACR - .. is,.
Moscow Inter Bank :Actuai.: Rate. calculated as,, average
 
based on , volumes, of deals.ibi:interbanki,ng credit market.
 
Figure 4. Cvernight Interest Rates for 1 Day Credit and .Debit
 
Operations. Astapovich A., Bipmolotov D. Russian, Banks an 1998.:
 
Development of Crisis. Questions of Economics^..5/1999.
 
; . August 1998I: ; 
On August 17, Prime Minister S 
announced that tte,g the ruble to fall 
hrom the former official rate of 6.3 rubles to the U.S, 
stapovich, D. Sipmolotov, Russian Banks in 1998: Developm,ent.' 
of Crrsis. Questions of Econcmics^ 5/1999. 
dollar to 9.5 rubles: to the dollar. Further, a .90-day
 
foreign debt moratorium was announced to prevent further 
capital flight out of country. The Central Bank had to 
interveriie .for two feasons: ■ the outflow of capital and the 
lack of market confidence in a stable exchange rate, given 
the devaluatiohs in Asia and: the fall in world energy 
prices. The Central Bank defended the exchange rate with 
intervention and interest rate increases.
 
De\aluation supposed to have its pluses and .minuses,
 
The devaluatioh would make it much, more expensive to. repay
 
foreign currency-denominated debt. The moratorium has
 
frightened already skeptical investors and likely will
 
reduce foreign, investment for . years to come. But from
 
another point of' view, devaluation has its benefits: It
 
would prreserve the reserves of the Central Bank and improve
 
the com].petitive position of Russian goods and services on
 
both foreign.and domestic markets. For some years now
 
Russia has had a current account surplus, but the IMF is
 
already forecasting a growing trade deficit.,
 
To save banking system. Central Bank and the
 
government.did following:
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• To,reduce pressure on currency reserves of Central
 
Bank: changed limits of currency corridor (moved up
 
and widened). Official rate is agreed to set according
 
to trades' on Moscow Currency Trading Exchange.^
 
• To teduce governmental expenses: stop trading GKOs and
 
other governmental obligation and restructure
 
obligations - default on internal debts by the
 
government. 
i ■ ■ ■ ' ■ ■ 
• To help private sector and banking system:
 
estajblishment of 90-days moratorium on payments to
 
non- residents and margin calls,, insurance payments,
 
and currency deals.
 
Established new currency rate was available only for 9
 
days. Banks were transferring into currency rubles given by
 
Central Bank for liquidity purposes and payment servicing.
 
25 of August fall of exchange rate exceeded 5% and trades
 
on Moscow Currency Stock Exchange were stopped. Floating
 
rate was, introduced September 3 and by September
 
dollar/ruble exchange rate reached 30 rubles for dollar
 
devaluation of 5 times for 3 weeks.
 
A. •Astapo'vlch, ■ D. Sipmolotov, Russian Banks in 1998: Development 
■of Crisis, Questions of Economics, 5/1999. 
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Further fast ruble.devaluation was stopped by
 
introducing rule of mandatory sell of 50% of currency
 
revenues, closing currency licenses for troubled banksy and
 
restructure of mechanism of currency trades to avoid
 
selling currency for speculative goals. Panic of population
 
from banks and ^'bank runs''' were increasing for second half
 
of August. The most pressure was on Moscow banks, which
 
attracted biggest volume of deposits.^
 
Table 7 Volumie of Population Deposits in Commercial Banks
 
Bank
 
Sberbank
 
Incoirebank 
.gro 
Lyiost-bank. 
Rossisky Kredit 
Menatep 
Promstro1bank of Rus s ia ■ * 
Avtobank 
Vorohdenie-
Gasprombank 
Mosbusinessbank 
Promstroibank St. Petersburg 
ONEXIMbank 
Vnesht;orgbank
 
Total for banks above
 
Other banks
 
Total deposits of population
 
Volum.e of 
deposits ■ Percent 
(mlrd rubles) of Total {%) 
133.2 .69.2 
7.5 3,.9 
7.3 3.8 
2.7 1.4 
2.6 1.4 
2.1 1.1 
1,3 0.7 
1.2 0.6 
0.8 0.4 
0.8 0.4 
0.8 0.4 
0.8 0.4 
0.7 0.4 
0.7 0.4 
162.5 84.5 
29.9 15.5 
192.4 100.0 
Table: Astapovich, D. 8ipmolotov^ Russian Banks in 1998: Development of
 
]:risis. Questions of Economdcs^^ 5/1999,
 
- 'A. Astapovich, D. Sipmolotov, Russian Banks in 1998: Development
 
of Crisis Questions of Economics, 5/1999.
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 The LCtsthat were taken to ease the situation and
 
reduce, pressure on banks were limits of withdrawal from
 
accounts in rubles and currency, payment of currency
 
accounts ih ruble often v>/ith lower than market rate,,
 
creating of preliminary,list for withdrawals. According to
 
Central Bank, volume of deposits in August only, was reduced.
 
for 4% in rubies and for 18% in currency,
 
Central Bank also had forbidden to Six majo.r banks to
 
have any operations with deposits and requested to transfer
 
aGGGunts df, private depositors to Sberbank. Currency
 
accounts would be transferred to rubles with fixed rate of
 
9.33 rubl s per dollar. Transferring deposits under this
 
scheme meant losses to up to 50% for currency accounts due
 
to continuous devaluation o.f ruble and lost interest rates. ,
 
The main question of relationships between foreign and
 
Russian banks was about payments on futures,,currency deals.
 
From 8/17/98 the trades on Moscow,vCurrency:,.Stock, Exchange
 
(MCSE) were stopped and the, yoiume of operi positions on
 
future and forward deals were estimated in one milliard of
 
dollars with 1/3 of it belonged,to foreign investors. MCSE
 
decided that banks would pay off such deals till end of
 
October with rate established as of 8/14/98 (7.1-7.4
 
rubles for dollar) small percentage of foreign
 
■ 82, 
investor was agreed to this type of rate, otherd were
 
demanding of payments according current market exchange
 
rate. This decision worsen situation around external debts
 
for banks still capable of serving their payment
 
obligations."^
 
As a result of mass play on rise of ruble in the
 
middle of September, the exchange rate grew up within four
 
days from 20.8 to 8.7 rubles for dollar, but later had
 
fallen baick to.16.4 rubles per dollar. However, during this
 
period some banks were capable to pay off their obligations
 
and some even to earn a profit on currency manipulation.
 
From ceasing of GKOs and other governmental
 
obligations markets, the most suffering bank was Sberbank,
 
which held up to 2/3 of its actives in governmental
 
obligations (83 milliard of ruble),. Other banks that
 
endured big hit from GKOs were banks investments in such
 
obligations of more than 20% of their actives - about 170
 
of them v/ith 40 - regional. Majority of these banks had
 
foreign initial capital. In comparison with leading big
 
banks, majority of smaller regional and small banks did not
 
suffered much from internal defaul"t due to limited access
 
Astapovich, D. SipirLOlotov, Russian Banks in 1998: Development
 
of Crisis, Questions of Econcmics, 5,/1999. ,
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to eurreocy operations and insignificant investments into
 
' GKQSy
 
■ E'ormer leading banks in the second half of August; 
■	 V* .' Tried to rebuild liquidity. They were counting on 
form government and Central Bank, local 
administrations with local budget resources, and 
exrsting currency reserves.. 
Fought with "bank runs'- by offering different schemes
 
of festructuring of depdsits into .long-term
 
obligations and refusing in registration, of legal' . ,
 
action from depositors.
 
• Sepa.rated vital and potentially profitable parts of
 
ban^s, transferring clients and their own resources
 
into 	filials. Part of resources was transferred abroad
 
under scheme of sellouts of actives to pay obligations
 
to foreign clients.^
 
Tried to solve problems with payments to foreign
 
investors. Banks were mostly on their own and were
 
responsible for talks to restructure their external
 
debts.
 
'A. Astapovich, D. Sipmolo.tov, Russian Banks in 1998: Development.
 
of Crisis, Questions of Economics, 5/1999.
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 Table 8. Obligations of Russian Banks to Foreign Investors
 
Obligation of Russian Banks to Foreign Investors
 
(as of 10/1/1998, millions of dollars)
 
Volume
 
of
 
Issued Forward
 
Bank Short- Credits
 
EurobondsContracts
 
Term 
Debts 
Sberbank 100 225* 0 325 
Vneshtorgbank 356 120 0 608 
SBS-Agro 631 113** 0 84 
Menatep 515 80** 0 100 
GNEXIMbank 353 70** 300 1900 
MFK 97 0 0 51 
Incomebank 274 140** 0 1884 
Alpha-bank 214 y y ** 175 0 
Most-bank 129 0 0 0 
Rossisky Kredit 118 229** 200 70 
NRB 208 42 0 268 
Bank of Moscow 15 20 0 0 
Avtobank 108 47 0 380 
Vorozhdenie 51 0 0 0 
Totals: 3169 1163 675 5670 
* Paid 
** Delayed / in process of restructure
 
Table: A. Astapovich, D. Sipmolotov, Russian Banks in 1998: Development
 
of Crisis, Questions of Economics, 5/1999.
 
Governments and Central Bank play active role in
 
developing, maintaining, and controlling the banking system
 
of the country. According to S. Aleksashenko, there are
 
four main directions of such actions:
 
• Solving crisis of liquidity.
 
One of the most painful experiences of banking crisis
 
is liquidity problem when banks are not capable to perform
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 payment functions between economic entities. The crisis of
 
payments should be solved first of all before business
 
connections are broken. To solve the crisis of 17 of August
 
1997V Central Bank offered to Incomebank and SBS-Agro - two
 
biggest banks involved into interbanking Credits
 
operations. Although to offer credit in that situations
 
would resuit in spending it on buying currency, .Central
 
Bank by doing so was trying to stop,domino effect of
 
payments defaults.
 
Central Bank also reduced reserve requirements for
 
banks, using part of reserve for payment obligations (10
 
milliard rubles), some of the banks including Sberban.k
 
received credits to pay the depositors (population) (15
 
milliard rubles), transfer of deposits from banks-bankrupts
 
to Sberbank to stop "bank runs"; ruble devaluation allowed
 
banks to sell currency and serve payments in rubles (from
 
middle o September till end of October Bank of Russia
 
bought around 2 milliard of dollars - 30 milliard rubles).
 
Although Central Bank was able to solve liquidity problem,
 
it was not able to.stop further ruble devaluation and
 
growth of prices
 
^ s. Aleksashenko. Banking Crisis: Does Fog Go .Away? Questions of 
Economics, 5/1999. ■ ' 
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 • Improving control over banking industry and creation
 
of legal basement.
 
Political fights and conflicts of interest between
 
higher and lower lines of government caused non-acceptance
 
of suggested law of deposits insurance; law about
 
bankruptcy was under consideration of low line of
 
government - Duma - for two years and become out of date
 
when fina.lly was approved. One of the other main
 
deficiencies of control of banking system in Russia is
 
decentralization of agencies performing control over
 
financial institutions.
 
Restructure of banking systeml
 
Restructure of banking system,/is. organizational
 
checkup and foreclosure of instable banks and banks closed
 
to bankruptcy. At the same time government creates a list
 
of banks it is not interested to be closed based on social
 
and polltical reasons. Reorganization actions for such
 
banks are created including the limitation and sometime
 
total replacement of management and stakeholders. As of.
 
February 1999, 397 banks were recognized to be closed in
 
the future (every 4^"^ bank).^ However, with the level of
 
Aleksashenko. Banking Crisis: Does Fog Go Away? Questions of
 
EconQmics, 5/1999.
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 legal regulations of closures and forced bankruptcies and
 
level of business activity of appropriate agencies, to
 
bankrupt these banks will take 3-4 years. In addition,
 
these banks can file contracts against "illegal" acts of
 
such agencies in the higher courts and prolong time.
 
• Recapitalization of banks.
 
The important goal of overcoming the financial crisis
 
is to rebuild and recapitalize banking system in general
 
and most important banks separately. There are two sources:
 
depositsj of population and resources of the. government. The
 
problem as government sees it is that roots of financial
 
crisis were in excessive currency risk and high involvement
 
in manipilatioh with governmental securities. Therefore,
 
the tradjltional method of banking system recapitalization ­
!
 
buyout o "bad." actives from banks - is not feasible,
 
Central Bank could, however, offer credits under
 
guarantee of stocks and ownerships of banks or full buyout
 
of banks Low level of savihg,s of population, political and
 
business interests conflicts -such as .51;% of stocks is equal
 
100% and 49% - 0% in management, refuse to make any changes
 
by current management, and low current attractiveness of
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Russian economy for external investments.would be the rakes
 
of effective implementation of recapitalization program.^
 
• Hope for.real sector.
 
Because of devaluation of .governmental securities and
 
relatively stable ruble rates, banking, system of credits
 
started to become more industry oriented as it was in 1992­
95. Volr.me of credits to industrial enterprises increased
 
from 9.4% to 11% in 1998. Now banks face limited range of
 
prdfitafcjle. placement of funds. Governmental credits to
 
banks to improve liquidity do not find effective
 
investment. Following graph compares profitability of
 
investments into different sectors of industry with
 
profitability of operations on market of interbanking
 
credits and manipulation with GKOs,
 
, 's. A.leksashenko. Banking Crisis: Does,Fog Go Away? Questions of
 
Economics, 5/1999.
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Profitability ofIndustrial Sectors of Economy
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Figure 5. Protitability of Industrial Sectors of Economy. Sibirov A. 
Banks and Industry, Bulletin of Financial Information, August 99. 
■ ■ 
Deposits of enterprises denominated in rubles grew in 
1998-1999, purchasing power of enterprises increased 28% 
from crisis till, the end of the year 1998. There is a good 
chance that resources of enterprises would be the main 
source of resource growth of banking, system and, since 
volume of such funds is tightly related to volume of 
credits to enterprises, credits to enterprises will 
increase as well. 
90 
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Trends ofBanking Credits to Industries
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Figure 6. Trends of Banking Credits to Industries. Aleksashenko S.
 
Banking Crisis: Does Fog Go Away? Questions of Economics, 5/1999.
 
Although the debts of industrial sector to banks grew,
 
in 1998 bank credits to industrial banks reduced. The
 
structure: of banking credits began to change towards
 
crediting' industries oriented on finished consumers' goods,
 
export, and industries that would replace import - metal
 
industry. forestry, food industry and machine sector.
 
• Creation of ARKO.
 
Sine:;e early 1998 the Bank of Russia has been committed
 
to the restructuring of the banking system in order to
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irhprove .coitttfiercial banks' aPtivifcy and^ enhance their
 
liquidity. The key part of that prdgram-^w set-up of .
 
the Agency for Restructurihg of Gredit Organizations (ARCO i
 
or ARKO)-.:; After Rhssia's finhhcial systera expiodedr pushing
 
most of, the country's banks ,into ihsoivency:/:. not, a , single;
 
nt . One has.been properiy : wound..up. The World Bank ,
 
estimatebl that,, at the top 18 banks alone,, liabilities:
 
exceed assets by $9.8 billion. .
 
After crisis of August 1998, Central Bank divided .all
 
Commercral banks into four categories;: .
 
• Crecit organizations Survived crisis and do not have
 
financial troubles.
 
• Stable regional banks, which will receive assistance . .
 
frorr. .Central. Banks.
 
em banks., whioh could not operate,on their own but.
 
which should be kept operating due to social and
 
economio reasons. ' c
 
Hopeless banhs without.significant.accounts of
 
enterprises or.population deposit.
 
'S..; Aleksashenko..Banking Crisis; Does' Fog.Go.Away? Questions of 
Economics, '5/i99"9.:. ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ' ■ ■ : i , ,1. ' ■■ " 
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 ARIvO was crea;ted as commercial organization to
 
continue this reconstruction of banking system started by
 
Central Bank. It should determine banks worth to offer
 
credits. establish size of credits, force bankruptcies,
 
etc. Central Bank established starting capital of ARKO of
 
10 milliards of rubles but additional funds would be
 
available also.
 
The hardest part,of operations would be to evaluate,
 
select, and support banks of third group. These banks can
 
offer as collateral for credits only, their own stocks.
 
Therefore, ARKO would be involved in managing and operating
 
of such banks majority of which were- leading banks before
 
crisis and managed by respectful "oligarchs". The guestion,
 
that arises from this situation is that in case if control
 
packets of these banks belong to ARKO then ARKO obtains
 
powerful influence over whole financial,system.^
 
, Ide;a Of creation of ARKO was,b,ofh; by Central Bank,
 
which in fact, controls ARKO ulthQugh if was supposed to be
 
commerc:ial credit organization. Through ARK0> Central Banks
 
can ao around the lav7, which forbids Central Bank to
 
pafticipate in-activities and, take part in capitals of any
 
j- K Simonov, ARKO Beginning of Great Advantage. Banking
 
Bu-siness, 3/1999.
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 commercial banks. 100% of ARKO stocks would be held by
 
governmental organization - Russian Fund of Property with
 
possibility of, transfer of 49% of portfolio to Central
 
Bank. The majority of ARKO personnel consisted of former
 
Central Banks employees and management - of active leaders
 
of Centra1 Bank.,
 
Unt 1 creation of ARKO, Central Banks performed these
 
actions. Central Bank's move to revoke the licenses of 12
 
commercial banks in 1998 looked promising. The 12 included
 
the once leading banks - Bank Menatep and Unikombank, which
 
had the argest branch network in the area around Moscow.^
 
Naming the 12 will not change situation - partly because
 
none has done much business lately. Menatep, for example.,
 
had tran^ferred ail its good assets to its subsidiary in
 
St. Petersburg. That now operates as a separate bank, and
 
runs all of Menatep's former branches in Moscow. All that
 
was.left for the Central Bank to liquidate wh-s an empty
 
facade, once the center of the financial and industrial
 
empire built up by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, one of Russia's
 
oligarchs
 
, Russian Banks:, Stable Doors.' Economist. May 22, '1,999.
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 Nor was there much left of Unikombank. Its extensive
 
branch network in the suburbs of Moscow was recently taken
 
over by Guta-Bank, which is controlled by the city
 
governnaent. Some of the smaller among the 12 banks were .
 
running what has become quite a common tax-evasion scheme,
 
Company ith a tax bill pays the managers of a defunct but
 
still lieensed bank a fifth of its tax arrears; the bank
 
pretends to have received the full amount, but fails.to
 
make the transfer to the government.^
 
Closing down a mere 12 banks is not going to
 
drastically change this.situation. By one estimate more
 
than 100 banks are now technically insolvent and more
 
bankruptcies must surely follow, not just to improve the
 
health oi the banking system, but also to boost tax
 
collection.
 
However, interest from Cabinet,of Ministers toward
 
ARKO was almost identical with interest of Central Bank
 
control cver banking sector- and Cabinet Of Ministers can
 
change f. e regulations, which govern activities of .ARKO,in
 
drder to get control over the organization.
 
1 •
Russian Banks: Stable Doors. Economist> May 22, .1999.
 
95
 
Since ARKO started its operation in 1999, the
 
performance was hot what was. expected. The organization is
 
not properly financed, does not have appropriate authority,
 
experience, and reputation. By the time,agency began
 
operations majority of funds were already spent. Central
 
Bank, which performed activities of ARKO, issued credits to
 
banks in 1998 with maturity of 1 year and by 1999 could not
 
collect majority of its loans. Central Bank offered
 
prolongation and transferred loans to ARKO. The volume of
 
activities is also higher than ARKO can handle.
 
Of the few banks that ARKO helped to lose their
 
licenses, most were.those trying to deal honestly with
 
their creditors; the immediate violator is the bank-

restructuring agency, ARKO itself. The evidence so far
 
suggests that ARKO was less harmful doing nothing. Just
 
hours after it announced that it, was putting $127 million,
 
nearly a third of its war chest, into Promstroibank ­
survivor with, supposedly, a chance of meeting its
 
obligati ns—the Central Bank of Russia announced that it
 
would withdraw its license.
 
Now ARKO works with small and average banks and its
 
activity does not aim on increasing stability and
 
recapitalization of banking industry, but on financial help
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to small banks to meet their ends. Funds available are
 
barely enough to help meet financial obligations of banks
 
and cannot significantly, reconstructure or change situation
 
in the bainks.
 
ARKO governor, Viktor.Geraschenko, said that 130 bank
 
licenses would be withdrawn year 1999.^ There has been no
 
official censure of ensuring stronger control against, the
 
widespread asset stripping. One bank, . Menatep, closed, only
 
to reopen as a new, debt-free, legal entity based in St.
 
Petersburg. Some other banks, merged into new ones, leaving
 
their debts behind. SBS-Agro set up a'' convincing-sounding
 
First Mutual Credit Society for new accounts,..but refuses
 
to pay out on old ones—despite receiving at,.least $300m
 
from the goyernment.in aid and loans.^ After the August
 
crisis, the Central Bank, gave banks about $.3.5 billion in
 
credits. But m.uch of the money was wasted as banks switched
 
ruble creidits into dollars and. transferred them to hard-to­
trace accounts abroad.^
 
In summer 1998 Standard & Poor's credit rating service
 
gave six Russian banks their very lowest rating "N.M." for
 
The Great Pretenders.- Economist, August 21, 1999,
 
The Great Pretenders. Economist, August;21, 1999.
 
The Great Pretenders. -Economist, August 21, 1999.
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 "not meaningfu Four of the six are among the group of -12,
 
leading banks pooling their resources in an attempt to stay
 
afloat. "It all depends on the Central Bank," said A1 ,
 
Breach, an l econdmid' analyst - at Moscow';s Russiah-Eurqpean
 
Center :for Economic .i Policyl "They/will . h to decide how ­
to bail out the banks, and which ones:! to keep in place.
 
■t/i. :/t^:.-/: 'l-tear' '19^ ' ..v^^ l'/ I'^'^' ­
; '/-Russia: has a, large and growing pnblic debt (i.e. 
gover.nitent- security T-bills, ' and ■ so on) . External public, 
debt is currently estiitiated to be about .$120 billion, .and. 
' internal. ic debt at arOuhd ..$60 to !$.80 billion. The . .. 
. ex.ternal.; debt was mainly inherited, from the USSR. Accordihg 
/to:tre'schedulihg agreements, in th.e years 1996.-98 abOut. $:9,5 
to $11 billion per year shohld be-paid in interest/and 
epayments, rising.to $16 billion beginning 
'in,/l999 ahd to/.$20 /billion beginning / in .20:02., assuming no . , 
: further/;1oans/ after.-1996.. Since . Russia has. already borrowed, 
mOre abroad, external debt '.seryieing /obligations starting 
in 2002 are likely to be In.the $25 tp /$30 billion range.^ . 
ling/ .Through; ■ The ;Rubie rRubble. /•Chrishian .Science ^Mpnitor.,/
/8y'll/l:998v' 
. /The Russian Financial Panic And The IMF. Problems of Post-
Communism, / Septertiber-October I998>/'/ .,,;;; 
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 ^ Even:the most optimistic bankers no longer expect
 
Russia t0 pay the: entiro $17.5 billion in interest and ,
 
that:is due .: ;Without further;aid,;'evenifinding, • 
the $9 billion Russia needs; to service the debt inGufred ' 
since 1991 lobts- impossible.:;:The: cbuhtry's ^ annuai current-
account surplus, excluding interestlpayments,!is a healthy ; 
$18 billion. But Russi:a:ns' .feluctahce tp .invest at home, or 
hold'.tiieif bwh curfency,.means that;mosf.of the .inflow,y, 
flies straigbt out of;the country tolSwitzerlaud,; U or' 
Gyprus, Littie..reaches the.tax' coileCtprs^,^^^^ the Central 
Bank's , reserVes Neither the gbvernment not. the Central ^ y 
Bank can pay Russia's debts. lax.revenues last year were 
running at arbund;'$1 biliion^;a mohth/.^ less,tha.n .those of .' 
New York City. The central goverhment .was spendihg $1.5 . ; 
billion a month. y- i i;;- 1: ■ :'7 
hough tax collection is imprpVin.g/: thefe. is no^.' ;.y^yy
 
chance of finding $9 billion from./that.. . Gnly .:$^^ of
 
country's $11.6 billion reserves axe./in eash; the bare
 
minimum, to cover a month's importS,,i.is/.$4:.bM Were
 
the state to drain central-bank reserves as well as sell
 
gold and shares in state-owned energy companies, chiefly . / .
 
Gazprom, it would raise only some .$4 ; billion. That is not
 
enough to.pay the'iMF>;;/let-alone Satisfy/all the other
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• '' l ■ ; 
■ ■ ■ 
creditor . The Russian budget for 199? assumes that $7
 
biliion will come from new international credits. But
 
bufued by defauit.bf: August 19:9,87; we'Stern bankers :say they
 
^would rather! nuclear waste-than end to Russia in its
 
current tate'. . Foreign, gbvernments might lend a little,
 
but 'only
 if the IMF and its sister br^anizations also help
 
- . . 1

•with some cash
 
■ ;'^;Russ'ia's:' Debts;}, . ■ 
What are; fhe: Russia''s: most . important debts? The :chief 
. ciaimant:is,.are:.
 
-• Eurcbbnds.
 
No :Cbuntry,has eyer defaulted,or'restfuctured a
 
sovereign Eurobond. Russia.does :not whnt to be the first,
 
Default on one of isSues. triggers crobs~default on all'
 
others, .ir
akinb. tbe whole amount on .all outstanding
 
Eurobonds: . due irnmediately,. :Anyway, . RuSsia • wi11;^,want :to ­
raise more..mbney in the future. Because the;.amount due this
 
year is only $1.7 billion, Russia may; yeb succeed, in:
 
serviGing";its Eurobonds. In any case, : a''. -­
. restruGturing;would;be.difficult .(although Pakistan is now
 
Mon !Y Can:,',t Buy'Me Love. The Economist, 2/6/99.
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being asked to do it), because the bonds are held in small .
 
chunks ($10,000 is the minimum holding) by thousands of
 
investors all round the world. j
 
• Other foreign private-sector creditors (inherited
 
external Soviet era debts). j
 
These account for $27 billion in irescheduled debt from
 
Soviet days. Although one kind, known^as lANs, which are
 
notes representing rescheduled interest payments, has
 
priority and is being honored, the majority, which are
 
restructured principal, known as PRINS, are already in
 
default. In theory, banks representing the bondholders
 
could sue. In practice, they are unlikely to do so..This is
 
partly because they fear Russia's ungraceful memory. It
 
also reflects the slight chance of a better deal - Russia
 
is now offering hew lANs instead of cdsh.
 
• The multilaterals.
 
International financial institutions are supposed to
 
come top of the range of debt holders, as "preferred
 
creditors". The biggest part is hold by the IMF, which is
 
technically unable to reschedule or rollover debt.
 
• Western governments (Paris and London Clubs). ..
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Most of this debt■; was; resehedu1ed after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Government-to-gpyefnment loans are 
hard to collect; their repayment depehds chiefly oh 
political relations..A deal with the IMF: would' involve, 
another restructuring of this debt, but there would:'be fury 
- particijlarly in Germany,; :,;:which ,ha^^ 4 payment due thiis 
year ^ 
• „ MinFins. : ; (goyernmental bonds, GKOrand QFZ; 
These, are- fuble ,an,d dollaf-denomilnated, bonds, issued^ 
domestically 	by Russia since 1993. Forfeign,,investb hold, 
the rest is held bytlocal investors. " 
Rusdians;. 
The most patient and long-suffering creditors are 
those whose salaries, pensions and budgets have been left 
unpaid for months. Wage and pension arrears currently stand 
at 77 billion rubles ($3.1 billion); the backlog on 
maintenance, investment and other public-sector bills is 
incalcu1dble. 
&ori s Nemtsov said in an interview at ithe Harvard , 
symposium	 that it is necessary to restructure Russia's 
debts, spreading repayment over 30 to'50 years. Russia's 
central overnment, he noted, has revenues of $20 billion 
.02 
to $22 billion. It owes $17.5 billion on its debts this
 
year.^ Under the current system, it is impossible to make
 
that large payment and carry on normal government spending
 
for defense, for instance, he said. Mr. Maslyukov is
 
reported as saying, wants the holders of its Soviet-era
 
debts to forgive 75 cents on the dollar. Almost half of
 
Russia's $148 billion in total external debts was piled up
 
by the Soviet Union before its breakup in 1991. Maslyukov
 
was likely making an opening gambit for future debt
 
rescheduling negotiations. The percentage forgiven may end
 
up less than 75 percent.^
 
Recent meeting of Russian President with premier-

minister of Germany showed that European financial
 
Community is not going to forgive any part of debt and
 
views Russia as capable of carrying out its obligations.
 
Russia's economy remains precarious after the August
 
1998 financial collapse. Gross domestic product fell by 4.6
 
percent year of 1998 and estimated to fall by another
 
percentage point in 1999 and 2000. Except for 1997, GDP has
 
decreased every year for the past decade, with an
 
^ Steadying A Giant. Christian Science Monitor, January 25, 1999.
 
^ Economic Scene. Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1999.
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accumulated decline, since 1991 of 40 percent. Inflation
 
rose to 4 percent in 1998 and remains high. Yet Russia may
 
have finally passed its bottom. Industrial production will
 
likely ihcrease significantly this year, and the fastest^
 
growing ndustries are not raw materials but machinery,
 
forestry textiles, food, and construction materials,
 
suggesting a qualitative change. The higher oil price helps
 
too^a $5 rise brings in, at least in theory, an extra $900m
 
a month.
 
At ong last, business restructu,ring and new product
 
developm'ent appear to have caught on.|Moscow shops have
 
been suddenly flooded with good Russian produce, in many
 
cases, last seen in the 1960s. Barter is abating, from 54
 
percent of industrial firms' sales in;August 1998 to 46
 
percent h January 1999. Major companies paid 49 percent of
 
their February 1999 taxes in real money, compared with only
 
35 percent last August., Bankruptcies have multiplied,
 
forcing malfunctioning companies.out and allowing good
 
companies to thrive. Profitability is improving,
 
The financial crisis imposed hard budget constraints
 
on both usinesses and governments, which pushed them to
 
achieve real economic growth. But the;ruble's devaluation
 
has sharply cut imports and turned around Russia's external
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finances. Russia is therefore unlikely to default oh itS; 
externa], debt, even if it receives no -IMF or. World Bank;, 
funding this year. The Russian stock index has tripled 
since October 1998, indicating that there is renewed ■reason 
to worry about too much foreign port olio investinent too 
quickly, 
Industrial output during April-June 1999 exceeded the 
levels of one year earlier by over- 5 [percent on average. 
The recovery appears to have been primarily led by import 
substitution following the depreciation of the ruble, 
,Fo,reign .exchange .market . pressufes have also eased, and: the. 
ruble hais stabilized, while monthly inflation has come down 
to uhdei'^ percent in June,y:reflectij|ig a tightening of 
fiscal and monetary policies. 
Th€i improved revenue performance reflects the recovery 
in output, the impact of the ruble depreciation and higher 
energy p)rices on the tax base, and aiji effort to improve tax 
collecti.ons. The overall balance of . payments^ has 
also become stronger. Following the recent recovery of 
energy prices and a sharp compressioh of imports, the 
external current account, on a cash i>asis, has swung from a 
winner Takes It All. ForeignAffairs/ 9/1/99. 
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deficit of $2.7 billion in the first quarter.of 1998 to a
 
surplus of $4,8 billion in the first quarter of 1999.
 
On paper, Russia has made enough progress in
 
rearranging its finances to make a new credit from the IMF
 
seem defensible. The ruble's deyaluatioh has pushed up
 
Russian xndustry, at least for now. Coupled with a higher
 
oil price, it has helped the governrflent collect more taxes
 
and balance its books. That keeps interest rates down. The
 
economy nay even grow slightly; if so, it will be for only
 
the second time in years of chaotic reform.
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Table 9. Russia: Selected Economic Indicators
 
(Annual percentage changes
 
• Production |and prices
 
Real trDP |
 
Change in consumer prices
 
Annual average
 
12-month'
 
Change in GDP deflator
 
(In percent of GDP)
 
■ 	 Public sector"^ 
Federal government 
Overall balance 
Prim.ary balance 
Revenue
 
of which: cash.
 
Expenditure
 
Interest
 
Non-interest
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
-3.5 0.8 -4.6 -2.0 
47.6 14,6. 27.8 • 92.5 
2,1.8 1.0 84.4 50.0 
43.9 16.6 11.4 74.9 
-8.4 -7.1 -5.9 • -5.1 
-2.5 -2.5 -1.3: 2.0 
12.5 , 12.3 ,10.7 11.6 
9.2 10.0 9.0 11.6 
20.9 . 19.0 15.6 13.9 
5.9 4.7 ,4.0 4.3 
15.0 14.3 . 11.6,, 9.6 
In billions of U.S dollars u.nless otherwise indicated)
 
External sector-

Total exports., fob
 
Total imports, fob
 
External cilirrent account
 
(deficit -)
 
Federal goyrnmnt external
 
Debt service due
 
As percent of exports of
 
goods and services
 
Stock of federal.'
 
government;external debt
 
As percent of GDP
 
Gross reserves coverage
 
(months,of imports,of
 
goods and services)
 
(Units as indicated)
 
Memorandum items:
 
Nominal■GDP (billions
 
of rubles)
 
Exchange rate (rubles per
 
US$ period average)
 
90.6 89.0 ■ 74.8 72.1 
- 72.8 77 . 4 56.8 , 46.1 
3.9 -3.0 2.3 11.4 
17.2 . 15. 9- . ■ 17.4 18.5. 
17.0, 15.4 19.8 22.3 
136.1 134.6 152.4 157.0 
32. 6 . 30.9 48,7 93.1 
2.0 2.2 2.0 2.6 
2, 14 6 2, 522 2, 685 4, 600 
■5,1 5.8 9.7 
Table: Russians Crisis. , Capital and Class, Summer 1999. 
The core problem of the Russian economy is still the 
budget deficit. Also, the state has failed to establish an 
107 
effective taxation system and especially a mechanism for
 
the collection of tax revenue. Additionally, continuing
 
high levels of capital flight into tax havens have removed
 
resources which could be used for productive investment:
 
more thaji 90 percent of companies trading on the Russian
 
stock exchange are registered in Cyprus, and more than $76
 
billion has been illegally exported since 1991.^
 
Next,step would be creating guarantied and profitable
 
conditions for average Russian to place his or her savings
 
in the banks - necessary element of efficient banking
 
system.
 
Although average,Russians lost about $2 billion in the
 
August banking crash, economists estimate that there are
 
further $40. billion to $60 billion in hard-currency savings
 
that remain hidden in places other than banks. That amount
 
of money, if unlocked, and injected into the domestic
 
economy, might go far to stimulate Russian industry and
 
commerce into growth after almost a decade of steady
 
decline. "Ordinary people are hoarding staggering amounts
 
of dollars. Thanks to the extreme distrust of the ruble and
 
the official .financial system, all that money remains
 
Russia's Cris.is. .Capital and Class, Summer 1999.
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frozen in economically inert forms," says Leonid Vardomsky,
 
an economist with the Institute of Economic Studies in
 
Moscow...
 
Following the August crisis, Russia's Central Bank
 
promised to guarantee all deposits stuck in failed
 
commercial banks "100 percent." In September the government
 
announced all accounts transferred to the state-owned
 
savings bank, Sberbank, would be redeemed by Nov. 30 - but
 
in rubles, at a rate of 9.3 on the dollar. Sberbank even
 
began paying back depositors from four failed private banks,
 
- Menatep, MOST Bank, Mostbusiness bank and Promstroybank.
 
More;,are', e to join the list. 'Alexander Torkunov,.
 
spokesman for the Gentral Bank,.says the goyernment will
 
provide 5 billion rubles (about $250 million) to redeem
 
some 300,000 defaulted accounts. That still leaves
 
thousands of depositors out.
 
The future role of institutional inyestors is.still an
 
open IS ue..Ontil recently banks were not the owne.rs
 
of share:s of:noh-^financial..Gompa and. mutu .pension
 
..and.; insu,raneeIfunds are just starting .to emefg;e. In the.
 
Russian, banks investment in non-govern'ment
 
Letting,:.;Fo.reign Banks- Russia? Christian Science Mbnitof,
 
1219/1998, 1 ■
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securities increased.from 1% of total assets in the
 
beginning of 1995 (as compared to 3% in the American banks
 
and much more in other Western countries) to about 10% in
 
mid 1997. Still, according to the CBR, in late 1997 total
 
investment of,Russian banks into the companies shares
 
amounted to 8 trillion rubles ($1.4 billion), or just about
 
1.5% of total stock market capitalization. This numbers
 
fell sharply after August crisis of 1998, but hopefully
 
will com4 back.^
 
In ihe 100 largest Russian corporations the share of
 
stocks owned by financial institutions is somewhat higher ­
- 18%, but the proportion of stocks belonging to outsiders
 
is also higher, so that the share of financial institutions
 
in totalioutsider ownership is approximately the same for
 
the large and largest companies - about 1/3. Besides,
 
industrial companies control banks more often than banks
 
control industrial companies: Gazprom alone by early 1998
 
was the major shareholder in three large banks
 
(Promstroybank,. Natsionalniy Reservniy Bank, Imperial) and
 
was going to buy Inkombank (all these banks went bankrupt
 
^ The,Financial System In Russia Compared To 'Other Transition
 
Econoiuies: The Anglo-American.Versus The German-Japanese. Comparative
 
Economic Sjtudies, Spring 1999'.
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in summer 1998). Recent developments were even less
 
favorable to major banks: the August :1998 financial crisis
 
undermined the positions of FIGs bringing some of them to
 
the verge of bankruptcy and forcing others to sell their
 
industrial property to pay back the debts.
 
It is reasonable to predict that high-income
 
inequalities will persist in the foreseeable future: even
 
if the government is to adopt a strong social policy, it
 
has only limited abilities to fight illegal incomes - a
 
major source of income differentiation, to collect taxes
 
(especially personal income taxes), and to increase
 
expenditure on welfare.
 
Recent, and very interesting, studies by of the
 
Oneksimbank (owner of Norilsk Nickel- biggest supplier
 
nickel alloys, one of top four in. the world) and Menatep
 
groups characterize their activities towards acquired firms
 
as, first and foremost, preparation for resale, while Alfa
 
Bank publicly proclaims this as a primary, goal. As a source
 
of working capital, bank credits were traditionally very
 
important in light and food industries, machinery and
 
equipment and wood industries (i.e. exactly those sectors
 
that recorded the greatest reduction of output in recent
 
years); whereas in resource industries (fuel and energy,
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steel and non-ferrous metals) over. 90% of the working
 
capital was financed from internal sources.
 
There is an obvious negative relationship between the
 
exposure of particular industries to bank credit and the
 
growth of employment and real wages: the more exposed
 
industries are normally poorly performing machinery and
 
equipment and light industry, while the less exposed are
 
fuel and electric energy, steel and non-ferrous metals. The
 
share of Russian industrial enterprises not using bank
 
credits ait all increased from 22% in 1994 to 32% in 1996
 
(37% in resource industries).^
 
Paradoxically, the performance of these enterprises in
 
terms of output,. employment and investment change, capacity
 
utilization, wages, financial conditions, orders and
 
inventories was superior to those that used bank credits.
 
To put in differently, it was the poorly performing
 
companies that borrowed from banks, while bank credits were
 
regarded as the financial source of last resort and were
 
used not for the expansion of output (and even less so-for
 
capital.investment), but for survival.
 
The Financial System In Russia.Compared To Other Transition
 
Economies: The .Anglo-American Versus The German-Japanese. Comparative
 
Economic Studies, Spring 1999.
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 In a sense such strategy of Russian enterprises is not
 
surprisiijig: other surveys suggest that most of them are
 
controlled by insiders and are not aimed at profit, but at
 
maintaining,financial stability, output and employment. It
 
is only natural that under these circumstances 71% of
 
Russian fhanagers considered the lack of financial
 
resources, not profitability or uncertainty, the major
 
obstacle 1 to capital investment.^
 
Distribution of long term bank credits across
 
industries follows a similar pattern: it is mostly
 
enterprises in non-resource industries that borrow from
 
banks to|finance capital investment, while better
 
performihg resource industries rely mostly on internal
 
sources.|There is a strong negative, correlation between
 
bank financing on the one hand and investment and output on
 
the other. It may well be that larger: credits to declining
 
industries are issued under pressure from regional
 
governments. Thus, the Russian banking system redistributes
 
funds not from weak to growing industries, as it normally
 
^ Thq Financial System In Russia Compared To Other Transition
 
Economies: iThe Anglo-Airierican Versus The German-Japanese. Comparative
 
Economic Studies, Spring'1999.
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happens in mature market.econGmies, b;ut ^ vice versa;, in
 
favour/of ■ deGlining industries. j ■ 
: , Redistribution ;p,f funds by Russian, banks from strong
 
to weak.:gnterpris,es^; froit relativaiy Jbetter off to. poorly
 
perfdrmiiig: industries/do ho.t really dontribute to
 
•restructuring. Despite the recent emergence of bank-based /
 
FIGs,'the Russian.financial,system does hot have much
 
chance/to evolve in the direction'of 'the: bank^based model.
 
FIGS .stiil:Cpntrol a very Small portion of the economy,, are
 
not able to provide the funds needed tor restructuring, and,
 
do,not yet look like sthategic long-term/investors;
 
, ,,: Banks in partiGuiar and.instithtional investors in.; . ,
 
generai' appear to be gust one of the Igroups of important . ,
 
■players, fighting for cohtrol^/d Rus;s,i.an companies, the 
Mother 	groups: beihg;' foreign investors,/ Russian nOn-financial 
companies (such as Gazprom, UES, Lukoil, etc. ) , and . i; . 
individual.sharehoiders. Moreover, losses suffered by major 
banks during and.: after . 1998 financial crisis lead , 
many ohservers to believe that the "era of oligarchs" in 
the .newest ;history. of Russian' capitalism is a1ready over. 
/■ ■. ./ .' The Financial System ,:ln Russia Compared:'To.''Other Transition y
 
Econom.ies: The .Angio-Amepic^^^^ Versus . The Getinan-^Japanese ... , Comparative.,
 
EconomiG Studies^ ■ Spring 1999. f V ' /d/ir J • ■
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Three state-CQhtrplIed banks,are: expected to dominatd:
 
Sberbank, .the state savings bank; i^neshtorg.bank, the state
 
.trade banky- and Vneshekonombank,:. whic issues - government .;.
 
bbliijations..The gdvetnment aiso plahs to take .over. S.B:S-.
 
Agro, a pprnmerciai,.bank w a near mohopoly :on farm ,/
 
lending hat lost heavily in ■T-biils ri Finally, . a few of: :. . 
regiohal or sectoral .banks will also be ..allowed operate: 
Medium-3ize- commerdial..'banks that survived the Grisis will 
likewise: st-sy ii^' :b)usiness/. bth such as once .powerful . . , 
Oneximbank,: may not clos but will remain inactive unless 
their tycoon . o.wbers ban. accumulate together neW capital.. 
The I surprise winners could be. foreign banks. Even 
Russian companibs.lare burning to bhemi. Some . 18 foreign 
banks have licenses in. -Russia, including Citibank, and Bank 
Austria. j.Ten.si.ons between.foreign .preditors and local banks 
are set bio risev:;.:Alt.hOugh. most foreigners, have written ofb; 
their RuCsiah debt, that won't stop them from suing Russian 
banks after Nov. 17. Already, Lehman Brothers Inc. and 
Deutsche Bank have filed suits in European courts to .fr:e:e.2e 
Russian . asset.s. Meanwhile,: .the governbenti a foreign 
creditors are close to an agreement to restructure short-
term debt;. But the Russian offer is worth an effective 10, . / 
115 
cents on Ithe dollar at most, says investment bank MFK
 
Renaissance.
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CHAPTER THREE :
 
GOVERNMENTAL BANKS
 
The State Bank of Russia.^
 
The iState Bank of the Russian Empire was founded in
 
1860 in the process of reorganization of Russia's entire
 
banking system. It was established when capitalism was
 
taking root in the Russian Empire and its creation was the
 
; , i ' . ■ , . ; ■ ■ . 
first of ;the "great reforms", by the Russian Emperor 
i ■ ' ' • ' 
i • ; . ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Alexander II. Considerable state interference in the
 
economy predetermined the genesis of the State Bank as an
 
institutional element of the government's economic policy.
 
TheiState Bank was a short-term commercial credit bank
 
and, according to its statute, it was established "to boost
 
trade turnovers and strengthen the monetary credit system".
 
Its functions were to discount bills of exchange and other
 
I . ■ • 
government and public interest-bearing securities and 
foreign bills, buy and sell gold and silver, receive 
payment on bills and other fixed-term monetary documents
 
for the account of trustees, accept deposits, extend loans
 
' I ' . ' ■ 
and buy government securities for its own account.
 
^ HISTORY, The People's Bank of the RSFSR, www.cbr.ru/eng/history
 
i " . , ■ ■ ■ 
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In ;the early 1880s the State Bank began to prepare a
 
monetary reform, which was launched in 1895 and ended in
 
1898 with the introduction of gold production in Russia. In
 
I
 
the course of the reform the State Bank was granted the
 
issuing ;rights.
 
I ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ; 
Aftjer the monetary crisis of 1905-1906 caused by the
 
Russo-Japanese war and revolution, the State Bank began to
 
be transformed into a banks' bank. By the beginning of the
 
First World War the State Bank had become one of the most
 
influential credit institutions in Europe. It had vast gold
 
reserves, whose ratio never fell below 93%, except in the
 
crisis year of 1906, and on average exceeded 100%. The
 
State Bank regulated Russia's money circulation and foreign
 
exchange settlements and through commercial banks actively
 
participated in crediting industry and trade.
 
During the First World War the State Bank was mainly
 
engaged in financing Russia's war effort, and on the eve of
 
the October 1917 revolution the lion's share of its assets
 
i - • . • ■ 
I , , . . . . , .
 
was repiresented by treasury bills and loans against
 
interest-bearing securities. Its gold reserves shrank from
 
1,604 million rubles as of June 16, 1914, to 1,101 million
 
rubles as of October 8, 1917. The pre-revolutionary history
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of the state Bank ended on October 25 (November 7), 1917,
 
when its[Soviet history began.
 
Oh October 25 (November 7), 1917, the Bolsheviks
 
seized the State Bank building in Petrograd (St.
 
Petersburg), but it was two months later that they actually
 
began to I control the bank and its operations. In the
 
morning Of December 14 (27) the Bolsheviks seized the
 
Petrograd commercial banks and later in the evening the
 
All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTSIK) issued a
 
decree oh nationalization of the banks, which established
 
. i ' ^ ■ 
State monopoly in banking. Private credit institutions were
 
i ' ■ 
nationalized and merged with the State Bank, which a month
 
later was renamed the People's Bank of the Russian Republic
 
(still inter it was renamed the People's Bank of the RSFSR,
 
the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic).
 
After the autumn of 1918 the People's Bank, which was
 
a part of the People's Commissariat (Ministry) of Finance,
 
known byjthe abbreviation Narkomfin, began to finance the
 
i . '
 
■I . 
economy hnd draft budgets. The policy of War Communism 
brought hbout non-cash settlements between the state 
enterprises and institutions and eventually the bank 
i . . ■ 
stopped conducting any lending operations. Its functions as 
a settlement center were reduced to a minimum, because all 
■ i . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ , ■ 
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settlements were effected with the state budget in line
 
with budgetary financing of enterprises, their profits
 
being transferred to. the budget,
 
Whdn the New .Economic Policy .(NEP.) was launched, the
 
All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTSIK). and the
 
Council I of People's Commissars (SNK): on October 3 and 10,
 
1921, respectively, passed resolutions re-establishing the
 
bank under the name of the State Bank of the RSFSR, On
 
November 16, 1921, it began.to conduct operations and in
 
1923 it|was transformed into the State Bank of the USSR,..
 
I ■ . ■ ■ ■ . . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ . ■ • ■ 
The bank had the right to extend credits to industrial and i 
commercial enterprises based on different forms of 
ownership, farms and self-employed handicraftsmen "only 
under the condition of their solvency and economic 
i ■ ■ ■ . ■ ' • ■ . ■ ■ ■ j . ■ ' . 
expediency". 
During, the NEP the following types of bank credits 
were used: bills of.exchange discounting, loans on call 
from special current accounts covered by bills of exchange, 
and;timd loans against bills, of exchange. In addition, 
three yqars after it's founding, the;bank began to practice 
direct target crediting. In October 1924 the State Bank 
compiled its first consolidated: credit plan comprising all 
branches. As a result of the reform of the.cash structure 
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of the state Treasury, conducted in 1925, the cash holdings
 
of the State Bank and Narkomfin were merged.
 
Soviet Russia's first commercial'banks, including
 
sectoral jjoint stock banks (specialized banks) .and mutual
 
loan societies, appeared in 1922. These banks were to
 
extend shiort-or long-term credits to individual sectors of
 
the econdmy. In 1924- the Committee on Banks was set up,
 
i ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
 
under the State Bank's Board to co-ordinate their
 
■ i * ■ ■ . ' • • ■ , ■ ■ I . . 
activities. In June 1927 as a result of the tighter 
regulatidn.of the short-term capital movement the State 
Bank was vested with the responsibility of exercising
 
immediate day-to-day control over the entire credit system,
 
. , ■ ■ I ■ ■ . c ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
while thd Narkomfin retained its function of general
 
regulation.
 
The State Bank was to supervise the activities of the
 
other credit organiz.ations in accordance ,with government
 
credit policy directives. Specialized banks were required
 
to keep tjheir free funds in and make borrowings from the
 
S,tate Bank only, and the latter , was granted the right to be
 
represented in their boards and auditing units. In
 
addition. the State Bank was to increase its share in the
 
specialized banks' equity capital.
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 As I the banking system was re-organized in February
 
1928, most short-term credit operations began to be
 
concentrated in the State,Bank. It also took control of
 
many affiliates of the joint-stock banks, which began to
 
play an:auxiliary role in crediting the economy.
 
In;the late 1920s and early 193Gs the USSR carried out
 
a serie$ of reforms aimed at creating an effective
 
mechanism of centrally planned regulation of the material
 
and financial aspects of the reproduction process.
 
Accordingly, a credit reform was carried through in 1930­
1932, which resulted in the creation, of a mechanism of
 
centrally planned regulation of the monetary and credit .
 
resource flows. In January ,1931 the acceptance form of non-

cash settlements through the,State Bank was introduced.
 
As'a result of the credit reform the State Bank lost
 
the last commercial elements of its activity and became a
 
typical I Soviet state bank, whose main functions were
 
extending planned credits to the economy, managing money
 
circulation and settlements, ensuring the cash servicing of
 
the stape budget and effecting international settlements.
 
The structure of the credit system that was established at
 
that time would remain in place for 55 years practically
 
unchanged.
 
i , ■ ■ ■ .. 
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In 1939 the State Bank began to collect cash. During
 
the Secohd World War (1941-1945) the State Bank issued cash
 
to coverI the.budget deficit, increasing the money supply,
 
fourfold!. To normalize the money circulation a monetary
 
reform of confiscatory type was conducted in 1947, during
 
which old money was exchanged for new at the rate,of 10 to
 
.1, cash kccounts in the savings banks were re-evaluated and
 
! ■ ■ ■ . . . . ^ 
the conversion of all state loans, except the 1947 loan,
 
was implemented.
 
In lL960 the State Bank began to compile long-term
 
investment crediting plans, in May 1961 the ruble was
 
denominated and devalued. One new ruble exchanged for 10
 
old rubles. At the same time the gold content of the ruble
 
was increased four times from 0.222168 only to equal

I . ■ ■; • • . . . 
0.987412 grams of fine gold. 
In 1965-1969 the economic reform brought about som.e 
changes in the activities of the State Bank, which were 
connected with lendihg and settlements, money circulation 
planning and regulation, financing capital investments and 
organizing the savings system. Credits on material assets 
.turnover! and wage costs and credits on ordinary loan 
accounts! became the main means of crediting industry. 
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In ijruly 1987 as a result of the reorganization of the
 
credit system new specialized banks were founded
 
(Vneshekpnombank SSSR, Promstroibank SSSR, Zhilsotsbank
 
SSSR and ISberbank SSSR) and the State Bank began to perform
 
the funct^ions of the country's main bank. It was assigned
 
the taskjof elaborating the consolidated credit plan and
 
planning I the.distribution of funds and credit investments
 
among all banks.
 
In ijlarch ,1989 the transfer of the specialized banks to
 
full cost-accounting and self-financing required.that the
 
State Bank provide them with target figures on the volume
 
of credilx resources, the amount of fupds attracted from the
 
population, and the volume of foreign-currency receipts, and
 
payments 1 on banking operations.
 
In lj)ecember 1990 the Law on the State Bank of the USSR
 
and the Law on. Banks and Banking were; passed. In accordance
 
with them, the State Bank of the USSRtand,national banks,
 
which were being established at that time on the basis of
 
the republican divisions of the State Bank, were to create
 
a single system of central banks based on a single monetary
 
unit (thp ruble) and performing the functions of a reserve
 
system.
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 The Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of
 
Russia) jwas founded on July 13, 1990, on the.basis of the
 
Russian^Republic Bank of the State Bank of the USSR.
 
Accountable to the Supreme Soviet of, the RSFSR, it was
 
originally called the State Bank of the RSFSR.
 
OniDecember 2, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR
 
passed the Law on the Central Bank of the RSFSR (Bank of
 
Russia),! which declared the Bank of Russia a legal entity
 
and the ima.in bank of the RSFSR, accountable to the Supreme
 
Soviet of the RSFSR. The law defined the functions of the
 
bank in|organizing money circulation, monetary regulation,
 
foreign!economic activity and regulation of the activities
 
of joint stock and co-operative banks.
 
In;November 1991 due to the establishment of the
 
Commonwealth of Independent States and the dissolution of
 
the Union structures, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR
 
declared the'Central Bank of the RSFSR the only organ of
 
state monetary and foreign currency regulation of the
 
economylon the territory of the RSFSR. The functions of the
 
State Bhnk of the USSR in issuing money and setting the
 
ruble exchange rate were transferred to it.
 
Ini1991-1992 an extensive network of commercial banks,
 
was created in the Russian Federation under Bank of Russia
 
i
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 guidance! through coinmercialization of the specialized
 
banks' affiliates. The Central Bank began to buy and sell
 
foreign exchange in the currency market it established and
 
to set and publish the official exchange rates of foreign
 
currencies against the ruble.
 
In December 1992 as a result of the establishment of a
 
i ' ■ ' ■ ■ ■ ' ■ . ■ 
single centralized federal treasury system, accountable to
 
the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Russia was no longer
 
required; to fulfill the functions of cash servicing of the
 
federal budget.
 
In 1992-1995 to maintain stability of the banking
 
system the Bank of Russia set up a system of supervision
 
and inspection of the commercial banks and a system of
 
foreign.exchange regulation and foreign exchange control.
 
As an agent of the Ministry of Finance, it organized a
 
government securities m.arket, known as the GKO market, and
 
began toiparticipate in its operations.
 
On April 26, 1995, the Bank of Russia terminated
 
direct lending to finance the federal budget deficit and
 
stopped extending centralized targeted credits to
 
individual industries and sectors of the economy.
 
Since 1998 the Bank of Russia has been committed to
 
the restructuring of the banking system in order to improve
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commercial banks;' activity to: enhance their liquidity.
 
The key part, of that :p).rqgram was the set-up of the Agency
 
for Restructuring of Credit Organizatiohs (ARGO) and Ihter-

Agehcy Coordinatihg ^ Committee fo^r Sector;
 
beyelopment (I.CG),. The: .Bank of Russia;.pays much attention:
 
-to .conductihg talks with interhational credit organizatidns
 
in ordeb to secure fuhds to Maintain the process of; ' ^
 
restructuring Russ-ia's banking system; and to . stipulate ;
 
:conditioi|is: oT technical support.: Today the Bank of Russia ■ 
: conSideri, the. increase in foreign, capital volume in the ^ 
Russian; banking sector , justifiable. 
, : ; Thep Russia is accountable to the State Duma of
 
the; Federal Assembly, which appoints land .discharges, the
 
Chairman ;0:f;the Bank; of Russia;(at the representation of
 
the President of the Russian Federation) and members, of the
 
Bank of Russia's Board of Directors as well as appoints an
 
auditor to the Bank of Russia and approves the Bank of
 
:Russia's annual report and auditor's report..
 
The tasks and functions of the Bank :of Russia are set by
 
the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Federal Law
 
on the Central Bank of the Russian;Federation (Bank of
 
Russia.). [.The:Bank of. Russia's main objective is to protect
 
the ruble and ensure its stability. The Bank of Russia.is
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 also the sole issuing center and the body of.banking ^ ^ ^ ; ■ 
regulation and supervision. Its main' functions arg:
 
- In collaboration with the government: of the Rus
 
Federation, it elaborates and implements,a uniform
 
national monetary policy designed:: to'protect th® nuble
 
■ ' 	and ensure^its .stability l.'I 
- ..It is the only issuer of cash and ,fehe drganizer of ,i^
 
■-	 -It,; is the creditor of last: re.sprt for credit ' 
: organizations and organizes, lihe.. .refinancing system; 
-	It sets the settlement rules of the Russian Federatipn; 
- It sets the riles of cdnducting banking, operations, and . 
accounting and. the reporting rules, for the banking 
system; . ■ ■;. ' . 
- It conducts state registration of credit organizations 
and issues and revokes the licenses of credit ' ' 
organizations and the organizations that audit them; . 
-	It supervises the activities of credit organizations; 
- It registers the issue of securities by credit 
organizations in accordance with federal laws.;. . . . 
- It conducts, on its own behalf or on behalf of the 
government of the Russian Federation, . .aill kinds of , . 
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banking operations neGessary for, the Central Bank's
 
.implementation of .its m^ duties;
 
- It con|ducts foreign exchange regulation, including 
operaltions to buy and sell foreign exchange, .and . 
establishes the procedure for effecting settlements with 
foreign countries; - ■ 
■ . j • . . ■ , _ . ■ ■ ■ ' ■ 
- It. organizes and exercises foreign exchange control on
 
its own and through authorized banks in accordance with,
 
the ijaws of the Russian Federation;
 
- It participates in making Russian Federation balance of
 
payments forecasts.and.organizes the drafting of the
 
Russian Federation's balance of payments;
 
-It analyses and forecasts the state of the Russian
 
Federation's economy as a whole and.by region,
 
concerning specifically monetary, credit, foreign
 
exchange, financial and price relations, publishes the
 
corresponding materials and statistical data and
 
performs other functions in accordance with federal .
 
■ lawsj 
Bank of Russia has more than 25;departments. The most
 
important ones and their functions are following:
 
The Foreign Exchange Regulation and Foreign Exchange.
 
ControljDepartment. Its main functions are:
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• Tp provide a legal framework for the Bank of Russia
 
p[)licy in the field of foreign exchange regulation
 
and foreign exchange control and pafticipate in its
 
implementation;
 
• Tp regulate foreign currency, requiring
 
permission., .. in::aGCordance. with
 
: T:o..Go-operate in accordance with the established
 
V pntcednre with;;t banks of foreiign
 
. : G.ountfles;and -in€ banks and other
 
i internationaT arid: na^t^^^^^ monetary and financial/
 
. ot'ganizations in the field of ;fo.reign exchange. . . '
 
: . foreign exchange control;
 
•. To analyze t state and development of foreign.^ - .T 
exchange regulation and foreign exchange contrpl,in 
. ■ the Russian Federation in onder to iraprbve the ^.i 
foreign exchange regulation and fpreign - exch^^ 1 
. .control rriechanisrris. . ^ ^ ■ 
The Open . Market- Operations Department..,ilts main 
'function; are:
 
.Participating in the implementation'of government's
 
.uniform monetary: poiicy by conducting (on behaif. of
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the Bank of Russia) trade operations in the
 
organized goverriinent securities market. (OGSM);
 
• Acting as an agent for the Ministry of Finance of
 
[the Russian Federation in placing and servicing GKO
 
and OFZ issues in the OGSM and maintaining market
 
|liquidity and stability;
 
• participating in the management,of the banking
 
system's liquidity through operations in the OGSM;
 
• ibarticipating in drafting regulatGry rules related
 
to the functioning and,development of the- OGSM's
 
.irrading. Settlements and Depository Systems;
 
•. brganizing the admission of new OGSM participants
 
and superyising:the market participants' trade.,
 
settlerrtents. and depository operations in the OGSM;
 
•. ponducting broker operations in the OGSM for CIS
 
/- countries.; '
 
Developing accounting and settlements methods .
 
related to operations with securities traded in the
 
OGSM,.keeping accounts of the Bank. of.Russia's own
 
operations in the OGSM, effecting settlements with
 
issuers on the results of OGSM operations and
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Isupervisiri^;the aGtivxties of the OGSM's Settlements
 
Centers;
 
Orgahizing the collection and processing of primary 
data on the ■OGSM, :developing new methods and tools ^ 
of analyses of the OGSM and conducting regular 
1 surveys of the OGSM, Bank of Russia operations and 
jthe activities of market participants,• 
Goordinating the activities of the securities 
departments of the Bank of Russia's regional 
|bfancheS, .(national banks) .t 
The Cash Issne Operatiohs Department., Its main 
functions are: , ; 
: • IEorecasting the volume and organizing the production, 
t jof banknotes and .coins,• 
Creating banknote funds and 
organizing theif transportation and safekeeping; 
Upgrading and keeping track of operations involving 
the issue of money ipto circulation and organizing 
its circulation; 
Studying the note structure of cash in circulation 
, land in reserve funds and supplying a sufficient 
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amount of notes, and coins of the required
 
,denominations in cash turnover;
 
• Establishing the procedure for upgrading cash
 
operations in the Bank of Russia's institutions and
 
credit organizations;
 
• Establishing the payment capacity criteria for
 
banknotes and coins and the procedure for replacing
 
,	 damaged banknotes and coins, withdrawing from
 
circulation and destroying worn banknotes and coins,
 
and organizing expert examination of Bank of Russia
 
and foreign banknotes and coins;
 
• Drafting proposals for issuing commemorative coins
 
made of precious and non-precious metals and
 
organizing their manufacture and issue;
 
• Drafting the rules and regulations for questions
 
within the Department's competence;
 
• iA.!utomating cash operations;: organizing technical
 
f|ortificatiGn of the Bank of Russia's institutions.
 
The I Currency Circulation Regulation Department. Its
 
main 	functions are:
 
• Studying and drafting proposals for improving the
 
state of cash turnover passing through banks' cash
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departments and the changes in its structure in the
 
Russian Federation;
 
• Analyzing current changes in the use of personal
 
cash incomes and the sources of these incomes, the
 
causes of these changes and their effect on the
 
state of cash turnover and drafting the
 
corresponding conclusions and proposals;
 
• Calculating cash volumes in circulation;
 
• Making cash supply forecasts and evaluating the cash
 
issue levels in the Russian Federation as a whole;
 
• Drafting proposals on changing the effective cash
 
balance limit in the Russian Federation as a whole
 
and establishing such limits for the Bank of
 
Russia's regional institutions;
 
• Studying the effect of wage and social payments by
 
legal entities on the state of currency circulation
 
in the Russian Federation and preparing communiques
 
on these matters;
 
• Analyzing statistical reports and accounting which
 
characterize the state of cash turnover in the
 
Russian Federation and its regions;
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• Drafting Bank ofv,Russia rules regulations on
 
organizing cash turngver; providing guidance for the
 
Bank, of Russia'8 regional institutions in matters
 
rdlated to organizing cash turnover and rendering 1
 
them practical assistance in Conducting this work.
 
The iBank Rehabilitation Department.
 
The main duty of this Department is to organize work
 
on preparing and implementing measures to revive the
 
activity|of credit organizations with: financial problems
 
and alsolto ensure reorganization and: liquidation
 
procedures concerning the corresponding credit
 
organizations and control over and organization of the work
 
of.the provisional administrations appointed to these
 
organizations.
 
The 1 Department of Organization and Servicing of the
 
Federal Budget and Extra-Budgetary Funds. Its main
 
■	 I ■ \ . ■ ■ ■• , 
functions are: 
■ ' ■ 
•	 organizing methodological work in the banking system 
oh the accounting of budget funds of all levels, 
pfrogram budgetary funds and state extra-budgetary 
fjunds and. arranging cooperation with the Ministry of 
Finance of the.Russian Federation, state extra­
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bjadgetary funds, the budgets of the constituent
 
territories of the Russian Federation and local
 
self-government bodies in tackling these issues;
 
• Organizing the cash implementation of the federal
 
b|udget in the banking system and compiling banking
 
reports on the cash implementation of the federal
 
, 	budget and on the balances in : the accounts of the
 
Ibcal governments and state extra-budgetary funds of
 
the Russian Federation;
 
• Qrafting proposals for the elaboration of uniform
 
state monetary policy with regard to the Bank of
 
Russia's relations with the budgets of all levels
 
and state extra-budgetary funds and on the domestic
 
government debt of the Russian Federation.
 
The|Prudential Banking Supervision Department.
 
i ■ ■ 	 ; ^ 
The! task of the Prudential Banking Supervision
 
Department is to provide methodological and organizational
 
.support for the Bank of Russia's functions in the sphere of
 
prudential supervision over the activities of credit
 
organizations. .
 
The!International Operations Department. Its main
 
functions are:
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• To elaborate and implement measures to; regulate the
 
!cchange rate of the ruble against foreign
 
currencies;
 
To create and manage the Bank of Russia's
 
nternational reserves;
 
• To work out and implement measures to encourage the
 
development of the domestic foreign exchange market;
 
• To work out and implement measures to encourage the
 
development of the precious metals market; .
 
• To. regulatg banking operations with precious metals;.
 
3 manage non-reserve precious-metal assets;. v
 
• T D participate in the elaboration and implementation
 
of state foreign exchange policy, promote
 
nternational cooperation:in the foreign exchange \
 
nd investment spheres and establish a system of
 
nterstate settlements;
 
• To work out and analyze the Rus.sian .Federatipn's' 1
 
balance of payments.
 
, Overall, the Russian payments system comprises abQut:
 
1,400 resident credit institutions, more than 4,000.
 
branches of credit institutions and nearly 1,200
 
subdivisions of the settlement system and it is the.
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principal means of. implementing the official monetary
 
policy by the Bank of Russia. , ,
 
The credit institutions located in the, Russian
 
Federation (resident credit institutions) and having the
 
banking license of the Central Bank of the Russian
 
Federation open only one correspondent account with one of
 
the Bank of Russia institutions (a cash settlement center
 
or operations department), which services them. The
 
branches of credit institutions may have correspondent
 
subaccounts to implement settlements.and may not have such
 
accounts. ■■ ' 
Credit institutions and their branches with
 
correspondent accounts and subaccounts with the Bank of
 
Russia effect settlements for their clients for
 
commodities, works and services and make tax and other
 
compulsory payments and their own income payments to the
 
budget and payments to the accounts of state extrabudgetary
 
funds through the various divisions of the Bank of Russia
 
settlement network.
 
Settlements effected through the Bank of Russia
 
settlement network are based not only on paper, but also
 
electronic payment documents,. These are the so-called
 
intra-; and interregional electronic settlements. The latter
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are regulated by the Provisions on Tnter-Regional
 
Electronic Settlements Effected through the Bank of Russia
 
Settlemert Netwofk. The exchange of electronic documents,
 
through the Bank of Russia settlement;network is regulated
 
by the Provision on the Rules of Exchange of Electronic
 
Documents between the Bank of Rus.sia, Credit Institutions ,
 
(Branches) and OtherClients of the Bank of Russia in
 
Effecting Settlements through the Bank of Russia Settlement
 
Network, adopted in March ,1998. The divisions of the Bank
 
of Russia settlement network participate in electronic
 
settlements as the bodies registering and supervising
 
payments.
 
After January 1,1998, the Bank of Russia charges, a,fee
 
for its settlement services. Some kinds of settlement
 
operations are conducted by the Bank of Russia free of .
 
charge. The operations conducted with correspondent
 
accounts of correspondent banks are divided into two types:
 
operations, to service clients and own interbanking
 
operations.
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 ■ Savings Bank of the Russian 
Federation (Sberbank)
 
The Joint-Stock Commercial Savings, Bank of the Russian
 
Federation (Sberbank) has been created as a joint-stock
 
company pursuant to the RSFSR Law "On Banks and Banking
 
Activities in the RSFSR". Its founder is the Central Bank
 
of the Russian Federation. On 20 June 1991, the Joint-Stock
 
Cbmmercljal- Savings Bank of the Russian Federation
 
(Sberbank) was registered with the Central Bank of the
 
Russian .Federation.
 
The bank's trade (full formal) name is the Savings
 
. Bank of the Russian Federation (an'open joint -stock
 
.company), the abbreviated name - Sberbank. The Savings Bank
 
of the Russian Federation is an open joint-stock company.
 
Its shateholders are the Central Bank of the Russian
 
Federation (.57:,..7% of stock} and over 300,000 legal entities.;,
 
and individuals. The principal objective of Sberbank is ,to
 
mobilize households' funds and to provide.cash ,
 
settlement services to individuals and a full range of
 
banking services to legal entities,. ■ Sberbankis,. paid-in 
authorized capital is 750,100,000 rubles as of January 1,
 
1999.
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Presently the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation:
 
• Is the leader among Russia's largest commercial banks;
 
• Runs a countrywide network of-offices cpmprising 73 
regional banks, 1,814 branches, 27,544 sub-branches, and: 
567 agencies. The bank has a representative,office in the; 
Czech RepubTic (Prague): (as of 01.01.99); ■ . ' 
• Has the status of a general agent authorized to service .
 
accounts of the federal budget and' to^ k®®P ^ ^^Gords :of if
 
revenues and funds. The bank, also enjoys the status of,a
 
payment agent of the Ministry.,of Fihan.ce of the; Russiah
 
Federation for the Domestic . Foreign. Currency Bond . liOan, ,
 
the State Savings Loan, the; State(Special-Purpose.
 
interest Bearing Loan;
 
A, payment agent for. the(19;92. Ruseian Domestic Lottery
 
(Loan;
 
• :,A primary dealer in the organized seGurities. market;
 
• An authorized , depository for Lombard ;.operations,,v
 
• ... A;licemsed: agent for managing asset.s , of,: non-go.vernitiental
 
vpension'.funds! .
 
■ t' Sberbank bases its policy of operations.with state' 
secufities on using existing instruments circulating in the 
market under condition of bringing the risk of loss to: the) 
I4i:
 
 miniitium. It is a member of associations:; Of operators in the 
Russian securities market: PAUFOR (■Professional AssoGiation 
of Stock Market Participants) , NAUFOR (National AssoGiation 
of Securities^Market Participants!, :PARTAD (Professionalv 
Association of . Registrars, Transfer Agents, and 
; Depositories) . At- the present mOmoht; , it is the only ■ ­
Russian bank in which the State guarantees the safety and 
payment of households' deposits. To secure its liabilities 
to customers, the bank maintains a reserve fund equal to ' 
about 50% of its paid-in capital. 
Sberbank offers corporate customers a full range,of, 
banking services in rubles and foreign currencies. Its 
institutions maintain over 1,000,000 corporate accounts, 
federal administration bodies and major industrial 
enterprises being among Sberbank's largest customers. . 
Sberbank: 
•	 Is the largest bank in Russia, to service :households' 
depositors: Sberbank institutions account for 84,9% (as 
of 01.01.99) of all funds deposited by individuals in 
th'is country's commercial banks. Sberbank offers a broad-
range of retail banking services, different types of 
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ruble and foreign currencies deposits designed for
 
various sections of the population;
 
Share of Population Deposits in the Savings, Bank ,
 
of 	Russia and Commercial Banks
 
100 j 
nSaving Bank of Russia 1Commercial banks 
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Compared to Total Individual Deposits in Banks. 
Figure 7. Share of Population Deposits in the Savings Bank of Russia 
and Commercial Banks. Web page of Central Bank of Russia. 
•	 ,Issues and services plastic cards of the international 
systems VISA and Europay, its own chip and magnetic­
, stripe cards SBERCARD. Sberbank of Russia is a principal 
member of the international payment systems VISA 
International and Europay .International; 
•	 Maintains correspondent relations with more than 250 
foreign correspondent bank. The bank performs 
transactions in 29 foreign currencies. As a member of the 
  
Societly for Worldwide Interbank Financial
 
Teleccmmunication (SWIFT),,Sberbank ensures a prompt
 
transfer of funds to any bank of the world;
 
• Is a rrember of several specialized:intexhatiohal: ; 
organizations: the World Savings Banks, Institutey^^^ ^^lt 
European Savings Banks Group (an ob-server),, the^ 
Interrational Banking Security Asspciation, the , 
Interrational Chamber of Commerce, ■ and some others; 
• Is sharing actively in the international program to
 
promote small- and medium-sized businesses in Russia
 
implemented under: the auspices of the European Bank for
 
Reconstruction and Deveiopment (EBRD):;
 
The .B-ank pcc top. pps,:ition among 12 biggest 
Russ,iah::coimnercial . banks ahdy^^^^^^^ fPllpwrng their. 1997 ■ 
performance, has been included in the listing,of the 
World's Top 1000 banks measured by Tier One Capifal and. 
ranks 134 in the world according to the same rating 
published in the 1998 July issue of "The Banker" magazine. 
According to "The Banker" (September, 1998),' Sbe.rbank has 
been placed 64th in Europe by its first-tie.r. capital,. and: 
103rd by its assets in the 1997 rating list'of!50:0 largest 
European banks. Sberbank of Russia takes thp lead. amo:hg 
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Russian banks included in the rating of 500
 
European banks.
 
Recent,:Hil.stoyy of Sberbank
 
1:990: The Russian Republican,,Bank of the Savings Bank
 
of the USSR is declared property of the Russian Soviet
 
Federative: Socialist Republic. The Savings Bank of the
 
;RSFSr: is transformed into a joint■stock .commercial bank;. 
1991: The general shareholders, meeting te-established 
.the 	JointJ Stock Commercial Savings Bank of the Russi:a;n 
Federation as a joint stock, company under the Russian La^ 
"On Banks and Banking Activities in the RSFSR'V, dated 
December 2, 1990.. 
1:993: Sberbahk was appointed: ah df fidia1 dealer of. the 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation in Government Short-
Term Zero Coupon Bonds and in Federal Loan Bonds. The Bank 
was also authorized to deal with Gold Certificates issued 
by the Russian Ministry of Finance. It started the issue of 
its own promissory notes and certificates of deposit. 
1996: Based on thO' annual results, Sberbank is the 
only Russian bank to be included in the top one hundred 
major European lending institutions (ranking eighth in 
profit and eleventh in return on capital) . 
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 1997: The international rating agencies Fitch IBCA and
 
Thomson BankWatch assigned Sberbank a BB+ long-term credit 
rating. ■ the highest among Russian commercial banks and 
equal to the sovereign rating of the Russian Federation. 
The Bank received the status of observer with the European 
Savings Banks Group (ESBG). Sberbank was included in the 
list of the top two hundred major world banks. 
December 17, 1998: "About 80% or nearly 60,000
 
depositors, using the opportunity of having liabilities
 
under tneir deposits transferred from six commercial banks
 
to Sberoank of Russia, have already withdrawn their
 
deposit^ or transferred their funds to Sberbank", - said
 
Mr. Kazmin, President and Chairman of the Board of Sberbank
 
of Russia, in the program "Hero of the Day".
 
Currehtly, Sberbank seems to the -only bank in which
 
people's trust. Amount of deposits in Sberbank is 3-4 times
 
higher than in dther: commercial banks taken together.
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CHAPTER FOUR,
 
CONCLUSION
 
Reasons of Banking Crisis
 
•in Russia
 
1) Specifics of development of financial sector in
 
Russia: political interests and conflicts, high dependency
 
from market of GKOs and other governmental obligations;
 
structure of ownership which allowed one related group of
 
people or organization to have control over bank's
 
operations;, low level of capitalization and low
 
requirements of initial capital to open a bank; high
 
expenses on banking infrastructure in order to start
 
operations; demonetizations and active use of barter deals
 
in business which lower demands on banking credits and
 
limited resources available for financial sector, which
 
force sdeking of resources abroad for banks and dependency
 
on currency rates; high level of defaults on payments in
 
industrial sector and high credit,risk.
 
2) Politics of banking regulations: mistakes of strategic
 
planning of Central Bank; low control over banking industry
 
■ 'A. Astapovich, D. Sipmolotov, Russian Banks in 1998: Development 
of. Crisis, Questions of Economics/ 5/1999.
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 and low involvement of enforGfemeht:agendles; virtually ri
 
existent legdl basement for;banking dperations including 
responsibilities of management and. stakeho^l^^ system of _ 
deposits insurance, procedure of bankruptcy and• 
reorganizatipn .of 'troubled fInancial' o.rgSnizations; out-of-. 
date,laws and'reguiations by'the time: they, were passed and 
accepted by every layer of goverhment;: Vih^ ■ 
eya1nation of consequences of . financial crisis- in Ssia; hot 
far-sighted decisipnS Of moratoritim pack ef August ,:17;> 
19,98.■■ ! y: 
3) Banking management: inexperience^-and, mistakes of. tpp 
managemerit of banks; weak .development; of investment risks.. - , 
and'.practices;! extensive expehses on ; image., 'support, of. ; 
fillials, maintaining numerous staff/ ' construction of . , 
offices and buildings; high level of bperatiohs risks --'y . ■ 
issuing credits based on personal relationship and 
friendship; operations within banks-enterprises,.groups. 
: .4) World economics and Asian crisis: inGlusion of , Ru^^^ 
into ,wor].d ecdhdmics processes, intensive .inflows/phtfldws,, ;, 
of foreign capital dnto/from Russia; teducing prices, of . . 
world's. material markets including raw,materials 
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Table 10. Dynamics of Oil Export
 
Mlns. Price, ' 
Years Mlns. $ Tons . $ / ton 
1992. 8, 54 5 66.2 . 129.1 
1993 8, 370 7 9.9 104.7 
1994. 11/513 ' . 95.4 . 120. 6 
. 1995. 10,413 96.2. 108.2 
.1996. 13,849 105.O' 131.9 
19.97 13,013 109.8 118,. 6 
1998 .8,7 90 117.9 . 74.5 
1999 12, 8 00 ; 118.0 108.0 . 
S. Aleksashonko,■A. Klepach Russian Banks After Crisis,. Questions of 
Economics, 4/2Q00,.' ^ 
5) Non-compliance of financial sector to demands of 
economy in general. 
Wit1 a gradual adaptation of banks to the new 
conditiohs ,of doing business in process, it would be 
premature to claim that the banking crisis has been 
overcome. This crisis is being manifested in the persisting 
problems of recapitalization of those banks, which have 
suffered the most in the crisis, stagnation on the 
securities and inter-bank operations market;and the 
continued lack of clients' confidence, above all. 
population. The banks' current conditions are characterized 
by lack of experience with credit evaluation, the absence, 
of (or inadequate) legal basement, cross - ownership 
14 9 
between enterprises and banks, poorly developed accounting
 
rules, weak enforcement of regulations and the
 
uncertainties raised by,the unstable economic processes.
 
Deposits
 
Real volumes of banking activity have not regained
 
pre-crisis levels. Between August 1., 1998, and May 1, 1999,
 
the ruble-denominated assets of the banking system
 
increased by 14.4%, while its.foreign exchange assets in
 
the dollar equivalent decreased by 26.5%. Growing foreign
 
exchange and credit risks led to a reduction of programs
 
for crediting the economy's real sector.
 
The sum total of the loans extended by banks to
 
enterprises between August 1, 1998, and May 1, 1999, fell
 
by 7% in rubles and 36% in foreign exchange (the dollar
 
equivalent). The share of loans to the real sector of the
 
economy.in the aggregate banking system assets shrank from
 
.34%: to 33% in. the same period. The.inevitable consequence
 
of the f.nancial crisis was the deterioration of bank
 
assets' quality. The share of overdue debt to banks on
 
extended credits in the total credit volume almost doubled:
 
from 5.3% as of August 1, 1998, to 10.3% as of May 1, 1999,
 
The proportion of bad loans also. grew. .
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Figure 8 Savings as Percent of Total Expenses of
 
Population. Web Page of Central Bank of Russia.
 
The investment activity of banks is largely restrained
 
by the narrowness of the resource base. Household bank
 
savings considerably decreased between August 1, 1998, and
 
May 1, 1999: the sum total of the ruble deposits of
 
individuals dropped by 44% and that of foreign exchange
 
deposits by 54%. By and large, the proportion of household
 
deposits in the aggregate liabilities of credit
 
institutions fell from 14.9% as of August 1, 1998, to 13.4%
 
as of May 1, 1999. . ,
 
However, the fact that the outflow of household
 
savings from commercial credit institutions in 1999 has
 
stopped can be regarded as a positive development. In June-

April the ruble, deposits of individuals went up by 1.1
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billion rubles, or 6.3%, and their foreign exchange
 
deposits remaLined at the level of the beginning of this
 
year. Between August 1, 1998, and May I, .1999, attracted
 
inter-bank loans reduced .considerably (by 4.8 billion
 
dollars, or 37%) mostly as a result of outflow from the
 
market of the funds of non-resident banks.
 
Table 11. Composition and Use of Incomes of Households (in
 
Billions of Rubles)
 
1992 1993­ 1994 1995 1,996 1997 1998 
Money expenciitures, , 6132 72539 ■ 348445 877602 13.2071216157,24 1672652 
total 
Including: 
Purctiase of goods and 
payment for service 5175 55066 235427 641488 922348 1115371 1331552 
Payment of cibiigatory 
dues and vai:ious : ' 580 6087 24784 51884 80397 116901 108464 
contributioiIS , 
Accumulatioi1 of savings 
in contribui:ions and 338 4959 23682 . 49115 65789 35998 ,18991 
securities 
Purchase of currency 39 6427 64552 , 135115 252178 ■ 347454 213645 
Increase (+1, decrease 
(-) of mone^T in hands 968 7410 16389 33146 18802 27,489 27835 
of popuiatlc)n 
Savings as jpercentage , ■ 5-.5i ■ 6.34 . 6.8. : 5.6 4.98 2.23 1.14 
to expenditiires 
Table: Web page- of Central ,Bank of Russia,
 
Decapitalization, i
 
. Decapitalization of the banking system is one.of the
 
most serious problems. The, largest multidivisional banks
 
sustained the most, tangible losses due to the customs of .
 
the struGture of their transactions (such as considerable
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investments in the GKO-OFZ markets, a huge volume of
 
futures in the foreign exchange market, borrowings in
 
foreign currencies and active work with household,
 
deposits). The assets of the 30 major banks (with
 
adjustments for changes in the exchange rate of the US
 
dollar) shrank by 19.3% in August-December 1998. Capital
 
declined by 57.3% in the same period of time. The situation
 
of the group of the major banks continued to deteriorate.
 
In January-April of 1999, their capital decreased by 40.6%.
 
On May 1 1999, their' balance losses constituted 21.2
 
billion dollars and the number of this group's banks, which
 
are in a critical financial situation, grew by almost 40%.
 
Against the background of the growing losses sustained
 
by credit institutions, the number and share of loss-making
 
credit institutions decreased from 588 to 415 and from
 
37.4% to 29.2%, respectively, largely thanks to the Bank of
 
Russia's more vigorous efforts to revoke licenses from such
 
credit institutions. As many as 162 credit institutions
 
lost their banking licenses in the period of January - May
 
1999 with 52 of them losing their licenses this year.
 
Lack of experience
 
Another difficulty is that expertise and procedures in
 
many banks are poorly developed. This is not surprising
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because banks in the pre-reform system often performed few
 
market economy's banking functions. Their ability to judge
 
lending opportunities from a commercial perspective tends ,
 
to be we; k.-Russian banks primarily make shorttterm .loans
 
to affiliated enterprises, which are continually rolled
 
over due to the inability of these enterprises to service
 
the loans. Russian banks thus currently serve in some
 
respects as conduits for state subsidization of.
 
enterprises. No restrictions are imposed in Russia bh loans
 
by banks to their affiliates.
 
Russian banks lend funds borrowed from the. Central
 
,Bank priitariiy to, their owners,and.affiliates, which;
 
generally are insolvent enterprises .unde-rgping
 
privatizcition. Enterprises in many cases are incapable of
 
repaying the loans. But banks are not required to identify
 
or take provisions against bad loans.
 
Bank Supervision
 
Strong bank supervision, including on-site inspection,
 
should be established by legislation. Whether the
 
supervisory function is assigned to the central:,bank or to,. ­
a new agency, the supervisors should be insulated from
 
external interference and political pressuresv
 
A major impediment to the effectiveness of banking
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 supervision is not only the lack of appropriate legislation
 
in line with international standards, but also the lack of
 
reliable information and the limited experience of
 
supervisory agencies and auditors. In many cases, the
 
' i ' • ■ ■ ' ' ■ ' 
necessary data are lacking which would enable an accurate
 
assessment of the amount of risk borne by a bank. Bank
 
supervisors and auditors should work together with the
 
accountants to improve definitions and practices with the
 
objective of better assessing banks' performance and
 
financial conditions. It is recommended that auditors and
 
bank officials would not be personally interconnected.
 
Ownership
 
Most commercial banks in Russia are at least partially
 
owned by enterprises. The conflict of interest this creates
 
is a recipe for crisis. , It threatens not only the
 
effectiveness of banks, but is also likely to prevent
 
competition in the financial spheres and to.mislead the
 
allocation of resources. As it has been written above, this
 
threat can be avoided by the introduction of regulations to
 
limit the lending to shareholders to the equivalent of a
 
small proportion of capital.
 
Although Russian banks generally are limited to
 
banking activities,, they are not prevented from owning
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.subsidiaries engaged in any line of business. Russian banks
 
own life insurance and real estate development companies,
 
among other non-banking .activities,
 
Deposit insurance system
 
Deposit insurance system will provide additional sense
 
of security for savers and will allow uncovering stashed
 
under mattresses funds.
 
Russian commercial banks generally fund .their lending^
 
activities with borrowings from the Central Bank and
 
deposits of.^affiliated enterprises rather than with
 
deposits from the general public. Only about 10-15 percent .
 
of the deposits of individuals in Russia are held .by
 
Russian commercial banks, with the Central B.ank-controlled
 
Sberbank, the main savings bank in Russia, holding.85^90
 
percent of individuals' deposits. Although Sberbank is
 
backed by a government guarantee, no deposit insurance
 
currently is available for deposits in commercial- banksi ■ 
Thel Russian banking law provides that ''banks shall'be .
 
required to maintain insurance and contingent funds," the
 
procedures for which shall be prescribed-by the Central
 
Bank.; In addition, the law provides that .''banks sh.ali. be :
 
required to insure deposits of individuals in accordance
 
with the procedure and on the terms prescribed by" the . . . .
 
Gentral Bank. The Central Bank, however, does not appear,to
 
have, pres.cribed any . deposit insurance , requirements as yet
 
.and no: Russian banks appear to offer deposit insurance. /
 
.Legal.responsibilities,:
 
disciosure, bankruptcy
 
Legal responsibilities, disclosure and bankruptcy
 
procedures laws a.re needed, to prevent, capital flow from one
 
'ihsolvent bank to. another by changing legal attributes ­
name, addresses and other,. .
 
.Securities, market.­
The extent of:securities activities: permissible for
 
Russian banks is unclean,. mbstly because the securities
 
market, in Russia: in Western: meaning is undeveloped. Russian:
 
banks are. authorized to act as agents in brokering .
 
securities for their custoirlers, bht their authority to­
..undenwrite and deal in ■ securities is not clear. 
.Some .banks may organize and manage mutual funds in
 
connection with the.privatization process.. .A representative
 
of the:R:is.sian Ant.i-Mohppply Committee.,expressed his view
 
informally^ however, that bahks;.should not be allowed to
 
sponsor .euch funds.
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Bank Risks
 
• Default, operating, interest rate, and liquidity' 
: ■ risks ^v . i" - ■ ■t; ' , ■ ''it•:■■■. : . . -tv 
These risks are extremely high due to the incompetent 
lending practiees (mostly to affiirate ehterprises that 
often insufficient) , lack of experience and knowledge, . 
absence of legal foundations, and due to overall unstable- . 
economic and political situation in. the country.. 
• Fraud risk. 
High as shown by recent scandal where inside 
employee(s) of one of processing centers were involved in 
fraud with ATM cards.' Information form, about 280 ATM cards ; 
used in ATM machines mostly in Moscow was used abroad to 
withdraw .cash form these accounts,../: 
The key activity for Russian banks remains the^ ^ ^ / / 
Struggle for access to budget resources at all levels, and 
rivalry for participation in investment and monetary ; . ,/ , 
competif ions, as well as . the redistribution of state / and. ,/ i 
.piivatized .prbperty. Russian banks are inconstant/with the 
goars and functions Of ■Western banks and. oriented primarily 
on gaining short-term profits. /Services they provide that , 
compatible in quality and importanee wlth^^ ^W^^ banks are. 
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payment,system and support in international trade (that
 
also became an official way for capital outflow).
 
•	Crecit Risks: risks of, default,on loans.
 
• Financial risks: risk related to, rate of exchange and
 
potential future reevaluation due to exchange rate
 
fluctuations, risk related to operations with stocks,
 
governmental obligations, changes in interest rates.
 
• Risks of loosing liquidity: expenses to rebuild
 
necessary levels of liquidity.
 
•	 Risk of, non-balance operations: forwards and futures
 
deals including with currencies.^
 
Publicly available information
 
about banks
 
Although there is a list of financial statements,
 
which are; supposed to be submitted to different
 
governmerjtal and taxation agencies, my efforts to find
 
I
 
these statements from publicly available sources were
 
unsuccessful. I did have found,a magazine that would
 
contain only tables, numbers, and other statistics.
 
However, as I have began searching for particular banks, I
 
have noticed that some information was missing - if bank
 
s,. Aleksashenko, Russian Banks After Crisis, Question of
 
Economics, 4/2000.
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feels that a number is not favorable it does not/siibinit it
 
because this magazine does not requires to send information
 
but is expecting that information would be sent. ThiiS/ it :
 
would be hard for potential depositors and investors to
 
properly evaluate banks' operations and condition without
 
asking friend of the friend who works in tax police 'to find
 
needed documentation.
 
No formulas used to evaluate bank's condition in West
 
would work properly in Russia due to huge differehce in
 
structure of banks actives and passives, availability of
 
true information, and types of activities.
 
What is' Next?
 
Active participation of the government in financial
 
markets are required in ordef to create legal base,
 
prbtection of new forms of:financial institutes (which
 
would be banks and/financial organizations operating
 
aGCO.rding "classic" definitions of financial institutions),
 
creatiph of institutions :.that , would sblve and arbitrage
 
disputes :and conflicts,,, support econpmic policies. p,f)stable
 
ruble: and-: stock market. ^ ^ ;
 
If nothing undertaken to stabilize financial,markets
 
and rationalize financial industry, the:development of
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 economy- and financial organizations will repeat itself as
 
it was from 1991 till 1998. First, stocks of profitable
 
enterprises will grow hundreds of percents. The prize of
 
these enterprises is underevaluated and was underevaluated
 
even right before crisis. Future potential of their stocks
 
growth would attract Russian and foreign investors and show
 
at the beginning that economy is stabilizing. Inflow of
 
foreign capital will help stabilization of ruble, increase
 
currency reserves,. inflation will fall, and even some
 
industries will show growth in production,
 
However, high profitability of speculations with
 
stocks would prevent investments into real production
 
industries, lower risks of manipulations with stocks and
 
bonds may even cause outflow pf ,.financial-f
 
prpduction sector of economy toward financial speculations,
 
Thrs situation would lead to worst conditions in production
 
industry, decrease in operations, increase in defaults, and
 
further decrease in investments into production,
 
ressing conditions of production sector would
 
: sharpiy Vcontrast with flourishing financial markets.
 
Salaries: of production workers would decrease or paid late.
 
deinand- on : products manufactured inside the country would
 
.decrease causing further fall of production and
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bankruptcies. On other hand, active inflow of investments
 
into financial markets will cause its instability. Growth
 
of monetary mass would exceed growth of production and
 
supply of goods. Investors will jump from one profitable
 
sector of financial market toward another reducing
 
stability of market and ruble. Temporary stabilization of
 
financial markets would be caused by disproportional growth
 
of financial markets with dying industry sectors on the
 
background. Soon enough, system will lose stability,
 
investors will convert rubles into currency and send out of
 
country, and crisis will happen again.
 
New crisis will probably completely destroy financial
 
markets of the country including banks that survived crisis
 
of 1998 due to support and control of the government. The.
 
government will not posses enough funds and power to
 
prevent or lessen degree of the next crisis.
 
As Of crisis of 1998, there were warnings from
 
scientist: to government and management of Central Bank
 
about coming troubles in financial markets and were
 
suggested some contracts to liguidate crisis conditions.
 
There were several seminars of leading scientists about
 
crisis conditions. Haif-yeaf before crisis, Duma accepted
 
the. law about emergency acts: of.preventing coming crisis.
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but this law was dismissed by the government. Four months
 
before crisis the document that contained detailed
 
prognosis of crisis development and preventing acts was
 
submitted to government and Central Bank by head of Trade-

Financial Union D. Mityaev^. But nothing was made. The basic
 
reasons, as was determined by investigation later after
 
crisis, were incompetence of management, negligence, and
 
conflict of interests - Central Bank was the biggest
 
operator on the governmental obligations and GKOs.
 
Central Bank will have hard situation of managing
 
monetary masses inside the country: expected increasing
 
inflow of Russian and foreign investors will force Central
 
Bank to participate in order to control volume of rubles.
 
If Bank will not buy incoming currency, stability of
 
ruble rate will fall and production manufactured inside the
 
country will lose its competency. It happened inn 1993-1994
 
when ruble grew three times; Russian goods were forced out
 
of market. Decrease in production sector was 21% in 1994,
 
heavy machinery construction - 31%, consumer goods - 30%,
 
Russian goods were supplemented by imported goods.^ The
 
^ C. Glasev, New Financial Crisis in Russia? Questions of
 
Economics, 6/2000
 
^ C. Glasev, New Financial Crisis in Russia? Questions of
 
Economics, 6/2000.
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policy Russian government and Central Bank used to avoid
 
inflation pressure of growing monetary masses, excess of
 
mass was supposed to be tighten by administrative (increase
 
in reserve requirements) and market (increasing interest
 
rate on governmental obligations and deposit rates)
 
measures.
 
One way to tighten exceeding monetary mass is to
 
borrow under percent. Since Central Banks does not have aim
 
to benefit from commercial investment, to pay the interest
 
Bank will have to print which will lead to growth of mass.
 
Bank would avoid this situation if it would invest into
 
some kind of operations and use revenue to pay interest.
 
But in case of industrial or production sector loans, but
 
the situation in these areas of economy would lead only to
 
losses rather than profits. Another way to tight funds is
 
to operate in highly speculative financial markets not
 
related with industrial sectors; however, such speculation
 
again would cause increase in monetary mass not supported
 
by supply of goods. As this financial "pyramid" growth,
 
stability of financial markets will lessen and as soon as
 
investors feel it, capital will start to flow out of
 
country.
 
164
 
  
 
The way to avoid such destructive policies is to. make
 
production sector of economy attractive for investments.^
 
•. 	Central Bank can give credits to commercial banks for ■ 
obld.gations of enterprises as collateral - first, 
profitable enterprises,, then less and less profitable 
with privileges in dealing with losses of commercial 
banks due to credits to non-profitable enterprises 
(tax exempt, lower interest rates, e.t.c.). 
• Transfer operations with monetary supply by regulation
 
of interest rates and decrease of fates until level of
 
average profitability of industrial enterprises would
 
be reached. This level should be identical with rates
 
on bank deposits.
 
• Central Bank should guaranty the credits to:
 
enterprises.
 
• Con:rol flow of internal and foreign speculative
 
por folio capital by studying its dynamics and create
 
adequate reactive measures. Uncontrolled excessive
 
inflow or outflow of foreign speculative capital could
 
cause financial shocks and lead to crisis. The
 
c. Glasev, New Financial Crisis in Russia? Questions of 
Economics, 6/2000. ■ 
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prevention could be done by creation of paper
 
regulations such as, for example, law to declare
 
preliminary significant amounts of.currency
 
withdrawals from country,
 
Possible Solutions to
 
Restructure the Banking
 
System
 
• Lack of banking capital.
 
It can be a result of losses due to crisis and not
 
necessary,leads to banks' inability to serve their
 
obligations.
 
• I Establishment of realistic regulations and time
 
schedule for fixed time period in order to increase
 
resources of banks.
 
Governmental participation and buyout,of part of
 
banks actives (through credits) to rebuilt capital
 
in order to meet capital requirements. To avoid
 
inflationary processes, banks would spend received
 
credits to buy long-term governmental obligations.
 
Current lack of liquidity.
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As a result of mistakes of banks' management of
 
matching actives and passives, or sellout banks' liquid
 
actives to'serve their obligations.
 
Buyout by government of operating actives of banks
 
and following sellout to other banks.
 
Involvement of banks, in whose capitals government
 
actively participates, to fund reliable long-term
 
actives.
 
Offer credits to support current liquidity.
 
Lack of current profits.
 
As a result of losses of operating actives parts
 
related to necessity of serving obligations or due to fall
 
in quality of actives.
 
Involvement of banks to participate in governmental
 
programs such as.crediting, serving governmental
 
profitable enterprises, credits of export busihpss
 
of governmental enterprises.
 
Transfer of banks to serve governmental enterprises
 
in banks' regidhs. i
 
Buyout by governmental of regional filials of
 
banks' and joining them with regional banks that
 
government is interested in.
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Buyout of actives with low quality.
 
Direct financial help (one-time donations, credits
 
with lower interest rates, selling to banks highly
 
I , profitable governmental obligations.)
 
Looses of banks due to growth of costs of obligations
 
(exchange rates reevaluations, forward deals, losses of
 
actives due to bankruptcy of borrowers).
 
Transfer of part of obligations to banks controlled
 
by government and provide guarantees to receiving
 
banks.
 
Direct financial help (one-time donations, credits
 
with lower interest rates, selling to banks highly
 
I profitable governmental obligations.)
 
.• Fo.rce joining and merging of small and inessential
 
banks to form bigger and more reliable banks.
 
• Involvement of foreign investments to banking
 
organizations, which have financial troubles currently but
 
possess high potentials in future operation. Attract such
 
investors by showing them that investing or participating
 
in such banks would require lower investments compared to
 
building financial institution from scratch. Increase
 
requireniients to banks operating with foreign investments
 
168
 
and crejate necessary governmental guarantees to foreign
 
participators.
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 CHAPTER FIVE
 
MONEY LAUNDERING
 
Many different terms exist to describe cash outflow
 
from country: money laundering, money run, outflow of
 
capital, capital leakage, etc. However, transferring of
 
.capital abroad can include official and legal ways.
 
Inclusion of Russia into world markets would
 
Consequentially lead to increase in outflow/inflow of
 
from Russia. In addition, activities .that are
 
considered illegal abroad may be officially accepted in
 
Russia. Thus, it is hard to say that. law. is broken and
 
specify whose law was broken.
 
' There are different estimation numbers of annual
 
capital outflow used by different agencies: fro example,
 
during period of 1992-1998 volume of outflow according to
 
different agencies fluctuated from $40 to $400 milliards.
 
Minimal balance belongs to officlai. statisfics;. bureau and
 
was derived from BOP, maximum aitiount'was given by.Ministry
 
of Internal Affairs of Russian Federation, which used
 
volume of resources spent by Russian citizens abroad.
 
Between these two extremes, there are several, other
 
estimations:
 
dvo-:
 
  
 
 
• $230 milliards - according to Ministry of Economics of
 
Russian Federation,
 
• $130-140 milliards - according to Central Bank,
 
• $130 milliards - according to independent consulting
 
agency "Fitch,"
 
• $50-60 milliards - according to World Bank and Paris
 
Club/
 
Dynamics of outflow is not constant: according to
 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, maximum amount of $15-20
 
milliards a year were in years of 1992-1993. Currently this
 
numbers are around $9-14 milliards per year. Majority of
 
transfers from Russia have money-laundering flavor.
 
^ Graph: E. Gvozdeva, A.Oleinik, Analysys of Capital Outflow,
 
Questions of Economics, 2/2000
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Figure 9. Volume of Capital Outflow (Milliards of Dollars a Year) . 
■Gvozdeva	 E., Oleinik A. Analysis of Capital Outflow, Questions of 
Economics, 2/2000. 
The general reason of capital outflow could be 
described as to avoid instability of markets and economics 
inside rhe country including taxation policies, and non­
existenj: legal support for investors. Capital may come back 
to Russia as highly speculative funds that would be used 
for very short-terms and would go. out, of country again. 
Russian investors prefer to invest abroad because of 
guarantees and protection of other state and international 
laws. 
Thsre are several reasons of transferring capital out 
of RussLa: 
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• Cree.ting predictable conditions for .investment
 
reducing risk of investment including financial risks
 
and legal support for recovery of defaults.
 
• Legal support and protection for investors in
 
developed countries.
 
■ I 	 ■ . ' ' 
• Minimization 	of taxes.
 
• Insurance against inflation. ,
 
• Money laundering.
 
• Sav.ngs for "rainy day" due to political, social, and
 
econlomical instability.
 
Table 12. Reasons and Locations of Capital Outflow
 
Goa.. Form of Outflow Countries % of Total
 
Business Direct investments Hungary, Finland,
 
Development and into foreign- Czech Republic 10-15
 
Investments .	 companies
 
Minimization of	 Deposits in foreign Bahamas, Cyprus,
 
Taxes	 bank and/or direct Latvia, Nauru,
 
,15-20 .
 
investments into Canary Islands
 
foreign companies
 
Savings	 Investments,into UK, Spain, Canada,
 
real estate, Cyprus, Malta,
 
65-70

savings accounts Holland, USA,
 
Swiss, Italy
 
Table: E. Gvozdeva, A.Oleinik, Analysys of Capital Outflow, Questions
 
of Economics, 2/2000.
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■Channels . used to transfer funds out of oountry: 
1, Obtaining permission from Central Bank. Residents e.ah 
y for. permit from .Central Bank (td :PPCtate> w . 
: . ital Gurrenoy operations by'presenting supportive,cap
 
^ ,d.OG aments from Ministry of Eoonomios or Ministry of 
, Tra ie, or other agenoies. If permit were valid, there 
: wouId be no question to further ourrenoy operations 
: .inGl.uding transfers abroad, 
2:Fa:ke deals: deals., with foreign Gompanies for import 
: : with pre-payment without reoeiving goods or bankruptoy. 
. .of ■ ier r ight after. reoeiving payment; 
ler/lower prioes shown in documents .than .aGtuaily^^^ 
. with difference transferred offshore; e.xport ':i­
without pre-payment; penalty payments as if company 
■btP ce the conditions of contract; payments ..for 
ser /ices, value of which is hard to estimate 
(ma keting research or consulting service) . 
3 . Offshere companies. Signing the contracts with 
offshere companies and leaving biggest part of profit 
there is. official and do not break:, laws hovievB^ : ^ ^ ■ 
unethical it is. Offshore companies can be used also 
for. fake deals and laundering money because local 
authorities are interested in capital inflow. 
17 4 
4. Issuing if credits abroad. "Default" of foreign,
 
partners leaves money abroad on bank accounts. In
 
addition, interest rates can be shown higher / lower
 
than actual.
 
5. Using slacks in customs laws and regulations.
 
6. Carirying money abroad as cash, y
 
7. Financial mechanisms. Using such' instruments requires
 
skills and experience but, at the same time, allows
 
using slacks in laws, reduce taxes, transfer capital.^
 
8. Other: art, valuable materials, etc. ,
 
Milliards of dollars are flowing out of Russia to
 
foreign bank accounts. Russia's exports, as a country,
 
stands for about $80 billion - so, there's lots of
 
transactions that take place. That might be money, that
 
Russians have earned, and they may have earned it
 
legitimately. Ittmay also be money that foreign investors
 
invest into Russia. Some of the activities may result from
 
Russian individuals' and businesses sending their legitimate
 
assets abroad for safekeeping. Some could involve Russians ,
 
conducting business with Western companies and paying for
 
Western goods. Neither of these activities is per se
 
L.Abalkin, Changes, in Structure;of Financial Market and Outflow
 
of Capital Question of Economics, 2/2000.
 
175
 
 illegal under United States law. However, the activities
 
could involve violations of Russian currency tax or other
 
laws.
 
Communist Party and KGB had started money outflows
 
long time ago. In 1991 after Soviet Union became Russia,
 
the huge sensation was the disappearance of Party's money.
 
Accordinjg to F. Ermarth, one international detective firm
 
1 ' ' '
 
had been! hired by the Yeltsin - Gaidar government to find
 
astronomical.sums essentially stolen by the KGB on behalf
 
of itself and the Communist Party of Soviet Union.(CPSU)
 
and deposited abroad in bank accounts and front companies.
 
Specialists on the, KGB had observed such activity
 
since the late 1980s. Using semi-private cooperatives, the
 
KGB was selling cheaply acquired Soviet commodities abroad
 
at world prices, putting the, proceeds into disguised
 
foreign accounts and front companies. Initially the KGB^
 
objective was simply commercial cover. But the program
 
evolved into operating businesses for off-budget revenues,
 
and from there into avenues for squirreling away, funds for
 
the safe retirement or political comeback of embattled
 
communist leaders.
 
^ U.S. representative Jim Leach Holds Hearing On Russian Money,
 
September! 22, 1,999.
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What sums were involved? Some in the U.S. intelligence
 
community estimated about $20 billion. But there was a
 
width of uncertainty: one private analysis estimated $4-6
 
billion; Russian press speculations ran to ICQ billion. By
 
all reckbnings the amounts were, very substantial. About a
 
year lat^r company located substantial funds expatriated by
 
the KGB. It informed its client and suggested approaches
 
for recovering the funds. By that time, however, the
 
Russian government no longer seemed to be interested. .
 
Obviously,, top officials and organizations had found ways
 
to access the funds that did not require, indeed would be
 
disrupted by, official efforts to repatriate them.^
 
Details from another investigation conducted in
 
Switzerland shows records and signed receipts indicating
 
financial payoffs to Yeltsin and his daughters, Tatyana
 
Dyachenko and Yelena Okulova,^ A Swiss construction company
 
called Mabetex, which won contracts for extensive
 
restoration work at the Kremlin, allegedly provided them
 
credit cards, paid bills amounting to tens of thousands of
 
dollars, and put $1 million in a Budapest bank account at
 
Seeing Russia Plain. The National Interest, Spring 1999.
 
,Kremlin Gilt - Or Is It Guilt? U.S.. News & World Report,
 
September 20, 1999.
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 their disposal. Mabetex is owned by businessman Behgjet
 
Pacolli, an Albanian Kosovar. Swiss investigators are
 
looking gnto charges that Mabetex paid $10 million in
 
bribes ig exchange for $300 million in contracts to
 
renovate the Kremlin and other official buildings in
 
Moscow.
 
Las . January Swiss authorities raided Mabetex's
 
headquar ers in Lugano and found records documenting
 
credit-card purchases in the names of Boris Yeltsin, his
 
daughter and close adviser Tatyana Dyachenko, and her older
 
sister, Yelena Okulova. The bills for the American Express
 
card in Yeltsin's name.werg.small, but the Eurocards
 
purportejily held by the daughters ran up charges of nearly
 
$600,000 in 1993 and 1994. The bills allegedly were paid by
 
Pacolli. He has denied doing, so, but concedes he did pay
 
credit-card charges for some Kremlin officials. The Kremlin
 
calls the entire Mabetex story "fictitious."
 
Investigators also discovered a mysterious account
 
called "Dean" at Switzerland's Banca del Gottardo.
 
According to documents obtained by the Italian newspaper
 
Corriere della Sera, the Dean account was held in the names
 
of three people: Pavel Borodin, the official in charge of
 
Kremlin renovations; Borodin's daughter, and Behgjet
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Pacolli. (Borodin denies that he ever had foreign bank
 
accounts.) Documents show that,on Dec. 5, 1995, $1 million
 
went into the Dean account from. Pacolli's personal account.
 
That day, $1 million whs transfefred to an account at the
 
Central European Bank in.Budapest.^
 
Payoffs and bribery we.re deeply ingrained during the
 
old Soviet system, and .the. transition to free-market
 
democracy has fostered international money laundering and
 
corruption on a grand scale. Since the collapse of the
 
Soviet Union, legal chaos and punitive taxes have been,
 
additional incentives for many Russians - especially
 
business owners, politicians, and crime bosses - to hide
 
finances and legitimize illegal income. Lev Makarevich
 
(1999) of the Russian Association of Banks believes $2
 
billion to $3 billion now leaves Russia each month, most of
 
it illegally. And,he estimates $500 billion has been
 
spirited to offshore institutions — like the Bank of New
 
York - since 1991, three times the total of all Western aid
 
received by Russia.^
 
The Incredible Fleecing Of Russia. Newsweek^ October 4, 1999.
 
^ Kremlin Gilt .- Or Is It Guilt? U.S. News .& World Report^
 
September 20, 1999.
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Says Richard Palmer, a former CIA station chief in,the
 
Baltics: "There are literally no Russian banks without ties
 
to organized crime." When Primakov, unleashed General
 
Prosecutor Yuri Skuratov in 1998 with orders to track down
 
the illegal flight of capital, one of his first targets was
 
Yeltsin friend Boris Berezovsky, suspected of diverting
 
Aeroflot profits to Switzerland. In turn, Yeltsin fired
 
Primakov, who had refused to stop the investigation.
 
Skuratov persisted, naming some 780 officials under
 
investigation for illegal trading in lucrative,treasury
 
bills. Among them was Anatoly Chubais, Yeltsin's deputy
 
prime minister and close adviser, initiator of
 
privatization. Last April, Yeltsin suspended, Skuratov after
 
the Kremlin had Moscow television station broadcast
 
videotape that appears to show the prosecutor cavorting
 
with two young prostitutes. But members of the upper house
 
of parliament,,suspecting a Kremlin plot to block his
 
investigation, refused to accept Skuratov's request to
 
resign for "health reasons."
 
With the help of Swiss authorities, Skuratov has
 
continued to follow the money in Switzerland, turning up
 
apparent evidehce of kickbacks, to Yeltsin, his daughters.
 
and.Kremlin property czar Pavel Borodin, who directed the
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 Kremlin's costly refurbishing. Once Skuratov's Moscow
 
apartment, country home, and his mother-in-law's apartment
 
were searched by investigators in what he decried as an
 
effort to silence him. Skuratov says he has evidence of
 
Kremlin misdeeds and is aggressively investigating Yeltsin,
 
although he stops short of directly accusing the Russian
 
I 1 ■ ■ 
leader of corruption.
 
There is also much speculation about the millionaire
 
Boris Berezovsky. Primakov had feuded with the powerful
 
banker arid was said to be behind the money-laundering
 
charges filed against him. Some insiders believe that
 
Berezovsljiy and Russia's other "oligarchs" got their revenge
 
j
 
by plotting Primakov's ouster with the help of Yeltsin's
 
daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko. "The talk of prosecuting
 
Berezovsky must have really hit Yeltsin's family, because
 
he is reputed to be their financial adviser," says Davvid
 
Satter, a Russia scholar at the Hudson Institute in
 
Washington. "Yeltsin must be concerned that his family
 
could become a scapegoat once he's no longer in power."'
 
Kr.eralin Gilt - Or Is It Guilt? U.S. News & World'Report,
 
September 20, 1999.
 
" Re]apse In Russia. U.S. News & World Report, May 24? 1999.
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The current situation with criminal money laundering
 
and corruption is briefly described by Jim Moody, former
 
Deputy Assistant Director, FBI Criminal Investigative
 
Division and by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
 
during.0. S. Senate Committee hearing on corruption and
 
money lauhdering in Russia:
 
TALBOTT: "Russia's criminal class has evolved from the
 
black marketeers, minor thugs, and fixers that existed at
 
the fringe of the old Soviet state, into the sophisticated
 
power brokers and money men who are pushing a once vast and
 
powerful empire into wholesale criminality and corruption.
 
Russians describe the current period as a smutna, or,time
 
of troubles, a chaotic interregnum like that of the early
 
17th and 20th century when anarchy ended only with the
 
. i ■ ■ 
establishment of yet another autocracy. Russia is going
 
through a revolution, a depression and a gold rush
 
simultaneously. Everything is up for grabs and might make
 
right.
 
. I quoted Mr. Yeltsin, who acknowledged publicly
 
that the mafia is the single greatest threat to the
 
survival of Russian democracy. And a statement that was
 
iU.S. representative Jim Leach Holds-Hearing On Russian Money,
 
September 22, 1999. h
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underscored by the 1994 mafia contract killing of Dimitri
 
Kaladoy, the investigative reporter who was looking at what
 
was happening in Moscow at the time.
 
started dealing with the Russians in October 1990,
 
and from day one I found out that corruption was one of the
 
major problems that they were facing: corruption and
 
organized crime. To give you an example, during one of my
 
trips CO Russia, in the eatly morning hours - and it must
 
have been 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning - a high- ranking
 
Russian official brought seven officers in to meet me so we
 
could talk a little bit, and he wanted me to meet people in
 
Russia that weren't corrupt. In other trip I met a high-

ranking officer and he estimated that 90 percent of his
 
officers were corrupt, which is a monumental problem to
 
address. But almost always, when they talk about corruption
 
over tsere, they say, the court system is worse.
 
MOODY: ... The biggest threat facing us today in the
 
United States is the literally billions of dollars that
 
these ;people have genefated that they're going to start
 
investing. And the best place in the world to invest right
 
now is the United States. So they're going to be purchasing
 
U.S. representative Jim teach Holds Hearing On Russian Money,
 
September 22, ,19'99.
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companies, they're going to be establishing companies, or
 
they're ^oing to be investing in our stock market to have a
 
tremendoas economic effect upon us. Now, I am an
 
experiensed organized crime investigator, and I have never
 
found anybody who was a criminal, who gained his money as a
 
criminal, that did not run a business illegally once they
 
get control of it. The long-term effect of what we're
 
facing is monumental, and I don't know how bad it's going
 
to be.
 
According to the Hudson Institute, "20,000 crimes
 
connected with official corruption are recorded every year,
 
but this is probably less than 1% of the real total. A
 
recent poll of Moscow businessmen revealed that several
 
thousand bribes are given and taken in the capital every
 
day." Corruption and crime act as confiscatory taxes and
 
make normal, unfettered commerce impossibility. ^ 
 
On of the numbers shown during hearing is. that 80
 
percent of the funds form Russian organized crime
 
operations first coming to the United,States. And of those
 
.funds from the U.S.,., 60 percent arrive from the city of
 
S representatiye Jim,Leach Holds Hearing On Russian Money, 
September 22, 1999. ■ , 
■ ■ ^ Russ;lari Meltdown:■ Ddil Blame Capita.Iism.. Human. Events, October 
1998. . 
j.8 4 
 Boston. Britain Criminal Intelligence Agency sent a report
 
to Premier-Minister that every year around $20 milliard of
 
laundered money from Russia,come to Great Britain and that
 
London is popular place of living or. visitors for at least
 
200 leaders of criminal organizations of Russia.
 
Anojther sensation of year of 1998 is laundering about
 
70 milliLrds of dollars through small island of Pacific
 
Ocean - Nauru. However, according to Victor Melnikov ­
assistant of president of Central Bank -these money
 
represent total amount transferred through the island
 
during official business processes. Majority of operations
 
are performed through Ecumene Bank, Inc. (Nauru), whose
 
I ■ ■ ■ : ■ ■ . ' , -. . 
customers are biggest corporations and companies of Russia
 
including Gasprom and other companies involved into oil and
 
gas business.'
 
How is it happening? There are few scenarios:
 
A Laundering Scenario: Tolling.
 
1. Russian company sells oil to its Own overseas shell
 
company at far below world price.
 
Dirty Money .Flow From Russia, . Arqumenti 'I Fakti (Moscow) , May, 
■2000. 
Miracle Island, Arqumenti 1 Fakti (Moscow) , 8 November, ■1999. 
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2. Shell [company resells oil at international market price.
 
earning huge profits.
 
3. Profits are funneled through foreign banks into.overseas
 
investments or back to ..Russia.
 
A,not|her Scenario: Loan Theft.
 
1. State I funds, which could include IMF loans, are, funneled
 
I ' . ' ■ ■ . 
to a shell.company overseas.
 
i ■ ■ . ■ ■ ■ ■ 
2. Shell company deposits money in multiple accounts at a
 
foreign bank.
 
3. Deposits are transferred to offshore investment or back
 
to launderer in Russia.
 
Third Scenario: Offshore.
 
■ t . ■ ' . ■ ■ ' 
1. Compaijy opens an offshore account, somewhere in Cyprus
 
where theire is no checking of income sources.
 
2. Transfer money to other offshore account in another place
 
or country.
 
3. Returning money back to Russia as payment for some fake
 
service.
 
Fourth Scenario: Improved Offshore.
 
1. Because company pays taxes on profits for performed
 
services, company still transfer money to offshore
 
accounts.
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2. But,funds are returned to Russia not as payment but as a
 
credit (that is not tax,abre).
 
■ One- troubling eharge has been that the Russian Central 
Bank that feceiyed the mone,y from:IM loan programs sent . 
some of that money to . a'small. 
offshore company located, in the:: British Channel Islands.. 
Most f6cehtly, .the' Russian Prosecutor(General Yuri Skuratov 
d that the Russian:Central Bank transferred $50. 
billion in. hard'.currency reserves in FIMACO. Central Bank 
officiaIs have since confirmed they.used FTMACQ to protect 
asse.ts;from foreign lawsuits and that some of the money 
o'ri from the IMF. But officials: have offered glaring 
discrepancies over the; sum involved. .The bank's deputy 
chairman, ;oieg, Mozhaiskoy,. ■ (s:ays $1.4 billion: was parked 
there at the height of its,activity in 1994.. But a 
predee€;Sso.n of Mr Mozhaiskov, Sergei .Alexashenko, 
confirmed the piosecutor''S citation of $50 billion.; Also 
unclear is where:the phoh commission .went. 
Current and former Central: Bank officials:deny wrongdoing. 
"MACO was fully: Owned.!by the . Paris-based . Eurobank,
 
.Which -S 77.75 percent owned by Russia's Central.Bank.
 
Liaundering Yeltsin. Nation, OGtober 4., 1999.
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other Eurobank shareholders include some of Russia's giants
 
- diamond firm ALROSA and oil companies Yukos and Rosneft.
 
In turn, the Monitor has learned that FIMACO owns 35
 
percent of another Eurobank subsidiary, Eurofinance, which
 
holds stakes in Russian banks and firms.^ A 1993 document
 
signed by a senior deputy to Viktor Gerashchenko, then and
 
now the head of the Central Bank, makes it clear that cash
 
transfers to the offshore firm were highly sensitive. "The
 
balance of the investment account of the [Central Bank] in
 
FIMACO shouldn't be disclosed on the balance sheet of the
 
bank," wrote the aide, A. V. Voilukov.
 
Just a week before Russia's first major devaluation,
 
Gerashchenko ordered a transfer of $1.4 billion in hard-

currency reserves to FIMACO—one third of the bank's
 
reserves at the time. Why the bank chose to transfer that
 
sum a week before devaluation is unclear. What is clear is
 
that the reserves were not used to help defend the ruble.
 
FIMACO's most controversial transactions came in early
 
1996, as Yeltsin was gearing up to win re-election. The
 
Central Bank channeled tens of millions through FIMACO into
 
Russian domestic bonds. The transfers were made before
 
^ Lenders Learn From Russian Ploy. Christian Science Monitor,
 
February 23, 1999.
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foreign institutions like Eurobank were permitted to buy
 
domestic bonds. In three separate investments, the Central
 
Bank invested more than $143 million, in domestic bonds
 
during, the 1996 campaign. At the time, interest rates on,
 
the bonds were stratospherically high; the bank made a
 
profit of $38 million. There are some suggestions that some
 
of the profits may well have ended up helping to fund
 
President Boris Yeltsin's 1996 re-election.
 
I ■ ' ■ ■ 
Asi|de from the issue of hiding money from creditors,
 
j. ■ " . ■ . ■ ■ ■ ■ , ■ ■ 
many questions have been raised over whether FIMACO served
 
as a conduit for capital flight, estimated at $150 billion
 
over the past decade. That sum is equal to the country's
 
entire foreign debt. Analysts believe E'lMACO's relationship,
 
with other Central Bank subsidiaries - a circle of
 
companie that own parts of each other -could enable it to
 
be used as a passage for channeling capital abroad. The
 
Central Bank, via these daughter companies, invests
 
commercially - a highly unusual practice.
 
. The FIMACO revelations come at a delicate moment in
 
Russian IMF negotiations,.'V/hich may explain the IMF's
 
reluctance to ,conunent , further i Moscow, in the throes of a
 
severe ejconomic crisis, is seeking more loans, because it
 
says it cannot , repay $17 .. 5 billion of debt falling due this
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 year Central Bank reserves are dangerously low for such an
 
indebted country - $11.3 billion dollars, of which only $7
 
billion is held in cash.
 
Th^ Central Bank says FIMACO—a company it controls
 
but that apparently has no employees or offices—invested
 
the hard-currency reserves wisely. But it has yet to
 
provide a real accounting of how that was done or of where
 
the profits from those investments have ended up. Skuratov
 
resigned his post the next day (medical problems was the
 
explanation); the bank claimed it hid the.reserves to ' ,
 
protect the money from foreign creditors; and now Nikolai
 
Gonchar, an independent deputy in the Duma, is accusing the
 
Russian Central Bank of having transferred those reserves
 
from the offshore account/back into government treasury
 
i ■ 1 ■bills and,concealing the profits.
 
A recent, independent audit confirmed that the Russian
 
government had channeled $1 billion in, foreign currency
 
reserves offshore in ah apparent speculative scheme and
 
that Russian officials cannot explain what happened to a
 
$4.8 billion IMF. loan last year. Russian,Central Bank
 
Just Say Nyet. New RepubliG, 3/22/99.
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officials said the $1 billion v/as transferred offshore in
 
an attempt to boost the market for government debt.^
 
The Kremlin's own study of corruption, released in the
 
summer'of 1998 estimated that it was costing the country
 
somewhere between $15 billion and $20 billion every year.
 
For cojnparison, the IMF has loaned a total of just $16
 
billion to Russia since 1992,^
 
In Russia, money is stolen hand over fist in all sorts
 
i ■ 
of way^. One despicable practice is known as "authorized
 
banking," whereby a politically connected bank is
 
i ' ' •
 
authorjized to handle federal budget money. Pension
 
payments, subsidies for Russia's remote Far North
 
communities, funds to rebuild Chechnya - all of it pours
 
into these banks, and far from all of it comes back out.
 
Yeltsin's regime has also handed out lucrative
 
exemptions from customs duties on imported alcohol and
 
cigarettes. These have gone, among others, to the Orthodox
 
Church and to a fund for excellence in sports headed by
 
Yeltsin's tennis coach and friend, Shamil Tarpishchev.
 
|The New Debate: Will A Cold Shoulder Replace Post-Cold War 
Optimism? CQ Weekly, 7/10/1999. , ■ ■ " 
^ iLaundering Yeltsin. Nation, October 4, 1999.
 
191
 
Collectively these exenipticns have cost the national
 
coffers hundreds of millions of dollars.
 
Money is also sometimes diverted from corporations,
 
often with Kremlin acquiescence. Prosecutors say hundreds
 
of millions of dollars have been siphoned from the airline
 
Aeroflot—a partly state-owned company that was run by
 
Yeltsin's son-in-law—into a Swiss shell company. And when
 
parliamentary auditors uncovered massive theft at the
 
state-owned Ostankino television station in 1995—Channel
 
1, the only station that could be seen throughout Russia—
 
Yeltsin "solved" the problem by signing a decree
 
liquidating Ostankino and transferring all its equipment
 
and privileges to a new company called ORT.^
 
Operations of governmental companies give the ground
 
for thoughts about the aim of the business. State budget
 
receives from majority of these companies almost nothing
 
because state does not knov/ what is going on inside
 
organizations. For example, according to labor laws, the
 
difference between earnings of highest and lowest wages
 
should not be more than 10 times. However, often it is far
 
form true: the difference reaches up to 100 times. In
 
" Laundering Yeltsin. Nation, October 4, 1999.
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additic>.n, resources of companies are used to purchase
 
i '
 
houses,! apartments, and cars for their management.
 
Another example.is October Rail Road corporation that
 
sold stiocks of Baltiysky Bank for 10 million of rubles in 
i 
May 19^8 and bought it back in October for 276.5 millions 
! ■ 
of rubies. Even if take into considerations inflation after 
i ■ i., ■ -h ■ . ■ ■ ■ .Augustjcrisis, the difference between selling and buying
 
pricesjis signifiGant and probably pocketed by somebody
 
from top management.
 
Big state owned enterprises have tenth and hundreds of 
I ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ' ■ 
"daughter" - companies - companies organized and sponsored 
i ■ ■ ■ . ^ ' , ■ ■ ■ 
i . ■ 
by these enterprises. Through such "daughters" cash flows
 
outside the enterprise and outside of. country. For example, 
!' ■ ' . ■ ■ 
"Rosvooruzhenie" - enterprise in military equipment and 
! ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
weaponiry - invested more than $100 millions of dollars into
 
I ' ■ ■ ' - , ■ 
■ i ' ■ ■ ■■ ■ ■ ■ ' ' 61 "daughter" - organizations, but received as dividends so
 
far Only $2.2 . m.ilTions.^
 
Privatization auctions also bring questions about,its
 
leqali:y. The criminality of these auctions was well
 
detailed in the Russian- and English-language press;
 
Izvestia, for instance, reported that $50 million in
 
Who Cuts Profits From State Property? Argumenti I Facti
 
(Moscow: 17 April, 2.000.
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 Ministry of Finance.funds had been transferred to .Bank
 
Menatep before the latter won a huge stake in the oil
 
company Yukos. More than one paper noted the curious
 
anomaly of two banks (Stolichny Bankland Menatep)
 
guaranteeing each other's bids in a "competitive" auction
 
for a stake in the oil com^pany Sibneft. The winning bid in
 
i '
 
that auJtion was just $10G.3 miillion, despite the fact that
 
the compjany, which at the. time produced more than 22
 
million jtons of crude per year, was clearly worth a lot
 
more. Moist observers at the time believed that the sweeping
 
victory jby the Communists in the 1995 parliamentary
 
electionjs was. at least partly fueled by public disgust over
 
these auctions. And every sane observer recognized that the
 
auctions! represented a profound step away from the Western
 
capitalist model.
 
Qn August 19th,'Bank of New York (BoNY), one- of
 
America's oldest, admitted to co-operating with an
 
investigation into alleged money-laundering Of as much as
 
$10 billion. The paper,trail has touched several European
 
banks too, all of which are said to have helped, over the
 
past year, to move $4 billion from Russia to BoNY's London
 
Tlje Journal's. Russia'Scandal. Nation, October 4, 1999.
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office. All the banks,deny wrongdoing. One focus of the
 
investigation (who also denies wrongdoing) is Bruce
 
Rappaporc, a 76-year-old Swiss banker whom Antigua, a well-

known Caribbean tax haven, recently appointed as its
 
ambassadjor to Moscow. He is joint-owner, with BoNY, of Bank
 
of New York-InterMaritime, a Swiss bank that does lots of
 
Russian business.
 
Another focus is Benex, a company run by Peter Berlin,
 
i . , ■ , • ■ ■ ■ ■ '■ ■ ■ ^ ■ 
husband bf Lucy Edwards (born Lyudmila Pritzker), a BoNY
 
executivje and a firm that authorities say is controlled by
 
i ' ' ■ 
Semyon Mpgilevich, allegedly a vicious mafioso known as the 
"brainy idon". The bank has suspended her, along with a 
second Riussian-born executive, Natasha Kagalovsky, manager 
of the department through which all accounts were flowing ­
- who is married to Konstantin Kagalovsky, a rich Russian
 
businessman, who in the early 1990s was Russia's IMF
 
representative.^
 
Konstantin Kagalovsky after leaving his IMF post
 
plunged into Russia's financial world, working as VP'at
 
Menatep Bank. The now bankrupt Menatep was known to have
 
been deeply connected to the Russian Central Bank - the
 
Crime Without. Punishment. Economist, August 28, 1999.
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reeipient of IMF mo-ney^-through its purchase of Russian
 
treasuries. l"'hrough .their . New York attorney, Stanley Arkin,
 
the couple said they "have,never been involved in money
 
laundering in any way, ehape or form." The point was well
 
taken: is it even possible to "launder" from a country
 
where the theft of;state assets is not against the law?^
 
.As-much as. $200m that passed through BoNY may have
 
come from IMF loans to Russia. The IMF says allegations of
 
money laundering are serious and it is,looking into them.
 
But it also says that its loans to Russia were deposited
 
directly into the accounts of the Russian central bank and
 
That it has neither the locus nor the ability to monitor
 
what happens next.
 
Venyamin Sergeyevich Sokolov,.Russia's chief auditor,
 
a, scientist and former university rector, is, as he puts
 
it, "leading the hunt" to find the $4.8 biliion the IMF
 
gave Russia's Central Bank to save the ruble last July,,
 
much of which was "diverted, misused, or simply stolen."
 
Within weeks,o.f the Deval, Sokolov was instructed to audit
 
the Centmar Bank, and by now he.has dozens of binders
 
stuffed with evidence of theft and fraud. "There's never
 
^ The Gangster State. Newsweek, September 6,. 1999.
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been an audit of the Central Bank," beams Sokolov, "let
 
alone one In which we have the legal right to obtain every
 
piece of paper pertaining to every transaction and when so
 
much money Is at stake. We are progressing through the
 
pile. And what we've found already smells."^
 
In conclusion of his report Is written: "Nearly 68
 
percent of the total sum of the IMF credits were spent on
 
the current needs of the Federal Budget, approximately 10
 
percent went to the payment of the foreign debt, the
 
remaining 22 percent, which should have gone to the
 
[financial rescue plan], went to purposes having no clear
 
relation to these activities." In other words, 22 percent
 
of the $4.8 billion IMF loan-or $1.06 billion - vanished.
 
Although all figures In this area are Inherently
 
unreliable, the Russian Interior Ministry has estimated
 
that organized crime controls 40% of the economy; other
 
estimates are even higher. Half of Russia's banks were
 
thought to be controlled by crime syndicates. Illegal
 
revenues are funneled through businesses that are kept
 
going only as money-laundering operations, or thanks to
 
monopolies maintained by force. But it does at least offer
 
Russia In The Red. Harper's Magazine, June 1999,
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a kind of stabiiity,,. One recent, opinion poll in .Moscow,
 
showed that a rnajority of residents believed,that the
 
munidipal admihistration was corrupt--but that a majority,
 
would • still be read.v to re-elect it;
 
What could.happen:in.the future with Russian .criminal
 
structures.? There are three troubling possibilities.. One is
 
.Of Russian orgahized crime abroad. Russian racketeers In
 
businesses S:uchi as prostitution and smuggling are already a
 
well-established feature of the criminal.landscape,in ; .
 
countries, with a big. Russian immigrant presence, including .
 
Germany and America. .
 
V . More worrying is co-operation with foreign criminals
 
in areas where Russian gangsters have a competitive
 
advantage, in either:skills or ruthlessness. Dr Galeotti's
 
research, for example,! suggests that Japanese gangs have .
 
used Russian hackers to attack . law-enforcement , agencies.'
 
databases. Russian professional assassins are also in big
 
demand .
 
But the worst threat comes from the fusion of a
 
state with powerful gangsters. It has never beeh
 
explained, for example, ho.w the menacihg Aum ShinrikyG cult
 
was able to cOhtinue bperating in RiisSia, even after its.
 
nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subv/ay. Russia:is a major
 
7-'1'98 "1
 
 staging-post for smuggling weapons and drugs, something
 
that wouid be impossible without the close co-operation of
 
i ' . ■ • - . 
state bodies. "Organized crime interests are global, not
 
isolationist," says one western security specialist. "They
 
would lofve it if Russia was in the European Union."
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TABLE 1. MAINISOCIO - ECONOMIC INDICATORS
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Gross Domestiic Product: 
Total, trillijon rubles (bin. 
rubles in 199|8) 19 172 611 1540 2146 2522 2685 
Per capita, dhos.rubles (rubles in 128 1155 4117 10399 14523 17421 18275 
1998) ■ 
Expenditure on final consumption, 
trillion rubles (bin. rubles in 9,1 106,8 422,1 1095,9 1544,7 ■ 1888,8 2048,3 
1998) 
Gross accumulation, trillion 
rubles (bin., .rubles in 1998) , 6,6 46,3 156,0 391,6 528,7 582,1 .438,0 
Fixed assets,! in book value (at 
be-ginning of year), trillion 
rubles (bin. rubles in 1998) 2,1 43,2 1189,6 5182,0 130.72,4 13286,2 14133,6 
Resident population (at end of 
year), mln. persons 148,3 148,0 147,9 147,6 147,1 146,7 146,3 
Including: 
Under working age, total 35,2 34,5 33,9 33,2 32,3 31,3 30,3. 
Males 1 17,9 17,6 17,3 16,9 16,5 16,0 15,5 
Females 17,3 16,9 16,6 ■ 16,3 15,8 15,3 14,8 
Working age, total 83,7 83,8 84,1 84,2 84,3 84,8 85,6 
Males ; 43,5 43,7 44,0 44,1 44,0 44,0 44,0 
Females j 40,2 40,1 40,1 40,1 40,3 . 40,8 41,6 
Over workingjage, total 29,4 29,7 29,9 30,2 30,5 30,6 30,4 
■ Males , 1 8,2 8,2 8,2 8,3 8,5 8,8 9,1 
Females i ' 21,2 21,5 21,7 21,9 22,0 21,8 21,3 
Natural increase, decrease (-): 
thos,. persbnd -219,8 -750,4 -893,2 -840,0 -777,6 -755,9 -705,1 
Per 1000 population -1,5 
-5,1 ! -6,1 -5,7 -5,3 , -5,2 . -4,8 . 
Average annual number of those 
engaged in nktional economy, mln. 
persons . . 72071 70852 68484 66441 65950 64639 63642 
including those at enterprises of 
non-state fopms of ownerships 
(without municipal and individual 22411 33327 37877 38470 38224, 38744 39267 
sector) 
Total number] of unemiployed, thos. 
persons 3937 . ,4511 5689 6539 7280 8133 8930 
Number of ofificially registered 
unemployed, thos. persons 578 835 1637 2327 2506 1999 1929 
Money incomeis of households, 
trillion rubles (bin. rubles in 7,1 79,9 364,8 910,7 1339,5 ■ 1643,2 1700,5 
1998) ■ ■ 
Money expenditures of households,; 
trillion rub'les (bin. rubles in 6,1 72,5 348,4 877, 6 1320,7 1615,7 1672,7 
1998) . ■ ■ ■■. 
Average m.one y wages, of those 
employed in 
(rubles in 1 
'economy, 
'998) 
thos. rubles 
6,0 58,7 220, 4 472, 4 790,2 950,0 1100,7 
Industrial p)roducts,2) trillion 
rubles (bin. rubles in 1998) 18,5 129 384 1108 1443 1601 ' 1681 
Produce of £.griculture, trillion 
rubles (bin. rubles in 1,998) 2,7 22., 4 ,73,7 203,9 286,9 309,3 302,4 
Including: 
Produce of plant-growing. .1,3 10,3 38,0 108,3 156,5 171,5 142,8 
Produce of animal husbandry 1,4 12,1 35,7 9'5,6. 130,4 137,8 159, 6 
Commissioning of total living area 
in residential houses, mln. sq. m 41,5 41,8 39,2 41,0 34,3 . 32,7 30,7 
Cargo turnover of general-purpose 
transport, trillion ton km 4,7 4,2 3,6 3,5 3,4 3,3 .3,1 
Passenger turnover of general-
purpose transported bin. ' 681,2 661,0 596,2 552, 9 527,7 511,5 481,2 
passenger-km 
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Retail trade turnover, bin. rubles
 
(mlri. rubles in 1998) 5600 58762 213430 553633 756357 884656 1065200
 
Marketable services rendered to
 
households, bin. rubles (mln.
 
rubles in!1998) 515 '6166 113043 274385
.. 34107 200051 318605 
Receipts of consolidated budget: 
bin. rubles (mln. rubles'in 1998) 5328. .49730 172380 437007" 558532" 711620" 657083 
In per cerit to GDP 28,0 29,0 28,2 28,4 26,0 28,2 24,5 
Expenditures of Consolidated 
budget: i 
bin. rubles (mln. rubles in 1998) 597(3 .57674 230385 486112 652720 839489 ■ 753009 
In per cent to GDP 31,4 33,6 37,7 31,6 30,4 33,3 28,1 
Deficit ol consolidated budget: 
bin. rubles (mln. rubles in 1998) 64.2 7944 65494" 49105 94188 127869 95926 
In per cent to GDP 3,4 4,6 10,7 3,2 4,4 5,1 3.,6 
Profit, loss (-) in economy®', bin. 
rubles (mln. rubles in 1998) 
5623 40763 80443 250599 124989 173998 -34632
 
Money supply (at end of year),
 
trillion publes (bin. rubles in 33,2 97,8 220,8" 295,2" 384,5" 452,5"
 
1998)
 
Including:
 
CO
Ready cash off banking system 13,3 36,5 80,8 103,8 .130,4 187,8
 
Deposit mjsney 19,9 61,3 140,0 191,4 254,1 264,7
00
 
Credit investments into economy 186972"
 
(at end of year), bin. rubles 5101,6 30019 83561,2 202308'" 276310'" 320326"
 
(mln. rubles in 1998) 134508 )
 
Including|:
 
160713"
 
Short-term 4835,3 28982 79284,6 116751 196202,4'265935'"
 
0).
 
26259" 
Long-term 266,3 1037 4276,6 17757 6105,2'" 10375'" 
Capital investments,, trillion 
rubles (bin. rubles in 1998) ■ 2,1' 27,1 108,8 267,0 376,0 408,8 402,4 
1 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 
Index of consumer prices (December
 
as compared to December of .26,1 9,4 3,2 2,3 1,2 1,1 ' 1,8
 
previous year, times)
 
Index.of industrial producers
 
prices (December as compared to
 
December of previous year, times) 33,8 10,0 3,3 2,7 1,3 1,1 1,2
 
Index of prices for agricultural
 
produce sold by a.gricultural
 
enterprises (times to previous 9,4. 8,1 3,0 3,3 . 1,4 • 1,1 1,1
 
year)
 
Index of prices in construction .
 
(times to previous year) 16,1 11,6 : . 5,3 2,7 1,7 1,1 1,1
 
Index- of tariffs for cargo ,
 
shipments (December as compared to
 
December of previous year, times) 35,6 18,5 3,5 2,7 1,2 1,0 1,2
 
External trade turnover
 
with countries of the world
 
(excludiEg CIS countries), bin. US 79,4 71,1 90,0 109,7 120,1 125,9 104,8
 
dollars {
 
Including: ■ 
Exports 42,4 44,3 53,0 65,6 71,0 70,0 
Imports ([including officially non-
registered imports) 37,0 37,0 44,1 . 49,1 55,9 45,8 
External trade turnover 
with CIS countries, (including
 
officially non-registered exports
 
and imports)., bin. US dollars 17,2 26,8' 28,1 32,3 37,3 36,1 28,6
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Including 
Exports . . 11,2 15,3. 14,5 . 15,5 17,6 14,9 
Imports 6,0 , 11,5 ■ 13,,6 16,8. 19,7 17,7 . 13,7­
1) Data in value terms are given in actual prices, for 1998 in price
 
effective since January 1,. 1998.
 
2) Data are given within the structure and,the methodology of the
 
respective years, with account taken of the correction for informal
 
activity. ,
 
3) Since 1996 with account taken of the valuation for the volumes of
 
! ' ■ • ■ 
transportation by rail of passengers entitled to free travel in 
■ ! ' 
suburban traffic. 
4) With ac ount taken of contributions to target-oriented budget funds,
 
5) Considering funds received by the Central Bank of the Russian
 
Federation, but they yet did not written into correspondence accounts
 
of Minfin of Russia as well as the balance by credit and currency
 
operations
 
6) In 1995 1997 the data of accounting record.
 
7) Accordi|ng to the calculation methodology adopted by the Central Bank
 
of the Russian Federation in 1996.
 
8) According to. the calculation methodology adopted by the Central Bank
 
of the Russian Federation in 1998 excluding data on credit
 
organizatiJons with abolished license.
 
00
9) In. the numerator, according to the methodology adopted by the
 
Central Benk of the Russian Federation in 1996-1997 in rubles and
 
foreign currency; without the Vnesheconombank; in the denominator
 
according to the calculation methodology which was effective in 1995.
 
10) According, to the calculation methodology adopted by the Central
 
Bank of tlie Russian Federation in 1997, without the Vnesheconombank,
 
excluding long-term credits for financing of investments into basic
 
main capital. '
 
11) According to the calculation methodology adopted by the Central
 
Bank of the Russian Federation in 1998; the data were given on credits
 
extended :o enterprises, organizations and physical persons.
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TABLE 2. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION BY BRANCHES
 
2000 December 2000 in % to 
in % Dec-99 Nov-00 
to 
1999 By total Influence By total Influence of 
of 
volume the working volume the working 
time fund time fund is 
is 
not taken not taken 
into into 
considerati consideration 
on 
(is (is excluded) 
excluded) 
Electric power 101,8 102,2 102,2 112,6 109,0 
Fuel 105,0 105,2 105,2 103,1 99,8 
Ferrous metallurgy 115,6 101,5 101,5 101,0 97,7 
Non-Ferrous 
metallurgy 111,3 105,1 105,1 98,3 95,1 
Chemical and 
petro-chemical 114,3 108,7 110,2 102,5 100,4 
Industrial 
machinery and 
metal cutting 115,5 97,2 106,8 99,1 103,9 
Loggin, wood 
working, pulp-and­
paper 109,5 99,5 105,8 111,5 113,7 
Building materials 107,6 96,0 101,3 92,0 93,3 
Glass, china and 
ceramics 110,9 106,3 107,5 98,5 96,2 
Light 122,0 101,3 111,4 99,6 104,6 
Food 107,1 101,0 105,0 103,8 103,8 
Microbiological 73,8 103,7 104,6 94,5 92,1 
Flour-grinding and 
mixed-fodder 93,5 91,8 92,4 98,4 95,9 
Medical, 
pharmaceutical 118,9 91,9 100,0 85,0 88,4 
Printing 113,8 93,9 103,3 96,7 101,6 
Others 108,3 100,4 104,3 102,9 102,9 
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TABLE 3. BYNAMICS OF GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
 
Billion In % to Billion In % to
 
of
!°f The Previous period The corresponding , Previous
 
rubles rubles
 
corresponding period of the period
 
period of.the the influence previous year the influenc
j
 previous year volume of the volume e of the
 j
 
of the working of the working
 
whole time whole time
 
fund is fund is
 
not not,
 
taken' taken 
into into 
The Influence considern The ■ Influence of consider 
volume of the volume the ation i
 
1 of the working (is of the working time (is
 
whole time excluded) whole excluded
 
) .
 
fund is fund is not
 
not
 
taken taken into
 
into
 
consider consideration
 
(is (is excluded)
 
excluded)
 
1999 2000
 
January ^ L87,6 97,6 99,1 ■ ...■92,-5 98,4 331,7 110,7 110,7 92,1 
February 189,8 97,0 97,0 100, 8 104,7 350, 8 113,7 109,3 103, 6 103,3 
March .^23,0 100,4 98, 9 111,3 100,7 387,5 109, 6 109,6 107,2 101,0 
Quarter I fe 00,4 98', 4 98, 4 102,1 105,9 1070,0 111,9 110,5 102, 4 104,8 
April . 223,2 ioo',.6
i 
100,6 95,7 97, 8 359,2 105,5: 108,-9 92,1 97,1 
May 213,2 106, 0 106, 0 93,6 97, 4 361,1 110, 6 107,2 98,1 95,9 
June 228, 6 109, 0 • 109,0 101, 6 .99,2 384,5 109, 8 109, 8 100,9 101, 6 
Quarter 
II 665,0 105, 0 105., 0 99,.0 97,7 1104,8 108,5 108,5 96, 6 96,6 
The first 
half of 
the year : 1265, 4 103,1 103,1 2174,8 110,3 109, 6 CO 
o 
July 242,3 112,8 114,5 102,1 98,4 391, 6 108,5 110,1 100, 9 98,7 
August 252,7 . 116,0 ■ 114,2 101, 6 101, 6 407,7 110,2 108,6 103,2 100,2 
September 271,2 120,2 120,2 100, 8 103,0 417,6 107,2 108, 9 98, 0 103,3 
Quarter 
III 766,2 116,3 116,3 102,3 98,9 1216,9 108, 6 109,i 102,3 99,5 
January-
September 2l031, 6 107,0 107, 0 3391,7 109,7 109,4 
1 
October 293, 7 110,3 112,0 102, 6 101, 9 442,7 110,4 108,7 105, 6 101,8 
November bii,8 112, 9 111,2 102,1 104,3 451, 9 107, 6 107, 6 99,5 103,3 
December 358,1 111,1 111,1 107, 4 103,5 476,2 , 102,5 105,6 . 102,3 101,6 
Quarter 
IV 963, 6 111,5 111,5 107,7 . 108,8 1370,8 106,5 . 107,0 105,8 .106, .9 
Year 2!995,2 108,1 108,1 4762,5 109, 0 108, 9 
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TABLE 4.1 INDICES OF MAIN SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
 
(in comparable prices; in per cent to previous year)
 
i 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Gross Domestic Product 85,5 91,3 87,3 95,9 96,6 100,9 95,4 
Expenditure on final 94,8 99,0 96,9 97,3 96,9 103,0 97,2 
consumption 
Fixed assets in economy 101,9 100,5 99,7 100,2 99,6 98,7 99,8 
Population 99,98 99,8 99,96 99,8 99,7 99,7 . 99,7 
Average annual 
employment in economy 97,6 98,3 96,7 97.,0 99,3 98,0 98,0 
Total unemployment (at 
end of year) _ 115 ,126 115 111 112 110 
Money incomes of 8,5 11,3 4,6 2,5 1,5 
householdsl) times times times times times 122,7 103,5 
Money expenditures of 8,2 11,8 4,8 2,5 1,5 
househoIcp.sl) times times times times times 122,3 103,5 
Average money wages 
accrued (consumer 
prices index 67 100,4 92 72 106 . 105 87 
considered) 
Industrial outputs) 82 86 79 97 96 102 95 
Agricultural output 91 96 ■ 88 92 95 101,5 87,7 
Produce df plant­ 95 97 90 95 100,3 107,3 76,5 
growing 
Produce pf animal 88 95 , 87 90 89 95,0 99,1 
husbandry 
Commissioning of total 
living area in 84 100,7 94 105 84 95 94 
residential houses 
Cargo turnover of 
general-purpose 86 89 ■ 86 99 95 97 97 
transporl: 
Passenger .turnover of 
general^purpose . - 87 97 90 93 93 97 94 
transport 
Retail tpade turnover 97 102 100,1 93 96 105 95 
Marketab,ie services 
rendered to households 82 70 62 82 94 106 99,5 
Profit i]a economy 1) 15,5 6,7 times 1,9 3,ltime 4.9,9 102,4 — 
times times s 
Credit i:ivestments into . 11,6 , 5,9 ■ 2,8 1,6 1,1 1,4 1,4 
economy (at end of ■ times times times times times times times 
year) 
Capital 1investments 60 88 ■ 76 , 90 82 95 93 
Externalj trade turnover 
with countries of the 
world (ekciuding- CIS 83 97 117 122 110 105 83 
countries)• 4) 
External! trade turnover
 
with Cis| countries 4)' 156 105 115 116 97 79
 
In actual prices.
 
Data kre given taking into account estimates for non-formLal
 
' activities.
 
Sincei 190'6. according to th,e calculation methodology adopted by the
 
Central:Bank of the Russian Federation in 1996-1997 in roubles and
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 foreign , curirency; without Vnesheconombank. Effective from 1997^ 
financing ■ ,(^f capital investments " has been excluded from long-term 
credits.
 
TABLE'-5. 'STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT^'
 
I ■ (in current market prices; in percent to total)
 
1995 1996
 
41.3 41.6
 
50.9
 49.9
 
1997 1998
 
39,4 39,3
 
52.1
 52.7
 
H Production ofcommodities
 
□Production of serw ces 
□ Net (minus subsidies)t3xes on products 
Im.puteci. services of financial intermediation are included in the 
intermediary consumption and distribution between branches producing 
commodities and services. 
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TABLE 6. 1 GDP IN COMPARABLE PRICES,
 
1
 
In comparable q I q II q 111 q IV 1998 q I q II q 111 q IV 1999 q I q II q 111
 
prices, in % to
 
1998 1998 1998 1998 1999 1999 1999 1999... 2000 2000 2000
 
the correspondent
 
period of thej
 
previous yeari
 
Gross domestic 98.7 99 91.9 91.8 95.1 97.3 101.2 1.07 107.3 103.2 108 107 107,9
 
product
 
Including: |
 
Final consumption 99.7 99.9 100 92.3 97.7 93.8 95.1 95.5 101.1 96.5 108 108,3 109,6
 
Households 98.9 99.2 98.9 89.9 96.4 91.2 92.4 93.9 100.7 94.7 109 110,9 112,6
 
Government 102 102., 103 96.2 100.6 101 100.7 100 102.2 100.9 102 • 102 101,5
 
Nonprofit 98.4 98.5 98.6 98.1 98.4 99.6 100.1 99.4 100.8 100 99.6 98.8 99,9
 
institutions|
 
serving households
 
Gross accumulation 110 94.7 69.8 17.9 68.7 54.1 82.7 112 4154 109.3 121 98,3 109,9
 
1 ■ 
Gross capital . . 86.4 94 88.3 85.3 88.8 93 92.1 102 114.2 102.4 112 115 119,1
 
formation :
 
Changes in 245 97.7 41.9 43.4 151 90.4
 
inventories 1
 
Net exports. 77 301 516 211 2755 245 68 160.2 102 106 97,7
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TABLE 7. USE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
 
(in actua1 prices; trillion rubles)
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 
bin,
 
rubles
 
Gross Domestic
 
Product j (in market 19,0 .171,5, 610,8 2.145,7 2522,0 2684,5
 
prices) J total
 
Includirig: OL
 
Final cc)nsumption, • 9vl 106,8 422,1 0
1095,9 1544,7 1888,8 2048,3
 
V•
 
expendit-ures OL
 
Including:
 
Households 6,2 68,0 267,\—1  760,0 1056,1 1287,6 1507,4
 
Government' 2,6 . 29,8 136,7 299,4 436,8 544,2 485,9
0 
institutions 
Out of "them: 
For individual 1.3 13,8 145,9 205,2 245,7 233,5 
goods and services 
For collective 1,3 ■ 15,9 76,6 153,5 231,6 298,5 252,4 
services 
Non-protit O7..3 9,0 18,3- ■ 36,5 51,8' 57,,0 55,0 
organizations serving 
households 
Gross afccumulation ' .6,-6 : . ■ 46,.3 156,0 391,6 528,7 582,1 . 438,0 
Incliiding: 
Gross capital . 4,6t,. 35,0 , . 133,2 327,9 454,4 489,9 471,7 
formation 
Changesj in 
. 2,0, 11,3 22,8 63,7 74,3 92,2 -33.,7 
inventories 
Net experts of goods 2,1 13,2 27,9 53,1 : 89,4 73,5 . 210,9 
and services 
Statistical . 0,6 , 5,2 4,8 0,1 17,1 22,4' 12,7 
discrepancy 
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TABLE 8. ENTERPRISES AND ORGANIZATIONS BY ECONOMY'S BRANCHES
 
(as of Ist January; thos.)
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 
Total inc:luding: 1245 . i'946 2250 2505 2727 2901 
Industry . . 212 .289 310 324 339 352 
Agriculti,ire ■■121 287 335 339 338 332 
Forestry 4,6 4.2 4,2 . ■ 4,1 4.1 4.1 
Construct ion 164 235 ■ 259 273 287 . 298 
Transport 36,0 . : . 4 7,5. 53,1 , 62, 7 60,1 67, 4 
Communicc tions 11.1 12,1 
Trade anc. public catering 302 5.25 640 . 746 852 , 935 
Wholesale: trade of produce,for 
producticin-technical purposes 25, 4 . 31, 8 33,9 36,9 39, 4 41.1 
Informati on and, computer.services 7,6. . 9.5 10, 0 10. 9 . 11. 8 12, 6 
Real est£ite transactions 2,3 4,8 7.3 9,6 12,3 15, 7 
General clommerciai . activity to. 
support nlarket performance 39, 9 58, 2, 66,7 77,4 88,0 . 97, 8 
Geologiesli prospecting and 
surveyiriG geodesy and.. , , 3,8 4,2 4.5 4,8 5.1... 2.7, 
hydrometehorology services- . 
Housing £ind communal' ' services 13,2, . 23, 5 34,3 38, 0 4 0,3 42, 3 
Non-prodiiction servigeb." fenderdd; 
to house]:loids , ' 12,6 .17, 7 18, 7 19, 5 20, 8 22, 0 
Public he^aith, physical.cuiture ■ 
and socisli security ' 42, 5 ■56, 5 63,7 68, 6 73,7 7 9,1 
Educatior1 .33, 3 44,3 57, 5 70, 0 83,5 96, 7 
Culture cind arts 2 6,8 33, 5 37, 3 4 0,2 43.9 47,8 
Science aind scientific service •. 72, 2 91,1 96, 8 100, 5 103,.9 105, 7 
Finances ^  credit, insurance, . 21, 9 36, 6 4.3, 6 47,7 50, 9 52, 4 
pension esecurity 
General c[overnment 61, 0 72, 4 78,8 83, 0 . 85, 2 85,7 
Public urlions and associations 18, 3 . 41,1 57, 2 105, 3 129, 0 144, 6 
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TABLE 9. ALLOCATION OE ENTERPRISES AND ORGANIZATIONS BY OWNERSHIP TYPES
 
(as of 1st January)
 
Number of In per cent to total
 
enterprises
 
and organizations,
 
thos.
 
1996. 1997 1998 1999 1996 19.97 1998. 1999
 
Total 2250 2505 2727 2901 100 100 100 100
 
Including by the types of
 
ownership:
 
State property 322 233 143 148 14,3 9,3 5,4- 5,1
 
Municipal.property 198 184 178 183 7,4 6,5 6,3
 
Property of public
 
associatio:n.s (organizations)
 
95 130 158. 183 4,2 5,2 5,8 6,3
 
Other property types
 
including mixed property,
 
property of juridical
 
209 '221 235 240 9,3 9,0 8,6 h3
 
persons, individuals and
 
persons witthout citizenship
 
Private prioperty 1426 1731 2014 2147 63,4, 69,1 73,9 74,0
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TABLE 10, NUMBER OFISMALL SIZE ENTJSRPRISES BY ECONOMY'S BRANCHES
 
(as of 1:t January).'
 
1997 1998 . 1999 
Total In'per Total■ In per Total In per 
cent cent cent 
to to to. 
total total total 
Total 841737 100 861063 100 868008 100 
Including 
Industry 131878 15/7 134810 15/ 6 136117. 15/7 
Ag.ricultu,re' 10879 . 1.3 11899 •1.4 ■ 137.5 9 „ 1.6 
Construct ion 137970 16/ 4 142087 16/ 5 , 137511 15/8 
Transport 17506 2/1 . 18588 2/2 18570 2/1 
Communics tions : 28 65 0/3 2733 0/ 3 . 3213 0,4 
Trade anc public catering , , 359357 42/7 372836 43/ 3 386110 44/5 
Wholesale; trade of produce 14 5 9,3- 1.7 14268 . 1.7 13214 1./5 ^ 
for prodi:iction-and'-technic.al 
purposes 
Information and computer ■ . 6167, 0/7 6355 0/7 , 5201 0/6 
services 
Real est£.te transactions . 3859 0/5 4625 0/5 5865 0,7. 
General c:ommercial. activity 
to suppoi■t market '35 919: 4/3 35955 . 4.2 , 35244 4/0 
performarLce 
Other kir[ds of activity in 
sphere of: material 17397 .. 2,1 17236 2/0 18890 2/2 
producticyn' ' 
Housing smd communal 2797 . 0/3 3949. 0/5 5062 0 / 6 
services 
Kfon-produiction services 
rendered to . households. 10190 1/2 ■ 11252. . 1.3 9152 . 1,1 
Public heialth 11008 1.3 15385 1.8 . 17239 2.0 . 
EducatiorL 6655 0/8 695 6 0/8 , 6668 0/8 
Culture £md art 6-4 8 8 0/ 8 7 94 8 0.9 8114 0./9 
Science £md, scientific ; 4 6710 .5/5 ■ 43818- 5/1 38812 4/5 
service 
Finance credit/, insurance/ 10773 1/3 . 7 839 0/9 7494 0/9 
pension slecurity 
Other kirids of activity in. 
sphere of1 non-material ■8726 1.0 : 2524 0/3 1766 0/2 
productic)n ■ , 
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TABLE 11. STRUCTURE OF PRIVATIZED ENTERPRISES (ENTITIES) BY OWNERSHIP
 
TYPES AND PRIVATIZATION METHODS in 1993 - 1997
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
 
Number of privatized enterprises 42924 21905 10152 4997 2743
 
(entities)f total .
 
Includinc ■ by ownership types^^:
 
Municipal 26340 11108 6960 3354 1821 . 
Of th^ subjects of the Russian 9521 ■ 5112 1317 715 548 
Federation
 
7063 5685 1875 928 374
Federal
 
Structurej of privatized enterprises
 
(entitiesi) by privatization 100 100 100 100 100
 
methods^ in per cent to .total:.
 
Auctic)ning 31,1 44,8 27,7 22,5 18,1,
 
Sales in auctions 6,3 4.4 4,2 3,9 5,5
 
Coinmeircial competition 3.0,4 24,0 15,9 8.9 9,6
 
Invest:ment competition 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.7 0,5
 
Redem )^tion of leased property 29,5 20,8 29,8 32,1 14,6
 
Sales of property of winding-up^
 
windeci-up enterprises and 0,4 1.5 4.2 5,7 9,1
 
const:ruction projects in process
 
Sales of real estate 15,4 22,9 38,5
 
. Sales of land 0,6 1.5 2,6
 
Othert 1.0 3,3 1.1 1.8 1.5
 
129,5 thbs. enterprises (entities) exchanged their ownership types in
 
1992 - i497.
 
As of the date of privatization.
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TABLE 12!. STRUCTURE OF PRIVATIZED ENTERPRISES (ENTITIES) BY OWNERSHIP
 
TYPES ANb ERIVATTZAT.ION METHODS in 1998 ■ 
1 • ■ ■ ■ 
I
 
Number cjf privatized enterprises (entities), total
 
Incliiding by ownership types^':
 
Municipal
 
Of the subjects of the Russian Federation
 
Federal
 
Structufe of privatized enterprises (entities) by
 
privatization methods, in per cent to-total:
 
Sales of. state.and municipal property:
 
Irl auction , \
 
Iri commercial competition
 
Including:.
 
with investment and social conditions
 
. WIth investment conditions
 
Wilth social conditions
 
Redemption of property granted on lease:
 
. . leaseholder according to lease agreement
 
means of transforming in open type joint - stock
 
cdmpany with right on priority,acquisition of shares by
 
leaseholder , ■ 
Sales of.property of winding-up and winded-up enterprises
 
Sales of real estate-

Sales of land plots in property complex of privatized 
enterprises 
Sales of enterprises - debtors ■ 
Sales of shares of open type joint - stock companies 
established by p.rivatization:. 
T(:) employees of company
 
l!1 specialized auction
 
Iranistorming state and municipal enterprises in open type
 
joini: - stock.companies with fixed 100 per cent of shares
 
in sijate o,r municipal ownership
 
Incliasion of state and municipal property in kind of
 
contjribution in authorized capitals of economic companies
 
Alieilation of state- (municipal) own shares of open type
 
joini:- stock companies, established in result of
 
privcitization by owners of state (municipal) securities,
 
cert:Lfying the right on acquisition of these shares
 
As of the date of privatization.
 
2129
 
1544
 
321
 
264.
 
. 100
 
3,8
 
4.1 .
 
3,1
 
6,8
 
0,3
 
5,6
 
47,6
 
4.0
 
0.4
 
-9,6
 
1,6

o
 
o
 
0,85
Ul
 
0,1
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TABLE 13. j PRODUCTION PRICE.INDICES FOR PRODUCTION MEANS, INTERMEDIATE
 
AND CONSUMER GOODS IN % TO THE END OF PERIOD.
 
In total Including
 
To the To Capital goods Intermediate Consumer goods
 
E
)revious December goods
 
period of the To the To To the To To the To
 
previous previous December previous December previous December
 
year period of the period of the period of the
 
previous previous previous
 
year year year
 
'. 1 1999
 
January | 106,9 106,9 108,1 108,1 104,8 104,8 10-9,8 109,8
 
February j 105,6 112,9 102,6 110,9 105,6 110,7 106,8 117,3
 
March 103,9 117,2 105,2 116,6 104,5 115,7 102,8 120,5
 
Quarter Ij 117,2 117,2 . 116,6 116,6 115,,7 115,7 120,5 120,5
 
April 1 103,7 121,5 104,9 122,3 103,8 120,1 103,1 124,2
 
May , , ■ j 103,6 125,9 101,8 124,5 103,8 124,7 101,6 . 126,3 
June 103,7 ■ 130,5 103,3 128,6 105,4 131,4 100,3 126,6 
Quarter Ijl ■ 111,4 130,5 110,2 128,6 113,6 131,4 105,1 126,6 
July j . 103,1 134,6 ■ 102,7 ,, 132,0 104,7 137,6 101.,9 129,0 
August I 104,7 141,0 102,5 •135,3 105,4 145,0 102,4 132,2
 
Septembeij 105,,9 7 149,4 104,.6 141,5 107,1 155,3 . 102,0 134,7
 
Quarter 1 114,4 149,4 110,0 141,5 118,2 155,3 106,4 134,7
 
III j 
October 105,5 157,6 ■ 103,5 146,4 106,8 165,9 101,1 136,2 
November I' 103,9 163,7 105,2 ■154,0 104,9 174,1 100, 7 137,2 
December 
!
i 102,2 167,3 ■ 102,3 157, 6 103,1 179,5 100,3 137, 6 
Quarter Iv 112,0 167,3 111, 4 .157,6 115,6 179,5. 102,2 137, 6 
■ ■ , - 1 ■ ' ■ ■ 2000 ■ 
January j 104, 0 ■104,0 : 106,1 106,1 103,-9 103, 9 99, 6 99,6 
Februaryj . 103,7 . , .107,9 10-5,6 112,1 103,7 107,7 100,5 100,0 
March' | . 
1 ■ 102, 6 11.0, 7 103„2 115, 7 102,7 110,6 100,5 100, 6 
Quarter I , 110,7 1 110,7 115,7 115,7 110, 6 110,6 ,100,6 100, 6 
April ■ 101,6 .112,4 102,1 118,1 101, 8 112,5 100,7 101,2 
May 101, 7 114,4 101, 8 120,2 101,5 114,2 101,2 102, 4 
June 102,3 117,:0 . 101,3 121,-7 103,0 117,6 101,5 103,9 
Quarter n 105, 7 ■ 117,0 105,2 121, 7 106,4 117, 6 103,3 103,9 
July , . 103,4 121, 0 ^ 102,6 124, 8 103, 4 121,7 102,1 106,1
August j 101,7 123,0 .101,8 127,0 101,5 123,5 101,6 107,8 
September ' ■ 101, 9 125,3 .101,7 129,2 101, 6 125,5 102,8 110, 9 
Quarter j . 107,1 ■ ■ 125,3 106,2 12.9,2 106,7 ,125,5 106, 6 110, 9 
Ill ■ 1 ■ 
October! 102, 7 128,7 101,5 131,1 103, 6 , 129,9 103,4 114,6 
November 
. ■ I ■ 
, ■ ■ 1 ■ ■ • 101,2 130,3 101,1 132,5 101,.0^ ' 131,3 102., 2 117,1 
December 101, 0 131,6 . 101,0 133, 9 100, 9 132,4 100,4 117,6 
Quarter IV 105, 0 131, 6 .103., 6 133, 9 105,6 132,4 106,1 117, 6 
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TABLE 14i. CONSUMER- PRICE INDICES.
 
Consumer Including
 
I
 { price index.
 
i '
 
1
 
Non-food Paid services
To the To Food
 
1
 
1 previous December
 Stuffs Goods For the
 
j1
 period of the
 
1
 population

1
 
1
 previous
j To the To To the To To the To
 
i year previous December previous December previous December
 
1
 
1
 
1
 period of the period of the period of the
 
1 previous previous previous
1
 
i ,
 
. ! year year year 
! . 1999 
January I 108,4 108,4 ■ 110,3 110,3 106,2 106,2 104,1 104,1 
February 104,1 112,9 104,4 115,1 104,0 110,4 103,2 107,4 
March i 102,8 116,0 102,8 118,3 103,2 114,0 101,9 109,5 
1 
QuarterjI 116,0 116,0 118,3 118,3 114,0 114,0 109,5 109,5 
April i 103,0. 119,5 102,6 121,4 104,0 118,6 103,1 112,9 
May 102,2 . 122,2 102,0 123,8 102,7 121,8 102,1 115,3 
June 101,9 124,5 101,7 126,0 101,6 123,7 103,5 119,3 
Quarter II 107,3 124,5 106,4 126,0 108,6 123,7 109,0 119,3 
July 1 102,8 128,0 103,2 130,0 101,9 126,1 103,1 123,1 
August i 101,2 129,5 100,5 130,5 , 102,4 129,1 101,9 125,5 
September 101,5 131,4 100,8 131,6 102,7 132,6 102,0 128,0 
Quarter 105,6 131,4 104,5 131,6 107,2 132,6 107,2 128,0 
III 1 
October 101.,4 133,2 100,9 132,7 102,2 135,5 102,0 130,6 
Novembpr' 101,2 134,8 101,0 134,0 101,5 137,6 101,7 132,8 
December 101,3 136,5 101,4 135,9 101,1 139,2 100,9 134,0 
Quarte,'r IV 103,9 136,5 103,3 135,9 104,9 139,2 104,7 134,0 
1 . 2000 
Januaty 102,3 102,3 102,2 102,2 102,2 102,2 103,4 103,4 
February 101,0 103,4 100,5 102,6­ 101,3 103,5 103,0 106,4 
March| 100,6 104,1 100,1 102,7 101,4 105,0 101,5 108,0 
Quarter I 104,1 104,1 102,7 1.02,7 105,0 105,0 108,0 108,0 
Aprilj 100,9 105,0 .100,3 .103,0 101,5 106,5 102,1 110,3 
May ■ j 101,8 106,8 102,2 105,3 101,1 107,7 101,3 111,8 
June 102,6 109,5 103,3 108,7 100,8 108,6 103,0 115,2 
Quarter II 105,3 109,5 105,8 108,7 103,5 108,6 106,6 115,2 
July 10.1,8 111,5 101..,8 110,6 100,8 109,5 103,8 119,5 
August 101,0 112,6 100,3 110,9 101,4 111,0 103,0 123,1 
September 101,3 114,1 100,6 111,6 102,1 113,3 102,8 . 126,5 
Quarter 104,1 ,114,1 ■ ., . 102,7 111,6 104,3 113,3 109,8 126,5 
III i 
OctojDer 102,1, 116,5; 102,1 114,0 . 101,9 115,4 102,4 129,5 
November ,101,5 11.8,2 . 101,5 . 115,7 101,5 117,1 101,6 131,6 
December ;101,6 120,2 101,9 117,9 101,2 118,5 101,6 133,7 
Quarter IV 105,4 120,2 105,6 117,9 104,6 118,5 ■ 105,7 133,7 
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TABLE 15. CONSOLIDATED BUDGET DEFICIT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
 
(in per cent to GDP)
 
12 -r
 
n ..
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 
TABLE 16. MAIN INDICATORS OF PRIMARY MARKET OF STATE SHORT-TERM BONDS
 
(GKO) AND FEDERAL LOAN BONDS (OFZ)
 
(according to data of Bank of Russia; trillion rubles)
 
1993 1994 1995^' 1996 1997 1998 
bin. 
rubles 
Emission volume 0,2 20,5 171,0 479,0 605,5 353,5 
Allocation volume (by face 0,2 17,5 140,4 399,7 449,1 225,5 
value) 
Revenues from sales 0,2 12,9 106,2 297,2 386,5 169,6 
Drawings of funds into 0,2 5,7 11,0 15,4 6,9 -39,9 
budget 
1) Starting from June 1995, the Minfin of Russia began placing federal
 
loan bonds
 
TABLE 17. STRUCTURE OF MONEY SUPPLY^'
 
(at beginning of year; trillion rubles)
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 
bin. bin.
 
rubles rubles
 
288,3 374,1
 
Money supply eluding: 33,2 97,8 220,8 295,2 384,5 452,5
 
Disposable money off banking 13,3 36,5 80,8 103,8 130,4 187,8
 
system
 
184,5 243,7
 
Deposit money 19,9 61,3 140,0 191,4 254,1 264,7
 
Data as of beginning 1996, as well as in denominator as of beginning
 
1997 and 1998 are calculated according to methodology adopted the
 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation in 1996; date in numerator and
 
as of beginning 1999 are calculated according to methodology adopted in
 
1998, without recording date for credit organizations with revoked
 
license.
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TABLE 18.j GROUPING OF FUNCTIONING CREDIT ORGANIZATIONS ACCORDING TO
 
SIZE. OF ilEGISTERED AUTHORIZED CAPITAL^'
 
(at begiijining of year)
 
•' . ■ 1 1998 1999 
Number ojf functioning credit 1697 1476
 
organiza.ltions, total
 
Includirig size of authorized capital:
 
Up to 500 thos. rubles 198 ,
 90
 
From 1500 thos. to 2 min. rubles 284 173 
Fromj2 to 5 mIn. rubles 327 219 
From; 5 to 10 mIn. rubles 345 335 
From,' 10 to 20 mIn. rubles 255 245 
From! 20 to 40 mIn. rubles. ■ 156 213 
. Frod '40 mIn. rubles and over 132 201 
1) Authorized capital the size of which has been paid by participants,
 
inclluded in By-rules of credit organization
 
TABLE 19. PROFITS OF FNTFRPRISFS AND ORGANIZATIONS BY MAIN ECONOMY^S
 
BRANCHES
 
(bin. rubles)
 
1992 1993 1994 1995^^ 1996^^ I997I) 1998 
j 
mIn. 
1 
ruble 
1 
s 
Profits, losses (-) 5623 40763 80443 250599 124989 173998 
in ecbnomy 34632 
In,binding by ,
 
brianches:
 
Industry 4015 27160 52706 154458 84143 90254 -4706
 
Agriculture 433 3062 -318 1345 -22847 -26817
 
1
 34986
 
Construction 249 3119 9408 22718 21545 17410 7478
 
Transport 243 3658 9323 30140 17483 28697 25495
 
Communications 26 398 1858 6964 7889 11058 4793
 
Tradb and public 127 , 1175 1172 14629 . 7532, 11388
 
cate,fing 17417
 
Wholjesale trade with 
goods for p.roduction- 120 777 1732 5569 2541 ■ 3108 -800 
and-itechnical 
purposes
 
Housing and communal 18 459 1799 . 2280 706. -2922
 
utilities 13501
 
Other branches 392 955 2763 12496 5997 41822 -988
 
1) According to accounting data.
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TJiBLE 20.I NUMBER OF LOSS-MAKING ENTERPRISES AND ORGANIZATIONS AND SUMS OF
 
LOSSES BYjECONOMY'S BRANCHES
 
1.995'' . 1996'^ , 19'97'' ■ 1998 
•Number	 Total Number Total Number Total "Number ■ Total 
of losses, of loss- losses, of loss- losses, •of loss-'losses, 
loss- blnr making bin. making, bin, • making ■b.ln. 
rnak.ing rubles enter rubles enter- , rubles enter rubles . 
enter prises prises prises 
prises • 
Total , j : 45159 37151. 6980.4 113504 714 92 135015~^ 64 4.4 0 274316 
Industryj 6985 12770 11809 45382 12510 53255 12084 ■ .139278 
"including:" ^ 
Elect.rid pov.^er 
industry • ■ . ■ . 115 456 199 . , 1523 201 : 10 69 . . 283" 2687 
Fue1 industry, 177 2425 209 57 99 .27 6 87-42 " .325 .. 28134 
Out of vjjhlch-: 
Oil ext.taction 23' 14 88 23 1801 .35 ■ . .2556' 63 ■ 13816 
Oil ref.ining. ■ .1 ■ ■ 0,0 7 197 14' , • . 959" .. ■ 19 ... .. ■ 7 963 
Gas Vj ■ ■ : 3, 142 ■ ■ 4 2 64., , 10. 1184 17 1656 • 
Coal j 1.2-4 771 , 130 3520 161 • . 3956 ■ ■17 0 . 4 67 0 
Ferrous,' 40 2 65 ■ 91 2780 . 120 4585 - • 123 10598 
metallulrgy 
Non- f^'rrous 
metallurgy • 1-4 4 7 4 7 . 244­ 4366 2 65 3655 223 , 8151 
Chemical and 
petrochemical 
industpy 101 1215­ •238 5375 270 ■ 5932 306 12195 
Machine-building.. 
and mental 1721 • 32 65,: 2853 10Q12 2965 11342 2920 37918 
cutting 
Logg1n'g, wood­
workin'g, pulp-
and-paper 108 1112 1844 6929 1962 7721 ■1815 11674 
industry 
Building, 
materials 604 533 986 1614 1091 2066 1167 2 930 
industry 
Light 1 industry , ■ 1519 1302 . 2247 2037 2127 .2385 1904 2641 
Food industry : 896 1092 1859 3936 2157 4495 2157 20249 
Agriculture 15333 8669 ■ 21862 28972 22069 35193 22565 39087 
Const|ruction 2061 820 4767 3471 4833 4989 4497 7417 
Transiport 2117 2744 3 655 13143. 3659 12678 3635 14742 
Communications 198 ■ 131 238 333. 255 3 67 451 6685 
Tradd and public 
catering 8789 3485 13553 6318 12240 6901 9201 29284 
Wholesale trade 
withjgoods for 
prodiiiction-and­
technical 674 1743 1254 2021 1321 930 1179 5051 
purposes 
Housing and 
coimmjunal 3210 4736 4644 958.2 4867 15495 6226 21003 
utilities 
Othdr branches 5792 2053 8022 4282 9738 5202 4602 11769 
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TABLE 21. CHANGES IN OFFICIAL RATE OF RUSSIAN ROUBLE
 
AS RELATED TO US DOLLAR
 
(at end of month)
 
Rate Rate
 
Ruble/US In per Ruble/ In per
 
dollar cent to US cent
 
previous dollar to
 
month previo
 
us
 
month
 
1992 May 5773 100,2
 
December 415 June 5782 100,2
 
1993 Julv 5798 100,3
 
December 1247 102,7 August 5830 100,6
 
1994 September 5860 100,5
 
December 3550 109,8 October 5887 100,5
 
1995 November 5919 100,5
 
DecemJoer 4640 101,3 December 5960 100,7
 
1996 1998^>
 
January 4732 102,0 January 6,026 101,1
 
February 4815 101,8 February 6,072 100,8
 
March 4854 100,8 March 6,106 100,6
 
April 4932 101,6 April 6,133 100,4
 
May 5014 101,7 May 6,164 100,5
 
June 5108 101,9 June 6,198 100,6
 
July 5191 101,6 July 6,238 100,6
 
August 5345 103,0 August 7,905 126,7
 
September 5396 100,9 Septem±)er 16,065 203,2
 
October 5455 101,0 October 16,010 99,7
 
November 5511 101,0 November 17,880 111,7
 
December 5560 100,9 December 20,650 115,5
 
1997 1999
 
January 5629 101,2 January 22,60 109,4
 
February 5676 100,8 February 22,86 101,2
 
March 5726 100,9 March 24,18 105,8
 
April 5762 100,6
 
Since 1998 considering the change in nominal cost of Russian
 
banknotes, effective since January 1, 1998.
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TABLE 22.!SHARE,OF POPULATION DEPOSITS IN THE SAVING BANK OF RUSSIA AND
 
COMMERCIAL BANKS IN TOTAL INDIVIDUAL DEPOSITS IN BANKS
 
(as of first, day of month; in per .cent)
 
□Sm'mg Bank of Russiwi ?aCorfimefeia§ banks 
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TABLE 23. STRUCTURE VOF. MONEY INCOMES-OF; HOUSEHOLDS, 
(in per cent to-' ■total) - . 
January-March 1998 January-March 1999 
lEIllllillllllllll^^ 
,'•2' 15.0 
/ntv-y 
5,1 ..„nptn;X 5.1 /\^
In;;; -i", .-•'''1 
15,4\ —- .3 i6.o\ 
\ ^ ' V':iii"/7®2.9 
i'Vii' jf 
0^^ 
1Labour remuneration, including hided wages 
m Social transfers 
El Property incomes 
1Entrepreneurial income 
□Others incomes 
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TABLE 24. REFINANCING RATES 01:' CENTRAL■ BANK. OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
' 2- ■:Period, in Effect Period in Effect %. 
Jan. 1, 19?1 - Apr. 9, 1992 . 20 July 24, 1996 - Aug. 18, 1996 110. 
Apr. 10, 1992 - May 2.2, ,1992 .. ' . 50 Aug.' . 19, 1996 - Oct. 20, 1996 80 
May 23, 19,92 March 2 9, 1993 .80 Oct^. 21, 1996 - Dec. 1, 1996 60 
March 30, ,1993 - June 1, 19 93 ■ 100 Dec. 2, 1996 -Feb. 9, 1997 48 
June 2, 1993 - June 21, 1993 . 110 Feb. 10, 1997 - Apr. 27, 1,997 42 
June 22,' 19 93 - June 2 3, 19 93 • 120 Apr. 28, 1997 -, June 15, 1997 36 
June 29, .1993 - July 14, 1993 140 June'16, 1997 - Oct.- 05, 1997 24 . 
July 15, 1993 -Sept. 22, 1993 • 170 Oct. 06, 1997 - Nov. ."10, 1997 21 
Sept.- 23,1 1993 - Got". 14, 1993 180 Nov. 11, 1997 - Feb. ,1, 1998 . 28 
Oct. 15, il993'~ Apr. 28, 1994 210 Feb. 2; 1.998 - Feb. 16,. 1998 42 
Apr, 29, 11994 - May 16, 1994 205 Feb. 11f 1998 - March 1, 1998 39 
May 17, i994 - .-June .1, 1994 200 March 2, 1998 - March 15, 1998 36 
June 2, 1994 - June 21, 1994 185 March 16, 1998 - May 18, 1998 30 
June 22, j 1994 - June 29, 1994 170 May 19, 1998 - May 26, ,1998 . 50 
June 30,! 1^94 - July 31, 1994 155' May 27, 1998 - June 4, 1998 150 , 
CO 
Aug. 1, [1994 - Aug. .22, 1994 150 June 5, 1998 - June 28, 1998 60 
]CnAug. 23j. ,1994 - Oct. 11, 1994 130 June 29, 1998 ,- July 23, 1998 80 
Oct. 12i 1994 Nov. 16, 1994 170- July 24, 1998 - June 9, 1999 . 60 
1 , . ■ June 10, 1999 - January 23, , 
Nov. iv!, 19 94 - Jan. 5, 1995 180 2000 55 . 
Jan. 6,! 1995 - May 15, 1995 200 January 24, 2000 - March 6, 2000 45 
May. 16,1 19 95 - June 18, 1995 195 March 7, 2000 - March 20, 2000 38 
June 19, 1995 - Oct. 23, 1995 180 March 21, 2000 - July 9, 2000 33 
Oct. 24, 1995 - Nov. 30, 1995 170 July 10, 2000 -,November 3, 2000 28 
Dec. 1^^ 1995 - Feb. 9, 1996 160 November 4, 2000 - 25 
Feb. lb, 1996 - July 23, 1996 120 
TABLE 125. INTEREST RATES (IN% PER ANNUM) IN 2000. 
i 
1 Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Get Nov 
Interbank Rate^ 11.8 11.3 6.5 11.1 7.6 5.1 ,3.4 4.6 3.3 5.2 8.5 
GKOs Yield ■ — ■ — 17 .2 14. 9 11.4 13.1 . 12. 9 10.0 10. 6 11.3 12.2 
OBRs |Yield^ . —. — , — — - . — — - - -
Deposit Rate^ 13.4, 7.9 7 . 6 5.4 7.3 7.2 6.4 5.1 4.6 4.4 4.6 
Credit Rate^ 34. 31.3 29.2 25.5 23 22.7 20. 9 20.5 20 18.1 
1) Interbank Rate - an average-weighted rate on .. overnight interbank credits in 
the Moscov\^ market.
 
2) GKOs Yield - an average-weighted GKOs yield by volume and terms of
 
circulation with maturities of up to 90 days.
 
3) QBRs Yield - an average-weighted by volume and terms of circulation.
 
4) Deposit Rate - an average-weighted rate on deposits of private individuals
 
in credit institutions (including Sberbank). for a term of up to one year.
 
5) ! Credit Rate - an average-weighted rate on legal entities* credits in
 
c,redit institutions (including Sberbank) for a term of up to one year. 
222 
- - - -
- - - - - - - -
CO
 
t—1
 
X—1
 
TABLE 26. INTEREST RATES (INs PER ANNUM) IN 1933.
 
1999
 
Jan F'eb iMarchApril May June Julv Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
 
Interbank Rate^'28.1 20.4 20.F 15.2 7.1 8.4 9 9.3 18.2 16,1 13.211.8
 
— — — - - -
GKOs Yield 33.4 30,7 27.4 20.2 16
 
...
 
— — — — — — — - -
OBRs Yield^' 31.918.4
 
Deposit Rate^' 24.222.8 18.9 14.6 14.7 11 12.6 8.8 9.7 9.0 9.4 8.5
 
Credit Rate^' 45.544.1 45.7 43.8 43.532.238.938.5 37.8 37.038.331.3
 
TABLE 25. INTEREST RATES (IN% PER ANNUM) IN 1998.
 
1998
 
Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
 
Interbank Rate^'24.130.3 25.9 29.5 47.6 56.1 58.8 45.3139.7 84.936.7 27.8
 
GKOs Yield 29.4 26.4 22.2 25 43.9 51.3 58 84.2
 
OBRsYield^' 80.1 54.940.8 48.1
 
Deposit Rate^' 11.612.2 11.2 11 12.9 14 15.1 17.5 23.8 27.322.3 25.7
 
Credit Rate^' 29.8 30.4 38.3 38.8 40.4 48 44.948.6 46.8 49 44.8 41.7
 
TABLE 25. INTEREST RATES (IN% PER ANNUM) IN 1997.
 
1997
 
Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
 
Interbank Rate^'21.125.8 32.4 28.2 14.8 16.1 14.316.215.618.220.528.4
 
GKO Yield 29.125.4 29.3 31.3 23.2 18.7 17.217.618.318.320.7 32
 
Credit Rate 4) 44.246.1 41.6 32.5 34.0 28.5 28.828.324.824.023.028.5
 
Deposit Rate^' 30.226.8 18.3 18 17.3 17.1 16.615.4 10.3 9.5 9.9
 
1) Interbank Rate - an average-weighted rate on overnight interbank
 
credits in the Moscow market.
 
2) GKOs Yield - an average-weighted GKOs yield by volume and terms of
 
circulation with maturities of up to 90 days.
 
3) OBRs Yield - an average-weighted by volume and terms of circulation.
 
4) Deposit Rate - an average-weighted rate on deposits of private
 
individuals in credit institutions (including Sberbank) for a term of
 
up to one year.
 
Credit Rate - an average-weighted rate on legal entities' credits in
 
credit institutions (including Sberbank) for a term of up to one year.
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TABLE 26. LABOR FORCES IN 1999.
 
Economically Including
 
active population Unernployea,
 
oficially
 
registered in the
 
employment
 
Employed Oriemployed services
 
Mln In % to the Min In % to the Mln In % to the
 Mln In % to the
 
people correspondi people correspondi people correspondi people correspondi
 
ng ng ng ng 
period of period of period of period of 
the the the the 
previous previous previous previous 
year year year year 
1999 
January 73,3 101,1 63,2 98,4 10,1 122,3 1,9 98,4 
February 73,6 101,7 63,2 98,8 10,4 123,2 2,0 98,6 
March 73,5 101,7 63,5 99,5 10,0 118,7 1,9 98,0 
Quarter I 
(on the 
average 
in a 
month) 73,5 101,5 63,3 98,9 10,2 121,4 1,9 98,3 
April 73,4 101,7 63,8 100,2 9,6 113,2 1,8 95,3 
May 73,3 101,8 64,2 100,8 9,1 110,0 1,7 92,7 
June 73,3 101,9 64,5 101,1 8,8 109,2 1,6 89,0 
Quartern 
(on the 
average 
in a 
month) 73,3 101,8 64,2 100,8 9,2 110,8 1,7 92,4 
July 73,3 102,1 64,6 101,4 8,7 107,0 1,5 84,8 
August 73,3 102,1 64,6 101,7 8,7 104,9 1,4 81,1 
September 73,2 101,7 64,4 101,6 8,8 102,3 1,3 76,3 
Quarter 
III (on 
the 
average 
in a 
month) 73,3 101,9 64,5 101,6 8,7 104,7 1,4 80,8 
October 73,2 101,4 64,3 101,6 8,9 100,5 1,3 70,9 
November 73,2 100,7 64,1 101,3 9,1 96,8 1,3 67,5 
December 72,9 99,9 64,0 101,1 8,9 91,5 1,3 65,5 
Quarter 
IV 
(on the 
average 
in a 
month) 73,1 100,7 64,1 101,3 9,0 96,1 1,3 67,9 
Year 73,3 101,5 64,0 100,6 9,3 107,9 1,6 85,1 
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TABLE 27. LABOR FORCES IN 2000.
 
Economically Including
 
active population Unemployed,
 
oficially
 
registered in the
 
Employed Unemployed employment services
 
Mln In % to the Mln In % to the M].n In % to Mln In % to the
 
the
 
people corresponding people correspondi people correspond people corresponding
 
ng ing 
period of the period of period of period of the 
the the 
previous year previous previous previous year 
year year 
2000 
January 72,5 98,9 63,8 100,9 8,7 86,4 1,2 63,7 
February 72,1 98,0 63,5 100,5 8,6 82,5 1,2 62,8 
March 72,1 98,1 63,9 100,6 8,2 81,3 1,2 62,6 
Quarter I 
(on the 
average 
in a 
month) 72,2 98,2 63,7 100,6 8,5 83,4 1,2 63,1 
April 72,2 98,4 64,4 100,9 7,8 81,0 1,2 62,3 
May 72,2 98,5 64,8 100,9 7,4 81,2 1,1 61,8 
June 72,3 98,6 65,0 100,8 7,3 82,5 1,0 63,3 
Quarter 
II 
(on the 
average 
in a 
month) 72,2 98,5 64,7 100,8 7,5 81,6 1,1 62,4 
July 72,3 98,6 65,1 100,8 7,2 82,6 1,0 66,0 
August 72,3 98,6 65,2 100,9 7,1 81,5 1,0 69,3 
September 72,3 98,8 65,1 101,2 7,2 81,4 1,0 72,3 
Quarter 
III 
(on the 
average 
in a 
month) 72,3 98,6 65,1 100,9 7,1 81,8 1,0 69,1 
October 72,3 98,8 65,1 101,2 7,2 80,7 1,0 75,5 
November 72,4 99,3 65,0 101,6 7,4 81,0 1,0 79,3 
Note. The total number of the unemployed for the period since May 2000 has
 
been adjusted based on the survey results for August 2000.
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TABLE 28. COST OF LIVINC 
(average per capita) 
19991998 
March|April| May | June | July |Auqust| Sept lOctcbiNovmb] Dec Jan 1 Febr jMarch 
rubles 
Total 427, 4 431, 9 434, 9 435,5 438, 4 449,7 552, 0 572, 9 618, 5 716,8 786, 9 829,1 856, 8 
population 
including: " 
working-
age 480, 7 485, 8 489,2 469, 9 493, 1 505, 8 620, 9 644, 4 695,7 806,2 8 60, 0 906,1 936,4 
pensioners 301, 3 304, 5 306, 6 307, 0 309,1 317, 0 38 9,2 403, 9 436, 0 505,3 558, 7 588,7 608, 4 
children 431, 7 436,2 439,2 439,8 442, 8 454,1 557,5 578, 6 624, 6 723, 9 787,2 829, 5 857,2 
The cost of living has been estimated on the basis of the methodology adopted 
by the Ministry of Labor of the Russian Federation on November 10, 1992. In 
accordance with the Federal Law of October 24, 1997 H' 134-FL "On cost of living 
in the Russian Federation" presently the new procedure has been developed for 
determining the size of cost of living. 
TABLE 29, POVERTY LEVEL CHANGE RATE 
37,7 
28, 55,2 
24,2 
22,4 20,7 20,5 21,2 19,9 
22,5 22,4 
24,9 
41.6 
35.9 36,6 
E 30 - 33,2 
30,6 30,4 
32,4 31,2 31,2 
29,3 
33,0 32,8 
II III IV I II III 
quarters 1997 19981996 1999 
3Number of population with money incomes lower than the cost of living 
"Share of population with money incomes lower than the cost of living in total population 
TABLE 30. STRUCTURE OF CAPITAL INVESTMENTS BY OWNERSHIP TYPES 
14,6% 16,2% 
85,4% 83 8% 
1998 1999 
nState □Non-state 
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TABLE 31. COUNTRIES WITH 	THLhLARGESTJN^ INTO RUSSIANS ECONOMY;
 
Accumulated at.end.of.the In reference.i
 
"first quarter invested
 
■ Million,. US In per cent in the first 
dollars	 , to total'. ■ quarter, 
mLillion US 
1
dollars
 
1\100.6 1006, iNC investments^ total . ,	 26019. 100 1556
 
Germany	 6344 24,4 239
 
USA-. ■ ■ ;■■ ■ I - -: • ^ i" . 5058 ■ 19,4 357 
UK ylj-: • • 3446 , 13,2 1.84 
France ■ | 3237, ■ . 12,4 43 ■ 
Cyprus J ' 3022 11,6 202 
Italy ' 1 616 .. 6 
Netherlands ■ 469 . . 67 
Sweden j- 372 ■1,4 ■ 18 . 
Japan .|\ 336 1,3 .8 
Finland '	 ■ 297 44 
TABLE 32. CHANGE, in: US' DOLLAR -EXeHANGE' RATE AND CONSUMER' PRICES INDEX 
(in : pei: ' cent to previous month) 
00 
205 1 
135 ­ □Official US dollar exchange rate (at end of month> 
185 EConsumer Prices Index 
175 ­
165 ­
155 ­
145 
135 
125 ­
T- 1Pv. 
115 -	 lO r—aZ pw <n	 ■Cj «0 If> P r- <£r 01 
O O O O O O P O9 S 
o o §§
' D	 p
o o O O105 ­ T- T- T- T- T- T- T- tt 
fY] [ flj 1 jT]	 
j months 
_rJ—t—L_35	 r ' ' ' 1 ' ' 
12 2 iiiiiiBli 4 6	 11 12lllili 
1997	 1998 
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TABLE 33. REMAINDERS OF POPC;?l,ATION DEPOSITS
 
IN BANKS IN 1998
 
(at beginning of montl\)
 
13S
 
119.3 1235 
 1175
 
120
 'X.. .... 
105 "" "5J 113» 
1092
 
90
 
75
 
1 60
 
■9 
^45-1 34,0 37,1 38,8 39,1 37,7 
30 35,7 38,1 
33,0 
26,9 .
15 24,4 233
 
0 
S ^ tt fe 5 Id !rI r 111. II I ^ ^
 ^ -9 ^ < 5 S S
 
t 2 a
 
Saxing Bank of Russia (Sbertxank) 
In commercial banks 
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TABLE, 34. NUMBER OF OPERATING CREDIT ORGANIZATIONS AND IHEIR BRANCHES
 
(WITHOUT SBERBANK AND VNESFiEKONOMBANK) 
No. of 
No. of branches 
operating 
No. of 
No. of opened by 
As of credit Sberbank credit 
organizati 
branches 
outlets organizations 
ons in CIS 
countries 
Jan. 1 1996 2,295 5,581 38,567 40 
Feb. 1 1996 2,285 5,542 38,567 39 
Mar. 1 1996 2,275 5,533 38,567 31 
Apr. 1 1996 2,268 5,514 34,426 30 
May 1, 1996 2,266 5,505 34,426 30 
June 1 1996 2,172 5,312 34,426 22 
July 1 1996 2,154 5,297 34,426 21 
Aug. 1 1996 2,141 5,245 34,426 21 
Sep. 1 1996 2,120 5,218 34,426 21 
Get. 1 1996 2,090 5,193 34,426 18 
Nov. 1 1996 2,073 5,135 34,426 18 
Dec. 1 1996 2,053 5,114 34,426 16 
Jan. 1 1997 2,029 5,123 34,426 14 
Feb. 1 1997 2,025 5,100 34,426 13 
Mar. 1 1997 2,005 5,078 34,426 13 
Apr. 1 1997 1,936 4,933 34,426 14 
May 1, 1997 1,887 4,828 34,426 14 
June 1 1997 1,872 4,781 34,426 14 
July 1 1997 1,841 4,741 34,426 12 
Aug. 1 1997 1,808 4,672 34,426 12 
Sep. 1 1997 1,789 4,618 34,426 10 
Oct. 1 1997 1,764 4,577 34,426 9 
Nov. 1 1997 1,739 4,549 34,426 8 
Dec. 1 1997 1,719 4,508 34,426 5 
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